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ABSTRACT   
There is a lack of attention towards the process of recovery in U.S. schools 
despite their vulnerability to natural and intentional threats with the potential of creating 
mass casualties.  By promoting resilience as a component of recovery as similarly 
modeled in Israel and the UK, the U.S. can empower children and the at-large 
community, enabling a quicker recovery.  Case studies from past mass casualty incidents 
from a variety of threat mechanisms involving schools were analyzed to assess (1) time 
criticality, (2) lack of information sharing, (3) family reunification, (4) lockdown 
considerations, and (5) first responder considerations.  Regardless of threat mechanism, 
most variables will factor in a school’s ability to recover, including the reality that the 
longer the exposure to the trauma, the greater the psychosocial impact and greater 
difficulty in recovery.  
School administrators and first responders, primarily from public health and law 
enforcement, should collaborate on efforts in the pre-event phase to mitigate both 
physical and psychological impacts from trauma.  The success of fire prevention 
education has promoted resilience for decades. Similar strategies should focus on all 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A.  PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Despite effective prevention and preparedness efforts, natural or manmade mass 
casualty incidents involving schools will occur in the U.S.  Yet, there remains an apathy 
and lack of commitment to prepare children for the disaster’s aftermath and the 
consequential psychosocial impact on society as a whole in the U.S. 
The events of 9/11 demonstrated the vulnerability of soft targets from asymmetric 
terror attacks, including schools.  Relatively new to modern day terrorism, Americans are 
still unaware of how far terrorists are willing to go to inflict large body counts and 
dramatically affect the psyche of American society.  No place is this vulnerability greater 
than in America’s schools, which is why coupled with the uncertainty of terrorism 
attacks, schools should prepare to minimize terrorism affects on the school population.  
One thing is certain: our schools are vulnerable with 53,000,000 plus children – 20 
percent of the total U.S. population attending school or day care.1  
Of primary importance is providing students, school administrators, and the 
community as a whole, the tools to cope with disasters if they occur.  The importance of 
researching preventative efforts cannot be underscored and seeking ways to improve 
emergency drills, plans, and target hardening of schools is encouraged.  However, the 
aim of this thesis is to identify preparedness strategies that will aid in the response and 
recovery of mass casualty incidents, whether they originate from the terrorist, the 
deranged gunman, or natural threats, including fires, floods, tornadoes, hurricanes, or 
pandemic outbreaks.  Children and the schools they attend remain soft targets whether or 
not the threat is intentional.  
                                                 
1 School Safety in the 21st Century: Adapting to New Security Challenges Post-9/11. Report of the 
Conference Schools: Prudent Preparation for a Catastrophic Terrorism Incident, (Washington, D.C.: 
George Washington University, 2004), https://www.llis.dhs.gov/docdetails/details.do?contentID=25708 
(accessed August 29, 2007). 
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B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
Research questions will determine the threat, consider the impact and strengthen 
preparedness.  The research will follow the continuum of questions.   
• What is the multitude of threats that schools may encounter?”   
• What are the critical variables commonly found with school disasters?  
• What are the anticipated psychosocial consequences of incidents involving 
schools?   
• Can the promotion of resiliency aid schools during the preparedness, 
response, and recovery phases of a mass casualty incident? 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Primary sources reviewed include official governmental reports and documents to 
support case studies and interview material.  National and international case studies add 
to the literature on the topic by assessing the threat, the experience, the impact and the 
preparedness of U.S. schools.  Secondary sources demonstrate the current literature on 
the topics, including books, scholarly journals, and opposing viewpoints.  This thesis 
explored research from numerous vocations that have an impact on the issue of school 
preparedness, incident response, and the need for attention to psychosocial recovery.  
Literature from the fields of emergency services, education, foreign government 
practices, and social psychology with an emphasis on children were reviewed.  
Government reports include the Townsend Report that explored the aftermath of 
Hurricane Katrina, and governmental survey of Toronto area residents following the 
SARS scare.  After action reports were developed after the Our Lady of the Angels fire 
(NFPA), and shootings at Platte Canyon, Columbine, and VTU.  The Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA), the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and 
the International Association of Emergency Managers (IAEM), recommend an “all 
hazards” approach. Such an approach requires schools to examine threats that range from 
low to high consequence. Planning, training, and conducting exercises must be integrated  
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into a school’s and community’s emergency response plans.2  U.S. government reports 
may suffice as a corroborating link to the terror experience that others have experienced 
abroad.  
Textbooks, including The Trauma of Terror, Jane’s Safe Schools, and Psychology 
of Terrorism, compiled writings of numerous experts that provided a broad spectrum of 
analysis on the physical and psychological aspects of terrorism.  They also presented 
perspectives on other forms of violence and natural disasters that often concluded with 
recommendations towards an all hazards model of preparedness. 
Relevant to the approach exercised in the research process was the fact that 
prevention is not always an option with regard to manmade and natural disasters.  
Markenson, et al., understood this same approach in the aftermath of 9/11 with their 
Uncommon Sense, Uncommon Courage report on the New York Board of Education’s 
focus on response, and most importantly, recovery.  Focusing on the response and 
recovery allows prevention and preparedness to be woven back into consideration.3   
The psychosocial and psychological impacts of mass casualty incidents were 
primarily found in journals in the field of social science.  Data was gleaned from 
recognized centers including the American Psychiatric Association, the National Center 
for PTSD, the American Academy of Pediatrics, and the Heritage Foundation.  Journals 
focused on school safety and lessons learned from previous school tragedies.  The 
examination of resilience has been explored by numerous authors including Rohan, 
Flynn, Cai, Buckle, Peek, and Markenson.  
With their numerous experiences as disaster victims, the psychological 
strengthening through resilience has helped nations such as the United Kingdom and 
Israel in the recovery process.  International models can teach a great deal because of 
                                                 
2 School Safety in the 21St Century: Adapting to New Security Challenges Post-9/11. Report of the 
Conference Schools: Prudent Preparation for a Catastrophic Terrorism Incident, 7. 
3 Markenson, David, Anne Degnan, and Gregory Thomas. Uncommon Sense, Uncommon Courage: 
How the New York City School System, its Teachers, Leadership, and Students Responded to the Terror of 
September 11. Columbia University: Columbia University. Joseph L. Mailman School of Public Health, 
December 2004, http://www.ncdp.mailman.columbia.edu/files/9_11reportASSESSMENT.pdf (accessed 
November 12, 2007), 4. 
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their personal experience with terrorism and international case studies were referenced 
for school preparedness.  International literature primarily focused on the impact of 
terrorism on specific populations, including children and an emphasis on societal 
psychological resilience.  In fact, resilience was a common theme in many readings. The 
relationship between terrorism and school attacks is scarcely mentioned, except for Israeli 
incidents that could no longer be ignored and the Beslan, Russia massacre.  Israeli 
academia has looked at youth and school violence for more than 30 years. Still, many in 
Israel did not believe school violence was a serious issue until the late 1990s.4  
Other studies have looked at the development of posttraumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD) in post-terror victims.  A long-term follow-up study of adolescent survivors of a 
1974 terrorist attack in Israel indicated that the adjustment in adult years was mediated by 
the extent of the injuries experienced.  Seventeen years after the incident, the severity of 
injuries was positively associated with the symptoms of post-traumatic stress. Four years 
after the 1995 sarin gas attack in Tokyo’s underground system, more than half of the 
survivors still had symptoms consistent with PTSD.5   
In Northern Ireland, a study was conducted on children’s stress in relation to their 
actual exposure to political violence.  A significant correlation was observed between 
exposure to political violence and manifest anxiety.  Specifically, children were more 
likely to report symptoms of anxiety when their friends or relatives were injured or killed 
as a result of the troubles or when they perceived their area to be unsafe.6 
The psychological phenomenon of forgiveness aided in the process of recovery in 
the Amish community following the shooting at West Nickel Mines, Pennsylvania and 
                                                 
4 Rami Benbenishty, Ron Avi Astor and Roxana Marachi, “A National Study of School Violence in 
Israel: Implications for Theory, Practice and Policy,” in Handbook of School Violence and School Safety: 
From Research to Practice, eds. Shane Jimerson and Michael Furlong (New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates, 2006), 483. 
5 Enrique Baca and others, “Short and Long-Term Effects of Terrorist Attacks in Spain,” in The 
Trauma of Terrorism: Sharing Knowledge and Shared Care, an International Handbook, eds. Yael Danieli, 
Danny Brom and Joe Sills (New York: The Haworth Press, 2005), 157-167. 
6 Andrea Campbell, Ed Cairns and John Mallett, “Northern Ireland: The Psychological Impact of “the 
Troubles,”“ in The Trauma of Terrorism: Sharing Knowledge and Shared Care, An International 
Handbook, eds. Yael Danieli, Danny Brom and Joe Sills (New York: The Haworth Press, 2005), 177-178. 
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also in Northern Ireland during “the troubles” as stated by Kraybill and Campbell.  The 
ability to forgive is not fully understood or accepted, especially by victims of intentional 
harm.  Still, the application of forgiveness is explored as it has helped particular 
communities heal.     
Tertiary sources were utilized from archived newspapers, magazines, and film.  
The historical perspective of mass casualty incidents relied largely on action reports, 
school safety experts, a digital video titled Angels too Soon that chronicles the Our Lady 
of the Angels school fire, a journal review, and government documents reports.   
The Homeland Security Digital Library (HSDL), the Dudley Knox Library, and 
the Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS) were the primary web resources.  For 
the chronological review of past school incidents, archived articles from the New York 
Times were of assistance. 
It is important to keep clear the distinction between school violence and terrorism.  
There is ample literature on school violence and how to mitigate and plan for its 
occurrence.  Comprehensive literature on America’s experience with terror may prove 
difficult.  Research found that some authors consider the threat of terrorism or school 
violence as overblown hype.  Incidents that do occur are isolated and the overreaction 
from the legal system, media, school officials, the public and elected officials, creates 
more reactive problems than is warranted.7 
There is literature that suggests the likelihood of a school shooting or a terrorism 
event occurring is overblown.  Some do not believe it is necessary to implement new 
plans for schools that are terrorism specific or even worry about school violence.  Media 
hype exacerbates people’s fears about the safety of their children in schools, which leads 
to misdirected public policy intended to safeguard the schools.  Politicians have 
attempted to remedy the “crisis” by posting additional police officers in schools.  
Children face a one in a million chance of being killed at school and research shows that  
 
                                                 
7 Elizabeth Donohue, Vincent Schiraldi and Jason Zeidenberg, “School House Hype: The School 
Shootings, and the Real Risks Kids Face in America,” Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice (1998), 
http://www.cjcj.org/pubs/schoolhouse/ (accessed September 3, 2007).  
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the numbers of school shooting deaths have declined slightly since 1992. In fact, the 
number of children killed by gun violence in schools is about half the number of 
Americans killed annually by lightning strikes.8   
This position can be challenged since experiencing Columbine, Beslan, Virginia 
Tech, Dunblane, Bailey, West Nickel Mines, and numerous other events since the article.  
This author believes the intent of the article is to guard against over regulation, and 
increased liability for absurd misinterpretations of zero-tolerance and other vague policies 
that means something different to individual districts or teachers.  The added bureaucracy 
may increase the threats to schools they are meant to protect against. 
One area that needs to be addressed is how to include the terrorism awareness and 
preparedness component into the school preparedness curriculum.  Disturbing enough is 
the increase in school violence from lone shooters, let alone the idea that terrorists would 
target U.S. children’s schools.  A great deal of literature addresses school violence, but 
research on schools specifically targeted by terrorists has been mostly limited to the 
authors of Terror at Beslan (John Giduck), Innocent Targets (Chris and Michael Dorn), 
and Stop Teaching our Kids to Kill (David Grossman).  
The psychological component of terrorism creates a fear factor for parents and 
their children that must be considered.  Schools can better protect their students and the 
entire school population by collaborating with public health and other first responder 
disciplines to promote psychological resilience.  Resilience is the ability to withstand loss 
or damage and possessing the ability to recover from the impact of the emergency or 
disaster.  The higher the resilience, the less likely damage may be, and the faster and 
more effective recovery is likely to be.9  
The epitome of resilience can be found in many stories of 9/11, but none more 
poignant than with the passengers of Flight 93 from Boston to San Francisco.  Armed 
                                                 
8 Donohue, Schiraldi and Zeidenberg, “School House Hype: The School Shootings, and the Real Risks 
Kids Face in America.” 
9 Philip Buckle and Eve Coles, “Developing Community Resilience as a Foundation for Effective 
Disaster Recovery,” Australian Journal of Emergency Management 19, no. 4 (November 1, 2004), 
http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/EMA/emaInternet.nsf/Page/AJEM#current (accessed April 16, 2008), 8. 
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only with knowledge that the previous three planes passengers did not have, the Flight 93 
passengers were able to accomplish what the military and government could not; stop the 
terrorists from their intended target-most likely the U.S. Capitol or the White House.  The 
duty of the federal government is to “provide for the common defense,” which was in fact 
protected that day by one thing alone:  an alert and heroic citizenry.10 
Countries outside of the U.S. have long accepted resilience as a strategy to 
strengthen their citizenry.  The multitude of school threats makes disasters impacting 
schools inevitable, even if disasters are rare.  The consideration of all hazards threats 
demonstrate the need for well-developed planning for school-based mass casualty 
events.11 In the manner that the outcome of numerous deadly fires changed through 
aggressive fire prevention education, the U.S. should adopt resilience as a strategy to deal 
with all-hazards.   
The main disagreements on the threat are primarily based on events that have yet 
to occur and the likelihood that they ever will.  At this point, there is a lack of research 
discovered in dealing with specific threats to U.S. schools from terrorists abroad.  
Without crying wolf, threats against Americans are nothing new but asymmetric targets 
including children need to be considered after 9/11. 
While no one is likely to argue against the value of resilience, there may not be a 
need to look outside U.S. borders to identify it.  Flynn maintains that U.S. resilience has 
always existed as evidenced by U.S. founding and U.S. sustainability through wars, 
disease, economic downturns, and numerous other challenges.  The point is whether 
Americans recognize the value of promoting resilience.  Flynn addresses a relevant 
question that the 9/11 Commission failed to examine: might the passengers on the other 
three planes reacted differently if they were aware of the terrorists’ intentions?  Evidence 
over the years before the attack had revealed an interest by terrorists in using passenger 
                                                 
10 Stephen E. Flynn, “America the Resilient. Defying Terrorism and Mitigating Natural Disasters,” 
Foreign Affairs 87, no. 2 (March/April 2008), http://opim.wharton.upenn.edu/risk/ (accessed April 16, 
2008), 4. 
11 James Graham and others, “Mass-Casualty Events at Schools: A National Preparedness Survey,” 
Pediatrics. Official Journal of the American Academy of Pediatrics 117 (2006), 
http://www.pediatrics.org/cgi/content/full/117/1/e8 (accessed January 21, 2008), e8-e15. 
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airliners as weapons.  This information was considered too sensitive for the public and 
never shared.  “What if” scenarios ask if the information had been widely publicized, 
would the passengers on the first three planes acted differently?12 
D. METHODOLOGY & SIGNIFICANCE 
Research methodologies to answer research questions and reach the 
recommendations found in the final chapter include case studies, interviews and 
conference proceedings.13  The focus will be on appreciative inquiry and promoting a 
collaborative effort to understand the threats, the process of recovery, and the promotion 
of resilience.  
Chapter II examines the natural and intentional threats that schools face.  Specific 
incidents such as the Our Lady of the Angels fire, and the Columbine massacre raised 
greater awareness and resulted in dramatic changes to policy - often at the national level.  
In the early twentieth century, fires and natural disasters constituted the largest threat and 
killed most student victims.  Natural disasters continue to be a threat as evidenced by 
Hurricane Katrina and the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak.  
However, recent school shootings and terrorism events have overshadowed natural 
threats because of the increased fear from intent and unknown time of occurrence. In the 
latter part of the century, school shootings became mainly a U.S. phenomenon and the 
targeting of schools is no longer off targets for terrorists. Most threats share 
commonalities whose trend could be expected to continue with future events if schools 
fail to learn from the past.   
Terrorism threats involving schools have been made verbally against American 
children though they have never been specific.  Actual terrorist attacks have occurred in 
other countries. The main disagreements on the threat are primarily based on events that 
have yet to occur and the likelihood that they ever will.  At this point, research discovered  
 
                                                 
12 Flynn, “America the Resilient. Defying Terrorism and Mitigating Natural Disasters,” 4. 
13 Author John Giduck presented the “Terror at Beslan” conference in August 2007 in Clarkston, 
Michigan from his book of the same name.  
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in dealing with specific threats to U.S. schools from terrorists abroad is lacking.  A 
segment of research found dealing with the outside threat considered the idea of schools 
being a terrorist target as hype and dismissed the likelihood of occurrence.14 
Chapter III examines case studies and provides a threat analysis based on the 
history of incidents involving schools and continues by examining case studies from a 
multitude of threats, specifically fire, school shooters, and terrorism targeting schools.  
The research progresses from the event phase of disasters to consideration of the 
psychosocial consequences of disasters on children and their families, the school and 
community, and the first responders.  Whether mass casualty incidents are natural or 
intentional in origin, there are often similar variables that contribute to scene mitigation 
success or failure.  Case studies include the fires at Collinwood and the Our Lady of the 
Angels schools and the explosion at the New London School in Texas.  Man-made or 
intentional case studies look at the shootings at Springfield, Oregon, Littleton and Bailey, 
Colorado, the Amish school in West Nickel Mines, Pennsylvania, the college shootings at 
Virginia Tech and Northern Illinois Universities, and the terrorist attacks at Ma’alot, 
Israel and Beslan, Russia.   
Chapter IV breaks down five critical variables commonly found in most case 
studies.  They are: (1) time criticality, (2) information sharing, (3) information sharing, 
(4) security, and (5) first responder readiness.  There are significant proximal threats that 
have occurred in the U.S. that placed schools or their population in harm’s way.  The 
Oklahoma City bombing, the 9/11 attack, Hurricane Katrina, and the severe acute 
respiratory syndrome (SARS) scare in 2003, are examined for their impact on the 
community.   
Interviews by telephone were conducted with survivor Michael Mason, who as a 
first-grader, survived the Our Lady of the Angels fire; Littleton Fire Chief William 
Pessemier (retired), who served as the fire department’s incident commander at 
Columbine; and, nationally recognized school safety expert, Dr. Scott Poland from Nova 
                                                 
14 Donohue, Schiraldi and Zeidenberg, School House Hype: The School Shootings, and the Real Risks 
Kids Face in America, September 3, 2007. 
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Southeastern University.  Personal communications were initiated with Division Chief 
Dave Walcher of the Jefferson County Sheriffs Office who served as the law enforcement 
incident commander at Columbine. 
Chapter V examines the psychosocial elements of disasters and their resultant 
impacts.  The conditions of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and panic are examined 
within the context of likelihood following disasters and how to minimize their 
occurrence.  First responders will also experience the effects of trauma and their needs 
should be considered.  Critical Incident Stress Debriefing (CISD) is a common tool used 
in the recovery process from traumatic incidents.  It is not without controversy.   
Chapter VI will define resilience as a strategy to empower school communities 
and minimize impact.  Israel and the United Kingdom (UK) have adopted the concept of 
resilience and applied it to aid in a community’s recovery.  The final chapter will 
recommend promoting resilience in schools to minimize the psychological impacts of 
mass casualty incidents. 
Consumers of this research include school administrators and faculty, public and 
mental health professionals, and first responder leaders.  Schools across the country in 
urban and rural populations have been subject to mass casualty incidents.  When looking 
only at the threat of natural disasters, 90% of the country lives in moderate to high hazard 
areas, vulnerable to high winds, earthquakes, flooding, hurricanes, volcanic eruptions, or 
wildfires.15   
Consistent characteristics include the fact that school officials will be the initial 
first responders.  Aside from the parents, they will also have the most contact with 
children and be an important cog in the child’s recovery, long after traditional first 
responders have left the scene.  Schools can benefit through the development of an 
applicable model focusing on recovery and the promotion of resilience. The actions of 
teachers, custodians, school resource officers (SROs), school nurses and other support 
staff have played critical roles in response and scene mitigation.  Through the actions of  
 
                                                 
15 Flynn, “America the Resilient. Defying Terrorism and Mitigating Natural Disasters,” 3. 
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individuals and of the group, school faculty has the power to influence the student by 
demonstrating leadership and calm in times of crisis.  These actions have often meant the 
difference between life and death.   
Homeland Security practitioners from first responder communities can learn the 
lessons from previous incidents involving schools that have exposed first responder 
vulnerabilities and shortcomings.  Establishing pre-event relationships primarily from the 
public health and law enforcement arenas with school officials and crisis response teams 
(CRTs) will help establish the importance of pre-event relationships.   
Public health has an often misunderstood role in preparedness and recovery.  
Whether the threats are natural or intentional, and especially for public health 
emergencies, they are an integral component of the first responder system.  For 
community resilience, no other first responder discipline is better suited to promote 
resilient practices.  There is an education of other first responder disciplines required to 
understand the importance of melding public health. 
During school disasters, law enforcement will have numerous complex situations 
to manage.  First, they will not have the initial resources to handle the quick assembling 
crowds, including the media.  A common problem that will result in public and media 
scrutiny, if not handled properly, are the security issues that include the ability to 
establish crowd perimeters and control.  Coupled with the crowd control issue will be the 
problems with family reunification that will add to the already present anxiety.   
Future researchers can apply preparedness and recovery principles not only for 
terrorism events, but for any school violence incident.  Further benefit can be derived for 
those charged with protecting soft targets, including places of assembly, shopping malls, 
and places of business focused on operational continuity.   
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Society considers schools as safe havens where there is comfort in sending 
children on nearly a daily basis.  The fact remains that schools are largely unprotected 
and school populations are vulnerable to numerous threats.  While terrorism has become 
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the worst of all fears, schools must consider all hazards.  Terrorism is just another 
component that schools must prepare for, not because of the motive behind the act, but 
because of the impact of the event.16  
Response and recovery will be affected by the mass casualty mechanism and 
those differences will be explored.  However, the underlying theme to the argument is 
that psychosocial consequences, regardless of intent, may be significant and should be 
give due diligence to promote the proper intervention strategies. 
Promoting a resilient nation does not require reinventing the wheel.  When 
looking at successful models in the U.S., fire prevention education is a successful 
paradigm shift that was ignored for decades until a tragedy in 1958 that left scores of 
children dead at a Chicago elementary school.  Existing preparedness models that have 
been successful in the U.S. and in other nations considered resilient can be utilized by 
schools.  Integration with public health and law enforcement communities are a key to 
successful implementation of successful resilient strategies.   
                                                 
16 Michael Dorn and Chris Dorn, Innocent Targets - when Terrorism Comes to Town, (Safe Havens 
International, 2005), xxvi. 
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II. EXISTING MASS CASUALTY THREATS  
This section will provide an overview on the mass casualty threats that have 
adversely impacted schools.  Webster’s defines threats as an expression of intention to 
inflict evil, injury, or damage; one that threatens; or, an indication of something 
impending.17  There are a multitude of threats by which schools can suffer manmade or 
natural mass casualties, and in either case, children will be the most vulnerable.  These 
events will create vast emotional trauma and be the most difficult crisis to which it is 
possible to respond.18  They do not have to be the specific target to cause the adverse 
impact on the education system, the students, and the at-large support system of the 
family and community.   
In the weeks following a major crisis, many children are afraid to return to school.  
To the child experiencing the trauma, the terror they feel is real whether the source is an 
approaching tornado, an armed gunman, the class bully, or the media reporting potential 
attacks.  Many of the reactions and coping mechanisms will be similar regardless of 
accepted terror definitions.  Attendance can expect a 25 – 30 percent decrease in the 
student population in the first weeks following a violent incident or disaster.19   
The potential for mass casualties could arise from a weapons assault, influenza 
pandemic, kidnapping/abduction, hostage situation, bus accident, natural disasters, mass 
contamination, bomb threats, explosions, hazardous materials incidents, or a 
transportation accident.20  In general terms, they all qualify as natural or manmade 
events, and the acts are either deliberate or involuntary.   
 
                                                 
17 Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary. 
18 Mike Dorn and others, Jane's Safe Schools Planning Guide for all Hazards, 1st ed. (Coulsdon, UK: 
Jane's Information Group, 2004), 292.  
19 Ibid., 292. 
20 Ibid., 199. 
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In recent years, the focus has been on the high profile, mass media events of 
direct targeting terrorism attacks in Beslan, Russia, or the numerous school shootings in 
both urban and rural parts of the U.S.  Less newsworthy, but so far, more consequential, 
have been the natural disasters that have affected schools.   
A. NATURAL THREATS 
In the past, U.S. vulnerability has been greater because of natural disasters and 
they have caused death to hundreds of children in the school setting.  Fires in the context 
of this thesis will be defined as a natural threat though the cause and origin of the fire 
may have been the intentional act of arson.  Fire is a natural phenomenon that can 
threaten schools through natural causes such as natural gas explosions (New London, 
Texas) or wildfires.  They are included here because they have played a significant role in 
America’s history, causing hundreds of deaths in schools.  During the first half of the 20th 
century, school fires in this country were mass killers. In the period 1907 – 1957, there 
were 36 fatal school fires in the U.S., killing 726.21  Tornadoes have caused numerous 
deaths and injuries to students.  The deadliest came in April 1967 at Belvidere High 
School in Illinois when an F-4 tornado struck as buses that had already picked up the 
elementary school children and were loading the high school students. Thirteen of the 24 
fatalities and 300 of the 500 injured occurred at the high school as 12 buses were rolled 
over and students were flung like leaves into the muddy field.  This was the nation’s sixth 
worst school death toll from a tornado.22  
For at least a century, America’s most severe natural disasters have become 
steadily less deadly and more destructive of property.  Hurricane Katrina contradicted 
this trend and proved that natural disasters are not just events causing mass casualties of 
days gone by.  In fact, their future occurrence is certain, including pandemics.  Hurricane 
Katrina caused the most damage in U.S. history impacting over 93,000 square miles 
across 138 parishes and countries.  It was also the deadliest natural disaster since 
                                                 
21 Ed Marek, “Teachers, Students, Neighbors Rising to Great Acts of Heroism, the Tragedies of 
Deadly School Fires,” www.talkingproud.us/Education040206.html (accessed July 23, 2008).  
22 Jim Allsopp, “40th Anniversary of Northern Illinois' Worst Tornado Disaster,” (2007), 
www.crh.noaa.gov/Image/lot/severe/21Apr1967_tornado.pdf (accessed March 19, 2008), 8. 
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Hurricane San Felipe in 1928.23  Currently, nine out of ten Americans live in locations 
that place them at a moderate to high risk of experiencing damaging high wind, 
earthquakes, flooding, hurricanes, volcanic eruptions, or wildfires.24   
There are few threats that scare the public as much as the outbreak of a pandemic 
disease and for good reason.  Recent scares such as the avian flu and the severe acute 
respiratory syndrome, better known as SARS, expose society’s vulnerabilities to a large-
spread outbreak.  In the last 300 years, there have been ten pandemics with three in the 
20th century and they are inevitable. The Spanish Influenza of 1918 killed 50 to 100 
million including over 500,000 deaths in the U.S.  Even with medical advances, the 
anticipated pandemic cases would exceed the surge capacities of hospitals.  Vaccines 
would take months to develop after the initial spread of the disease, and scientists 
estimate that the vaccine would be available to 4 million people worldwide.  Given that 
there are 3 million people in the U.S. alone, a large portion of the population will be 
unprotected.25 
The guarded reaction to a pandemic will require physical isolation, or social 
distancing from the public.  Challenges will include balancing the isolation with the need 
to communicate and connect with the outside world.  Also, the issue of family 
reunification will be prominent with health emergencies.  Fear should be expected as a 
natural reaction when social distancing is in place.  Remaining connected to the 
community is imperative to minimize loss of life from poor communication or 




                                                 
23 Francis Townsend, “The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned,” in Multi-
Discipline Approaches to Homeland Security, Cohort 0701/0702. Winter 2008 ed. (Monterey, CA: Naval 
Postgraduate Schools, 2006), 1-74, 5-7. 
24. Flynn, “America the Resilient. Defying Terrorism and Mitigating Natural Disasters, 3. 
25 Francisco Cai and others, Community Resiliency through Schools. Social Innovation and 
Entrepreneurship: Saving Lives in the Next Pandemic, (Stanford University, June 7, 2007), 
http://sie.stanford.edu/1/reports/community_resiliency.pdf (accessed April 17, 2008), 2. 
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next pandemic occurs.  According to the CDC, 45% of all single parent households will 
not have anyone on which to rely, and 35% of households with children will experience 
some form of hardship when the schools are closed.26 
When looking at public health emergencies and other natural disaster threats, their 
occurrence is largely predictable.  For this reason, the public may feel a false sense of 
security, believing they can prepare immediately before or as events unfold.  Previous 
school disasters and even those in close proximity have taught Americans how to prepare 
for recovery and continuity.  Having the knowledge is not the same as taking the 
necessary precautions to mitigate impact.  One arena where schools have largely heeded 
the warnings comes from the uniquely American threat of school shootings.   
B. SCHOOL SHOOTINGS IN THE UNITED STATES 
Manmade threats are those that are most often deliberate and come without 
warning.  Though the vast majority of students go to school daily without incidence, 
school violence incidents are highly emotional events that have occurred in rural and 
urban areas in all parts of the U.S.  In the last decade, American children have been 
victimized by increased acts of violence at schools.   
Since 1974, there have been over 80 reported school attacks worldwide and most 
of those have occurred in the U.S.  Of those attacks, a large majority resulted in 
casualties, mostly from shootings where the perpetrators were young teenagers.  Other 
common characteristics found that most of the perpetrators were from the community 
where the attacks took place. The attacks have been spread throughout the U.S. and a 
large number have occurred in small communities.27   
One of the consequences of school shootings is that they receive intense media 
coverage that can result in copycat crimes elsewhere.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
the copycat phenomenon is frequent and threats increase in schools across the country 
                                                 
26 Cai and others, Community Resiliency through Schools. Social Innovation and Entrepreneurship: 
Saving Lives in the Next Pandemic, 3. 
27 Michael Dorn and Chris Dorn, Innocent Targets: When Terrorism Comes to Town, (Safe Havens 
International, 2005), 31-32. 
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after a highly publicized school shooting.  The days, weeks, and months following a 
school shooting is a critical time for students, teachers, and law enforcement to become 
more vigilant in noting disturbing student behavior.28   
Even with high profile shootings within the last 16 months at Virginia Tech 
University (VTU) and Northern Illinois University (NIU), shootings at universities are 
rare events, averaging about 16 a year across 4,000 institutions.29  There are many 
differences, yet many commonalities between violent events at college campuses and 
grade schools.  The most prominent difference is the increased vulnerability of the very 
young and the emotional impact such attacks would inflict.  College campuses are 
considered businesses that are not required to perform fire drills, or any emergency drills 
for that matter, unless mandated by an internal policy.  Grade schools are usually 
regulated by the states that require compliance with emergency fire, lockdown, and 
severe weather drills.  Still, university shootings that occurred at VTU and Northern 
Illinois universities provide lessons that can be applied to faculty, first responders, and 
students at all levels. 
The analogy to elementary schools is not very useful as the threat in elementary 
schools are usually not from students, the classrooms often have locks, and have voice 
communication systems for teachers and students, and the at risk population is in one 
building, and not the 131 buildings like at VTU.30  The same holds true for high schools, 
except for the profile of the perpetrator.  Similar to college campuses, it is very common 
for the perpetrator of a shooting at a high school to be a student.   
Schools have shown a tendency to adopt a one-size-fits-all approach to any 
mention of violence.  This considers all threats the same, but it may underestimate 
legitimate threats or overreact to non-credible threats.  The danger is that students may be 
unfairly punished or stigmatized when they are not dangerous.  Abraham Maslow stated, 
                                                 
28 O'Toole, Mary Ellen, PhD., The School Shooter: A Threat Assessment Perspective (Quantico, VA: 
U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, (2005), 4. 
http://www.fbi.gov/publications/school/school2.pdf (accessed April 10, 2008). 
29 Mass Shootings at Virginia Tech, April 16, 2007, Report of the Review Panel. Presented to 
Governor Kaine-Commonwealth of Virginia, (Virginia: Virginia Tech Review Panel, August 2007), 18. 
30 Ibid., 83. 
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“If the only tool you have is a hammer, you tend see every problem as a nail.”  Schools 
that treat all threats as equal fall into this fallacy.  Schools need to recognize that not 
every threat represents the same danger, requiring the same level of response.31   
Society needs to consider the worst of all fears – the threat of terrorism in 
America’s schools.  Serious preparation absent of histrionics will allow schools to 
incorporate terrorism preparedness as part of an all-hazards approach.  Terrorism attacks 
on schools have occurred elsewhere in the world.  Are terrorists willing to target the 
U.S.? 
C.  TERRORISM 
Though the chances of terrorism occurring are reduced from other mass casualty 
threats, there is evidence that the long-term impact of terrorism will understandably be 
much greater. There has not been a catastrophic terrorism incident within the U.S. since 
September 11, 2001, though not from a lack of effort.  According to the U.S. Code, 
Section 265(d), the goal of terrorism is “premeditated, politically motivated violence 
perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups…intended to influence 
an audience.”32  The act of terrorism itself is designed to create chaos and a pervasive 
fear of the unknown, unpredictable, yet intentional threat.33   
Exploring terrorism from a psychosocial perspective reveals the true goal of 
terrorism is to cripple by fear and grief.  Military psychologists have long known that 
fear, stress, and exhaustion will cause more casualties than bombs and bullets.  For every 
death during the SCUD missile attacks on Israel during the Gulf War, there were 272  
 
 
                                                 
31 Mike Dorn and others, Jane's Safe Schools Planning Guide for all Hazards, 1st ed. (Coulsdon, UK: 
Jane's Information Group, 2004), 450. 
32 Jonathan Comer and Philip Kendall, “Terrorism: The Psychological Impact on Youth,” Clinical 
Psychology: Science and Practice 14, no. 3 (September 2007), 179, http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-
2850.2007.00078.x, (accessed July 9, 2008). 
33 Larry E. Beutler and others, “The Need for Proficient Mental Health Professionals in the Study of 
Terrorism,” in Psychology of Terrorism, eds. Bruce Bongar and others (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2007), 34. 
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hospital admissions resulting from clinical psychological emergencies.  After Aum 
Shinrikyo’s use of sarin gas on the Tokyo subway system where only 12 died, 4,000 
nonaffected individuals were treated at area hospitals.34   
When considering the terrorism threat to America, the enemy in the Global War 
on Terror has shown patience and attention to detail between operational attacks and 
ruthlessness unlike any enemy of the past.  Potential fallout for future consideration is the 
asymmetric attack methods of U.S. enemies; not against the U.S. military, but by 
targeting America’s most vulnerable locations and population.   
The year 1968 began what is generally considered the start of modern day 
terrorism when militant Palestinian groups concluded that attention to their situation was 
insufficient.  Palestinian tensions escalated to target Israeli populations deliberately 
including children, schools, and school buses.35   
Buses are an extension of the school system and largely vulnerable to attack. They 
have been popular terrorist targets for years, particularly in Israel.  On May 8, 1970, 
Palestinian terrorists crossed the Lebanese border into the small agricultural community 
of Avivim.  Knowing the schedule of the two school buses, terrorists ambushed a bus, 
killing the adults and the bus driver causing the bus to crash.  The attack caused the death 
of nine children from the ages of six and nine, and three adults.  Many others were 
injured and the terrorists were never apprehended.36  Buses travel over significant 
distances and efforts to protect the large number of buses stretch resources, regardless of 
which government, to the limit.37   
                                                 
34 Bruce Bongar, “The Psychology of Terrorism. Defining the Need and Describing the Goals,” in 
Psychology of Terrorism, eds. Bruce Bongar and others (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 5-6. 
35 Dennis Pluchinsky, “Ethnic Terrorism: Themes and Variations,” in The Unconventional Threat to 
Homeland Security (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2005), 35-42. 
36 “What Happened at Ma'Alot, Kiryat Shmona, and Other Terrorist Targets in the 1970s?” 
http://www.palestinefacts.org/pf_1967to1991_terrorism_1970s.php (accessed May 3, 2008). 
37 Dorn and others, Jane's Safe Schools Planning Guide for all Hazards, 33. 
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Over the years, the objective of terrorists has transformed from symbolic violence 
to increased brutalization and producing as many deaths as possible.38  Since the 1970s, 
the terrorism experiences of numerous countries including Israel, Russia and Turkey have 
taught that children are not off limits as terrorism targets.  Children and schools have 
been specifically targeted and children murdered, including the recent attack in March 
2008 when eight people were killed and 11 wounded as a Palestinian terrorist armed with 
an M-16 concealed inside a television box opened fire in a crowded rabbinical seminary 
in Iraq, before being killed by an off-duty paratrooper.39   
The women and children killed at the Twin Towers and elsewhere during the 
September 11, 2001 attacks were not the targets, but the attackers considered them 
collateral damage along with the destruction of the symbols targeted in the attack.  These 
motivations were not too different from Timothy McVeigh’s in Oklahoma City six years 
earlier.  Terrorist acts yield horrendous results in the media on a regular basis from Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and elsewhere.  It is hard not to envision a worst-case scenario occurring in 
an American school as being only a matter of time. 
In February 2002, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher assessed the U.S. 
post 9/11. 
America will never be the same again. It has proved to itself and to others 
that it is in truth (not just in name) the only global superpower, indeed a 
power that enjoys a level of superiority over its actual or potential rivals 
unmatched by any other nation in modern times. Consequently, the world 
outside America should never be the same either. There will, of course, 
arise new threats from new directions.40 
Osama bin Laden’s official spokesman, Suleiman Abu Gheith, stated in 2002, 
“We have the right to kill four million Americans–two million of them children–and to 
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exile twice as many and wound and cripple hundreds of thousands.”41  Shamil Basayev,42 
the planner of the Beslan attack, justified the killing of children stating, “We regret what 
happened in Beslan.  It’s simply that the war, which Putin declared on us five years ago, 
has destroyed more than 40,000 Chechen children and crippled more than 5,000 of them, 
has gone back to where it started from.”43  A surviving teacher relayed the words of one 
terrorist who felt no remorse in killing children.  “Russian children are killing our 
children in Chechnya, so we are here to kill yours.”44  Gheith, Basayev, and their ilk 
rationalize killing children by perceived injustices against their own country or religion.   
Despite the rhetoric of abu Gheith, Basayev, and their ilk, Islamists have yet to 
demonstrate they represent a threat to American schools on American soil.  So far, al 
Qaeda appears to view both women and children as collateral damage in jihad and not 
specific targets.45 
There are still some unsettling issues that cause concern.  In September of 2004 in 
Iraq, the U.S. military discovered a computer disk with downloaded data — all publicly 
available on the Internet.  The disk contained a May 2003 Education Department report 
called “Practical Information on Crisis Planning: A Guide for Schools and 
Communities,” as well as photos and floor plans of certain U.S. schools.46 
The manner in how potential terrorist attacks will occur should be considered.  
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) will threaten in the form of chemical, biological,  
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radiological, nuclear, and explosives (CBRNE).  Whether the CBRNE event is intentional 
or an accidental chemical release in close proximity, schools should be aware of their 
surrounding threats.  
Chemical events are likely to produce immediate symptoms that will summon 
emergency services to the vicinity, as people will be affected within seconds or minutes.  
Inexpensive, and easier to acquire than biological weapons such as anthrax and smallpox, 
chemical weapons are still considered a low probability, but high impact for use as a 
mass casualty weapon.  In 1995, the terrorist group known as Aum Shinriko dispersed 
Sarin nerve gas on the Tokyo subway system in a deadly attack that killed twelve.47  
Though it was poorly executed, the psychological impact was significant as thousands 
feared exposure and flooded hospitals.  
Biological threats are more complex and more deadly.  They have been used in 
warfare and there is serious concern over the security of the enormous stockpiles of 
biological agents, including anthrax and smallpox accumulated by the Soviet Union 
before its collapse.  Mailing letters or packages containing dried or liquid biological 
agents, such as viral, toxin, bacterial, or rickettsial agents could carry out an attack on a 
school.  After 9/11 and the subsequent anthrax scare, many schools rushed to add a 
Chemical/Biological response policy.  Though their impact and the response required are 
dramatically different, many school districts have erroneously contained the two events 
into one policy.48 
Radiological attacks could come in the form of Radiological Dispersal Devices 
(RDD’s) also known as “dirty bombs.”  Typically, RDD’s would not release enough 
material to injure or kill many people, but the release alone would cause massive fear and 
panic and would render the targeted area contaminated and unusable until a costly 
cleanup is complete.  The nuclear threat is highly unlikely though not impossible.   
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Terrorists would most likely target a nuclear reactor, causing the release into the 
surrounding area.  If a nuclear attack did occur, they would not have to target schools 
since the collateral damage to the entire region would be significant.49 
History has shown that the use of explosives is the most common device of the 
terrorist.  Inexpensive and easy to acquire materials, bombs have been a useful tool in 
effecting change while creating mass casualties, usually civilian.  With no practical 
experience or specific knowledge, the four British citizens responsible for the four nearly 
simultaneous July 7, 2005, bombings in London, made the bombs from homemade 
organic peroxide devices carried in backpacks.  The March 2004 terrorist train bombings 
in Madrid, Spain was not the work of suicide bombers, but from bombs left in bags and 
backpacks and detonated by cell phones.50   
Though still the largest intentional killing of children in a school setting in U.S. 
history, the May 18, 1927 bombing of the Bath Consolidated School in Bath, Michigan is 
a largely forgotten incident.  Andrew Kehoe, a 55-year old farmer and school board 
member, was angered at the school board for increased school taxes that he felt would 
result in him losing his farm.  He had also lost his savings from paying for treatment of 
his wife’s chronic illness.  After killing his wife Nellie, and blowing up his own farm, 
Kehoe brought surplus dynamite from World War I, known as Pyrotol to the school.  He 
then proceeded to detonate the explosives killing over 40 students and teachers, the 
school superintendent, and himself.51  Some may consider Kehoe’s actions as a terrorist 
act, but with the absence of trying to effect social change as part of a larger movement or 
shared philosophy, it would not meet most definitions of terrorism.52   
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Another component of terrorism is the taking of hostages.  The adult American 
public considers the hostage taking of children as the terrorist act that produces the 
greatest psychological disturbance.  This finding comes from two nationally 
representative samples of American adults (18 and over).  The first sample was taken in 
late 2006 and included 2,200 individuals.  The second replication sample experimentally 
manipulated the presence of children into various threats and it was the malevolent intent 
to harm children-not the harm to children as bystanders or collaterals that so upset the 
American public.53   
There is evidence that the hostage taking of children in schools is not the aim of 
perpetrators.  An armed school invasion will require a different approach from law 
enforcement than conventional methods of the past.  Some trainers in law enforcement 
suggest eliminating the term “hostage” when the innocents being held against their will 
are innocents in a school.  Americans are naïve when it comes to school sieges.  There 
will be a battle and people are going to die, including uniformed people such as police 
officers and firefighters.  Large males and those that visibly demonstrate leadership will 
also be killed early in the siege.54  
Armed school intruders do not plan on holding hostages and bargaining for 
concessions.  The term “hostage” leads to the next logical step for resolution – 
negotiation.  Any opportunity of negotiation should not be afforded to homicidal and 
suicidal predators that specifically attack schools.  They should be neutralized at the 
earliest opportunity, as their intent is to kill children before possibly taking their own 
lives.  Early police contact is the key to saving lives.55 
To date, no U.S. schools have been the target of an international terrorist.  Still, 
they remain vulnerable and viable targets for the following reasons: 
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• An attack would instill fear and panic nationwide as they did with the 
Columbine attack. 
• The reputation of the terrorist/group could be promoted. 
• Schools provide essential community service with one-quarter of the 
nation’s population attending daily. 
• Domestic terrorists have directly attacked schools and schools were 
indirect victims on 9/11/01. 
• An attack would warrant national media coverage. 
• Schools symbolize America’s future.56 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Recognizing terrorism as a possibility in today’s world does not mean that alarm 
bells should be sounding across the country.  By first making schools aware of threats 
whether they have occurred in the U.S. or not, preparedness planning can occur for 
school districts and the emergency first responders.  The intent of addressing the potential 
threats to schools is to learn from past disasters and look to the future in a proactive, not a 
reactive manner.  The proverbial “sky is not falling” and the aim is not to be an alarmist.  
Burying our heads in the sand is not suggested either.  The simple fact is that most 
schools are safe from the possibility of a terrorist attack, and other threats mentioned may 
only be slightly higher in probability.  Otherwise, Americans would not send their 
children there on a daily basis.   
A common theme is that no one expects the natural disaster, shooting, or terror 
attack to affect their school.  It will always be the “other” school.57  When the unexpected 
does occur, can school administrators and first responders answer that they were 
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level, no matter how unlikely, and perhaps because an al Qaeda or Beslan-type attack on 
an American school or schools is so unthinkable, it becomes the first of all fears. 
However, just because something is unthinkable, does not mean it is likely.58   
Natural or manmade disasters represent similar characteristics, yet possess many 
unique challenges.  The reality is that children, schools and first responders face the 
potential of being impacted by each.  Most countries, including the U.S., have 
experienced other crises, such as explosions, ice storms, and earthquakes that have 
affected students and schools. All countries have schools that are “potentially” in harm’s 
way—schools are built next to nuclear power plants, next to railroad tracks, in the path of 
hurricanes, next to factories that manufacture explosives or explosive material.59   
Intentional threats expose the vulnerability and the inability to protect children 
while they are at school.  They also become 24/7 media events that may exploit the 
victims, and in the case of criminal attacks, inflate the status of the perpetrators and often 
create copycat attacks.   
Prevention and preparedness should be emphasized but the best laid plans will not 
prevent all school disasters.  With the multitude of threats facing schools, an all-hazards 
approach to emergency planning is recommended.  On one end of the continuum, they 
need to be prepared for weather, pandemics, and natural disasters.  On the other end are 
the acts of manmade crime, violence and disasters.  On a day-to-day basis, the most 
school administrators may deal with are aggressive behaviors, bullying, fighting, and 
related issues, but they must be prepared to manage the worst of circumstances.60   
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What is not needed are more federal research, conferences, symposiums, 
gatherings, advisory groups, panels, commissions, hearings, manuals, guides, templates, 
and regurgitation of best practices.61  The next chapter will examine incidents that have 
critically impacted schools, whether the event was a natural disaster, or intentionally 
meant to harm children at school.   
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Preparedness and Response, 1, Congress #110 sess., 2007. 
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III.  CASE STUDIES – MACRO VIEW CHRONOLOGY OF MASS 
CASUALTY INCIDENTS 
The following mass casualty incidents are landmark events primarily involving 
schools.  The tragedies are different in nature yet share many commonalities that schools 
and communities should consider, regardless of the mechanism of threat.  The 
introduction provided here is a macro-view background and represents just a small 
sample of events that have occurred affecting schools.  The primary focus is on U.S. 
incidents though disasters from abroad were included since they may have implications 
for the U.S., such as terrorism attacks on schools.  All received mass media attention, 
which translates to the conscience of societal importance.  All reveal vulnerability from 
the school, first responder and community levels.  Specific natural events were selected 
though many occurred a long time ago because they remain viable threats and teach many 
lessons still today.   
If further evidence is needed, two significant natural disasters occurred in May 
2008; the typhoon in Myanmar, and the earthquake in China - each killing 10,000.  In 
2004, the tsunami in the Indian Ocean killed over 225,000, and in the U.S., three years 
later, the U.S. is still attempting to recover from the devastation of Hurricane Katrina.  
This is a reminder that disasters do not always happen “over there.”  
A. NATURAL/ACCIDENTAL EVENTS 
1. Collinwood School Fire - Collinwood, Ohio (March 4, 1908)   
America’s second worst school disaster occurred at Collinwood School in what is 
now Cleveland, Ohio, when overheated steam pipes ignited wood joists under the front 
stairs.  Ultimately, 172 of the school’s 366 pupils, two teachers and one rescuer perished.  
As the children found the flames close upon them, they attempted to ascend the stairs, 
which caused a mass crush from the children simultaneously descending the stairs in the 
three-story building.  Panic ensued as children at the foot of the stairs attempted to fight 
their way back to the floor above, while those coming down shoved them back.  Most of 
the 200 students fighting for their lives died here.  The majority of those that escaped 
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managed to turn back and reach the fire escape and windows in the rear.  According to 
the county coroner, “The construction of the school house was an outrage.  The hallways 
were narrow and there was practically only one mode of exit.  The children were caught 
like “rats in a trap.”62  
Problems with the crowd escalated as the majority of the 8,000 residents of 
Collinwood arrived at the school and fought with police and firefighters to gain access to 
their children.  Many parents helplessly touched the hand or stroked the head of their 
child as they struggled to free their children from the crush of trampled upon bodies.  
Unable to remove them they watched their children die before them.  With the police 
greatly outnumbered and unable to control the crowd, a few of the residents helped the 
police fight back.63   
The final casualty of the blaze was the Collinwood community’s independence. 
With the city unable to guarantee fire safety resources - such as a paid fire department - 
for its inhabitants, voters approved Collinwood’s annexation into Cleveland less than two 
years after the blaze.64  
2. New London School Explosion - New London, Texas (March 18, 1937)   
America’s worst school disaster occurred on March 18, 1937, after a natural gas 
explosion at the New London School in Texas.  The 253 feet long and 56 feet wide 
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and walls collapsed, burying the victims in a mass of brick, steel, and concrete.  The 
tragic result was approximately 298 students and teachers, nearly three-fifths of the 
school’s students and teachers, in the building at the time were killed.65  
Walter Cronkite was a young journalist at the time and would go on to become 
one of the 20th century’s most well known reporters.  He described the school explosion 
as the “day a generation died.”66   
3. Our Lady of the Angels School Fire – Chicago, Illinois (December 1, 
1958) 
Undetected at birth and uncontrolled in the early moments of its life, it can grow 
into a savage, indiscriminate killer.  This is not the description of a terrorist, but the 
description of one of the nation’s worst fires, and a microcosm of all great tragedies.  On 
December 1, 1958, the Our Lady of the Angels School fire in Chicago, Illinois killed 92 
children and three nuns.  
The fire burned unnoticed at the bottom of the northeast stairwell shortly after 
2:20 p.m.  As the heat broke the window, fresh air rushed in and the empty stairwell 
turned into a chimney, bypassing the first floor, protected with fire doors and onto the 
second floor.  Simultaneously, hot gases from the fire entered an open pipe shaft in the 
basement stairwell and flowed into the cockloft between the roof and ceiling of the 
school.  Flames erupted in the hidden area above the six north-wing classrooms packed 
with 329 students and six nuns.  The first box alarm was not sounded until 2:42 p.m., 
meaning twenty minutes had passed since the first smell of smoke.  All fatalities would 
occur in five of these classrooms.67 
By the time victims reacted, egress was compromised and the only viable escape 
for most children and nuns was through windows.  Many were killed in their seats as 
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flames and smoke poured through the broken transoms above the doors making escape 
impossible.  Other children were found at the windowsill unable to scale the greater than 
3 feet sills from the ground openings.  They were piled on from fellow classmates.  One 
hour later at 3:45 p.m., the fire was brought under control.68   
The reaction of school officials was widely criticized.  As a Catholic school, Our 
Lady of the Angels had strict rules that students and teachers were expected to follow.  At 
the time of the fire, one of these rules permitted only the mother superior, the school’s 
principal named Sister Mary St. Florence Casey, to ring the fire alarm.  In Room 212, 
Sister Therese was doing what she thought was best.  As smoke poured over the transom 
into Room 212, she thought the chimney must be backed up.  When she felt the unusually 
hot doorknob, she knew it must be a fire.  Still, she knew they could not leave the room 
until the fire alarm sounded.  What she did not know was that the path of egress used 
during orderly fire drills was being cut off as flames and smoke grew in the corridor 
outside.  Without experience and an alternative plan, Sister Therese decided around 2:30 
p.m., “We can’t go until we’re told.  Let’s pray.”  As she concluded the prayer, the fire 
alarm had still not sounded when the heat shattered the transom.  It was then that she 
ordered the children to the windows.  Twenty-eight fifth graders would die in Room 212. 
She too perished.69   
First responders had the difficult task of performing their professional tasks while 
some had children trapped or missing.  A child of one of the firefighters died in the blaze.  
Firefighters arrived to children hurtling themselves out, or being pushed out by 
classmates of the upper story windows, covering the pavement.  One after another they 
jumped as rescuers and parents attempted to catch or break their falls before hitting the 
concrete.  Lieutenant Charles Kamin of the Chicago Fire Department reached the top of 
the ladder to Room 211 to discover eighth-grade children piled on top of each other, 
crowding the window opening and pulling at each other desperately to reach safety.  With 
the room about to ignite, Kamin began pulling kids out by their belts and dropping them.  
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He hoped they would grab the ladder as they fell, but broken bones were the better 
alternative to remaining in Room 211.  Within two minutes, the room reached its flash 
point and as Kamin pulled another boy whose clothes were on fire, he helplessly 
witnessed as the knees of the remaining children simply buckled, and the children wilted 
like a bunch of burning papers before collapsing straight to the floor.70 
B. SCHOOL SHOOTINGS 
1. Thurston High School - Springfield, Oregon (May 21, 1998) 
At Thurston High School, 15-year-old Kip Kinkel walked into the cafeteria in a 
trench coat and after firing 51 shots, student Jacob Ryker subdued him, but not before 
killing two and wounding 23.  When police searched Kinkel’s home, they found his 
parents fatally shot.  They also found five bombs, a hand grenade and a howitzer shell 
casing, though Kinkel’s intentions with the explosives was unknown.71  
The day before the shooting, Springfield Police arrested Kinkel for having a 
stolen gun.  Kinkel had paid $110 to another boy for the shotgun.  He was detained 
briefly and released to his parents.  When asked if he intended to hurt anyone, he said no.  
He just liked guns.72 
As a skinny, freckle-faced freshman, Kinkel’s obsessions with guns and bombs 
were all but ignored by adults at a school strapped for school counselors with a ratio of 
about 1 counselor for 700 students in a school with more than 1,500 students.73 
2. Columbine High School - Littleton, Colorado - (April 20, 1999) 
The watershed event for U.S. school safety and security occurred within the 
Jefferson County School District at Columbine High School shooting in Littleton, 
Colorado (1999) where 12 students and 1 teacher were killed by two high-school 
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classmates.  On the morning of April 20, 1999, seniors Dylan Klebold and Eric Harris 
took their first life after encountering two students having lunch on the school lawn.  
Their simple goal was to kill as many fellow students and teachers as possible by 
detonating two 20-pound propane bombs and then shooting everyone that survived the 
explosions.  When the bombs failed to detonate, their alternate plan resulted in moving 
throughout the school firing at students and teachers and igniting pipe bombs for the next 
45 minutes.74  Images from the incident shocked the nation and caused school districts 
nationwide to evaluate their safety and emergency plans.   
Teacher Dave Sanders was one of the victims who were severely wounded from a 
shotgun blast.  After briefly exchanging gunfire with law enforcement, Klebold and 
Harris turned their weapons on themselves and forty-seven minutes after taking their first 
victim, they themselves lay dead.75 
A Unified Incident Command Post was established at 1159 hours consisting of the 
Littleton Fire Department and the Jefferson County Sheriff’s lieutenant in charge.76  
Criticism arose that the incident command post was established too late and with 
insufficient resources.  It was at 2:40 p.m. that SWAT officers were able to finally reach 
Sanders and about 30 students that were hiding inside Science Room 3.  Paramedics 
would not get to Sanders for another 30 minutes, at which point he had no pulse and there 
was nothing rescuers could do for him.  Sanders’ death would serve as the impetus for 
transforming law enforcement actions throughout the nation in dealing with the active 
shooter. In an adjoining classroom, deputies found another 50 to 60 students and two 
teachers hiding.  From there they moved into the library where they would discover the 
greatest carnage.77 
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Students were transported by bus to a local elementary school where parents were 
advised to await their child’s arrival.  Since the school was a crime scene, there was a 
delay for the coroner to gain access and many did not learn of their children being killed 
until late the following day.78   
In October 1997, Columbine’s principal suspended Harris and Klebold for 
hacking into the school’s computer system, but did not notify law enforcement officials.  
Three months later, the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office had arrested Harris and Klebold 
for breaking into and stealing contents from a van, but their policy at the time was to only 
report serious crimes to school administrators, such as drug dealing, assault, and other 
felony crimes.  Parents of a student, threatened on a web page by one of the shooters, 
filed a complaint with the Sheriff’s office.  They, in turn, reported the complaint to the 
School Resource Officer, but did not notify school administrators. 
Before the incident at Columbine occurred, the school district had begun to work 
on changing their emergency plan. After considerable effort, a new plan was adopted in 
the fall of 1999. The plan identifies a wide variety of emergency incidents and describes 
what faculty and other staff should do in response to each situation. The plan lists who is 
in charge, whom to contact, what to do, and where to go in the event of various 
emergencies. A partial list of the situations covered fire, student-staff illness, injury, or 
death, building explosion, bomb threats, bus accidents, suicide threats, and kidnapped or 
missing persons.79  Also, before the incident, special response teams had never 
considered a school-based scenario in their drills because they believed it was an 
unrealistic training scenario.80 
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3. Platte Canyon High School, Bailey, Colorado - (September 27, 2006) 
A stranger walked into Room 206 of Platte Canyon High School in Bailey, 
Colorado, shut the door, and placed his backpack on a desk. The teacher addressed the 
man and asked what his purpose was in the classroom. The intruder pulled out a handgun 
and ordered all male students and the teacher out of the classroom.  Three minutes after 
911 was called, officers arrived on the scene and made entry into the school in an active 
shooter formation.  Within minutes, they located the shooter and secured the school. 
Barricaded in the room, the situation changed from active shooter to a hostage situation 
requiring a negotiator.  Simultaneously, all students had been evacuated from the school 
complex, except for the two still held as hostages.  
The students were all taken by bus to a local elementary school allowing staff to 
assist with student accountability.  This allowed parents to go to one location to pick up 
their children.  After two hours of no contact with the intruder Duane Morrison, or the 
two hostages, the SWAT Team made entry.  One hostage ran out of the room.  The 
intruder shot the other as she attempted to leave.  SWAT members fired upon Morrison 
as he simultaneously fired upon himself.  He was pronounced dead on the scene while his 
victim was pronounced dead at the hospital.  If any school learned the lessons of 
Columbine, it was nearby in Bailey, Colorado.   
4. The Amish School Shooting at West Nickel Mines, Pennsylvania - 
(October 2, 2006) 
Charles Carl Roberts IV walked into the single room Amish schoolhouse in West 
Nickel Mines, Pennsylvania and ordered the adult women and boys to leave.  At 11:05 
a.m., the police heard three shotgun blasts followed by rapid-fire pistol shots.  One 
shotgun blast was fired through the window by the main door, nearly missing several 
officers.  As the troopers rushed the building, smashing windows with batons and shields, 





style, Roberts had gunned down the lineup of girls on the floor, killing five and critically 
injuring the other five girls who survived by rolling around and burying their heads in 
their arms.81 
5. Virginia Tech University (VTU), Blacksburg, Virginia – (April 16, 
2007) 
Similar to the Columbine incident, law enforcement officials from Virginia 
Polytechnic Institute and State University (Virginia Tech or VTU) came under sharp 
criticism for their actions on April 16, 2007 when Seung Hui Cho walked onto the 
campus and killed 32 students and faculty, wounded 17 more, and then killed himself.82  
Cho had secured the exit doors with chains.  In just 8½ minutes, he had discharged 204 
rounds.  He still had 174 rounds left.  Killing the first two victims was a tactical error that 
allowed SWAT teams to assemble.  Many of the students were seated in tight school 
desks, allowing Cho to walk down the aisle shooting most in the head where they sat.83   
The first victim was killed at about 7:15 a.m.  The Virginia Tech Police 
Department (VTPD) arrived at 7:24 a.m. and secured the crime scene.  Approximately 
two hours later between 9:40 and 9:51 a.m., Cho began shooting in Room 206, killing 9, 
before moving to Room 207 where he continued shooting.  Upon hearing the numerous 
gunshots, students in Room 205 barricaded the door preventing Cho’s entry, despite his 
firing at them through the door.  As he entered Room 205, he began shooting students at 
their desks.  Three people that pretend to be dead survive.  Cho returned to rooms 207, 
205, and 204, shooting more victims.  At 9:51 a.m., as police reach the second floor, Cho 
shoots himself in the head.84 
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Cho’s background and the VTU incident epitomize the failure of connecting the 
dots between school officials, law enforcement, and mental health professionals.  By the 
time Cho enters 7th grade, he is shy and introverted and diagnosed with “selective 
mutism.”  In 8th grade, his writings reference Columbine and concerned teachers ask his 
parents to intervene with counseling.  After a year on antidepressants, he responds well 
and is taken off the medication.  In the fall of 2004, Cho enters his sophomore year at 
VTU and takes an interest in writing.  He submits a book idea to a publishing house, 
which is rejected, seemingly depressing him.   
Individuals and departments at VTU clearly knew of his growing mental 
instability by his junior year in 2005, yet they did not have all the information that 
collectively could have made a difference.  Within three weeks, two females have filed 
complaints with the Virginia Tech Police Department (VTPD), after disturbing instant 
messages (IMs) from Cho.  After being told to have no contact with the second student, 
he tells his roommate in an IM that, “I might as well kill myself now.”  The roommate 
contacts VTPD who bring Cho in to be evaluated by a prescreener who considers him “an 
imminent danger to self or others.”  This leads to an overnight stay at the Carilion St. 
Albans Psychiatric Hospital for mental evaluation.  The next morning he is released as 
the psychologist concludes that he is not a danger to himself or others. 
In 2006, Cho has numerous verbal altercations and his writings become darker, 
including a paper he writes about a young man who hates the students at his school and 
plans to kill them and himself.  Some faculty members bring their concerns to the dean.  
One professor threatens to resign if Cho is not removed from her class.  The night before 
the assault, Cho’s family receives his weekly Sunday night call and report the 
conversation as normal.85 
6. Northern Illinois University - Dekalb, Illinois (February 14, 2008) 
In the fourth U.S. school shooting within a week, a former student opened fire 
from the stage of a lecture hall, killing five students and wounding more than a dozen 
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others before taking his own life.  Lauren Carr, a 20-year-old sophomore, was sitting in 
the third row of the lecture hall when the gunman walked through the door with a gun 
pointed straight ahead.  “I personally Army-crawled halfway up the aisle…I said I could 
get and run or I could die here.”  Police were on scene 29 seconds after the 911 calls 
started coming in. 
C. TERRORISM 
1. Ma’alot, Israel - School Attack (May 15, 1974) 
Israel’s largest incident of school violence occurred on May 15, 1974, Israel's 
Independence Day, in the northern town of Ma’alot where a group of 11th grade students 
from Safed (Tsfat) were on a field trip to the Golan for a full day of hikes. That night, the 
children were housed at a school in Ma’alot where they slept on the floor.  The Marxist-
oriented Palestinian terrorist group, known as the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine (PFLP), attacked the school dressed as Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), killing the 
guard and some of the children. Some children escaped by jumping out of a window on 
the second floor and the remaining 90 teenagers and 10 teachers were held as hostages.  
The Israeli government, unaccustomed to negotiating with terrorists, rescinded this 
position with the scores of children captives and the promise that the innocent hostages 
would not be harmed.  Terrorists had demanded the release of Palestinian guerrillas being 
held in Israeli jails.  After negotiations broke down, a unit of the elite Golani brigade 
stormed the building.  The terrorists began to shoot the young hostages.  All of the 
terrorists were killed in the assault, but not before 68 were wounded, and the lives of 22 
children, along with three teachers and one soldier were taken.  In Beirut, celebratory 
demonstrations were ordered by Nayef Hawatmeh, the PFLP leader, to honor the fallen 
fedayeen as noble martyrs of the cause.86  The incident in Ma’alot resulted in a national 
trauma, the formation of the anti-terror unit known as Yamam within the Israel National 
Police and a national policy for school protection.87 
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2. Beslan, Russia, September 1 – 3, 2004 
The terrorist attack in 2004 on Beslan School Number One in Beslan, Russia was 
selected because it is a modern day example of what would be America’s worst 
nightmare.  The intentional harming of hundreds of children in a place considered safe; 
where children are sent without a second thought – U.S. schools.   
The Beslan incident is the high watermark for a terrorism attack on schools and 
hostage taking, and it is the defining event for serious consideration to school security 
from terrorism.  It is a distinction they, or any other community, does not want. 
According to former Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge, one of the implications 
for the U.S. from the Beslan incident was the request from President Bush to his top aides 
to review plans in dealing with hostages.88  Beslan is the worst of worst-case scenarios, 
and as a nation, the U.S. is largely untested and somewhat apathetic to threats that will 
potentially impact schools, directly or indirectly; specifically, when it comes to the 
terrorism threats.   
Located 900 miles south of Moscow in the Russian Republic of North Ossetia, 
Beslan is an agricultural and industrial community of 40,000 of predominantly Orthodox-
Christians, along with a Muslim minority.  Children learn at a very young age to restrain 
their emotional expressions in the presence of adults in North Ossetia.89 
Beslan was not an isolated terrorism incident in Russia, though it was the first 
attack specifically targeting children.  It was the culmination of numerous attacks in 
2004.  A subway train explosion in Moscow caused by a suicide bomber on February 6, 
killed 39 and wounded 350.  An explosive device in May at a holiday concert killed 
seven, including the Chechen President.  Events in August of 2004 escalated when two 
Russian airliners that departed from Moscow’s Domodedevo Airport crashed a few  
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minutes apart, killing a total of 90 passengers and crew.  The investigation determined 
that two Chechen suicide bombers from the Islambullah Brigades were responsible for 
the terrorist acts.90 
In Russia, the first day of school in September is known as the Day of Knowledge 
where children arrive with gifts for their teachers, often bringing extended family 
members to celebrate the children’s first day of school.  Beslan Middle School No. 1 was 
a combined facility for grades 1 through 11 at which time Russians graduate high 
school.91 
In 2004, Beslan’s Day of Knowledge became the beginning of the largest school 
terrorism disaster in history when reports of 32 and up to 49 radical Islamist terrorists 
took the official number of 1,181 teachers, children, and their parents hostage.  Two of 
the dozens of kidnappers were females strapped with bombs. Explosives were deployed 
around the school. The terrorists showed no mercy and no reluctance in killing children.  
Early in the siege, 18 large men and teenagers were brought to the second floor and 
executed.92  Children were forced to stand in front of windows so snipers could not kill 
the terrorists.93  Hostages were denied food and water, and denied the use of the school’s 
toilets.  Soon the gymnasium became unbearably warm and foul.  On the second day, 
women were telling their sons to urinate into plastic bottles so that children, even infants, 
could drink it to stay alive.94 
On the third day after 1 p.m. an explosion occurred though the reports from 
hostages would conflict as to the cause.  Some believe one of the bombs strung in the 
gym, fell from the basketball backboard and detonated.  Others thought the foot of one of 
the terrorists slipped from a pedal detonator on which he was standing.  Whatever the 
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cause, after 62 hours, a firefight between the terrorists and Russian Special Forces 
erupted, along with an armed local population.  The battle was on that lasted hours into 
the night.95  
The tragedy at Beslan was Russia’s September 11 as terrorist’s subjected hostages 
to abuses not seen in Europe since the Nazi atrocities of World War II.  The death toll 
and the number of injuries varies widely, with those killed ranging from 330 to 400 and 
some believe the number is two to three times higher.  Official Russian statistics 
determined that 330 individuals died.  Of those, 317 were hostages and 186 of them 
children.96 
Russia has a history where embracing admissions of wrong-doing are indicative 
of weakness.  In the final analysis, the uncooperative Russian government prevented a 
thorough investigation examining the role of the Russian security forces and the 
responsibilities of the authorities.  
Russian authorities refused to examine the terrorist attack within the larger 
context of the Chechen war.  After the investigators confirmed that Chechen leader 
Shamil Basayev “was responsible for everything,” there was no need to conduct further 
investigations, determine the conditions making the attack possible, or reconstruct events. 
Thus, they could write in the investigatory documents that the weapons and instructions 
were received “from unknown people at an unknown time in an unknown place,” that 
everything took place under the leadership of Basayev, who personally gave the terrorists 
almost every automatic weapon and bullet.97 
Government officials were shocked at the initial arrival of the citizens of Beslan.  
Many showed up with handguns, shotguns, hunting rifles, and even rocket-propelled 
grenades (RPGs) were in abundance due to the ongoing war and the close proximity of 
the Ingush.  Frustrated at the perceived lack of action from the government, the leaderless 
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mob grew from dozens to hundreds and surrounded the school.  The vigilantes began to 
surge forward, shouting at the terrorists and firing rounds at the school.98  The civilian 
population would never be secured or controlled by law enforcement or military officials.  
There is speculation that it was gunfire from the angry mob that caused the eruption that 
started the firefight and subsequent explosions.99  As a result of Beslan, schools 
throughout Moscow increased security measures and provided uniformed guards.  
According to press reports, all 1,600 schools in the capital were equipped with close-
circuit cameras and permanent security guards.100 
If capable of taking an objective approach to study the true events of Beslan, the 
reward would not only benefit Russians still under the threat of similar attacks; the study 
would help schools, mental health professionals, and first responders the world over, 
better understand the lessons to prevent, prepare, and recover from terror attacks on 
schools. 
D. PROXIMAL THREATS TO SCHOOLS 
Not all mass casualty incidents directly target schools.  Still, there is no denying 
the significant impact events such as the Oklahoma City bombing, the terror attacks of 
9/11, the SARS disease outbreak, and Hurricane Katrina had on local schools, 
communities, and the entire nation.  Research studies on the physical and psychological 
components of recovery, especially on children, have been developed for the school 
community, and are included in this chronology.  The reader will note the brevity of the 
overview.  A plethora of research on each incident exists and this section is intentionally 
brief.  The incidents are put into context of the other disasters mentioned as far as their 
impact on schools and the school population is concerned.  Findings from each will be 
covered throughout the thesis. 
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1. Oklahoma City Bombing – April 19, 1995 
More than any other U.S. disaster pre-9/11, the 1995 bombing in Oklahoma City 
provides the greatest research into terrorism’s impact.  Timothy McVeigh, a U.S. citizen 
angry with his government, bombed the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City.  Not 
only did the bombing shatter American innocence, it broke the stereotypical view of the 
terrorist.  Some may question the addition of Oklahoma City as an example targeting 
children.  McVeigh was aware that children were present in a daycare facility and he set 
out to intentionally target civilians, including children.  McVeigh, with the help of Terry 
Nichols, attacked the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City on April 19, 1995 with 
a 4,800-pound ammonium nitrate truck bomb.  The Oklahoma City bombing was the first 
modern day attack on U.S. soil and provides a public health comparative analysis with 
terrorist attacks in other countries that have vast experience with terrorism.   
Of the 168 deaths, 19 were children and 47 more children were injured.  Many of 
the 19 children killed were located in a second floor daycare center, when the Murrah 
Building collapsed.  Thirty children were orphaned. A total of 219 children lost a parent 
and more than 400 individuals were left homeless in the area.  By 3:30 p.m. on the day of 
the bombing, a family assistance center known as the Compassion Center (the Center) 
was operational.  During its 16 days of operation, the Center was a place to exchange 
information and to provide information about emergency services, mental health 
counseling, security, and comfort for victims and surviving family members.  Four 
hundred mental health professionals tended to thousands of victims, survivors, family 
members and rescue workers as they sought information and solace.  Within 48 hours, a 
need for a child mental health specialist on the death notification teams was recognized.  
Following the death notification, parents and other family members often had questions 
on how to talk to children of different ages and what reactions to anticipate, and how to 
manage their own grief in front of their children.101  
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2. New York – September 11, 2001 
An examination of threats, preparedness and resilience cannot omit the events of 
9/11.  Not until then was psychological resilience from terrorism studied in greater 
context in the U.S.  This section will only explore the events of 9/11 as they affected 
schools in the area of Ground Zero in New York City and the New York school district’s 
long-term planning.  The New York City Board of Education is the largest public school 
system in the United States with over 1.1 million students and 140,000 staff.  Eight public 
schools are located within a quarter mile of Ground Zero and 9,000 students ranging from 
three to 18 years of age.  While chaos ensued around them and transportation was shut 
down, school administrators proudly evacuated all 9,000 students without injury, and 
ensured family reunification with all 1.1 million students throughout the city.  
Approximately 1,500 children and staff suffered losses in their families.  Within a day of 
the disaster, the Board of Education had provided school faculty with guidance on how to 
address the immediate needs of the students.  During school evacuations, children 
witnessed people jumping from the burning towers.  According to a New York Times 
editorial: 
Many of the children were screaming for their parents who actually 
worked in the towers.  As one teacher stepped into the street, a small child 
saw the burning bodies falling from  the tower and cried out, “Look, 
teacher, the birds are on fire!”102   
Parents recall their anxiety in trying to reunify with their children.  Most were not 
able to reunite with their children for over four hours.  Reported stress symptoms 
increased with the parental allowance of unrestricted television viewing of the disaster 
coverage.103 
                                                 
102 David Markenson, Anne Degnan and Gregory Thomas, Uncommon Sense, Uncommon Courage: 
How the New York City School System, its Teachers, Leadership, and Students Responded to the Terror of 
September 11 (Columbia University: Columbia University. Joseph L. Mailman School of Public Health, 
(December 2004), http://www.ncdp.mailman.columbia.edu/files/9_11reportASSESSMENT.pdf (accessed 
November 12, 2007), 4. 
103 Robert Pynoos M.D. and others, “Impact of Terrrorism on Children,” in Kaplan & Sadock's 
Comprehensive Textbook of Psychiatry. Volume II, eds. Sadock, Benjamin J., M.D. and Sadock, Virginia 
A., M.D., Eighth ed., vol. 2 (New York: Lippincott Williams & Wilkins, 2005), 3554. 
 46
The important role of school officials cannot be underscored.  Custodians in 
schools near Ground Zero on 9/11 were instrumental in protecting schools.  Custodians 
were crucial to the maintenance of buildings.  Some even slept in the schools to support 
rescue operations.104 
One of the interesting aspects from the report from Columbia University’s 
National Center for Disaster Preparedness, titled “Uncommon Sense, Uncommon 
Courage, was the New York Board of Education’s focus on the return to “normalcy,” 
school continuity, and the short and long-term processes of recovery.  This deviates from 
most after action reports that tend to focus primarily on response.  The 9/11 tragedy is the 
worst disaster inflicted on American civilians in history.  The Uncommon report is from a 
school’s perspective, which adds credibility that can guide school districts across the 
country if faced with their own unfortunate consequences of a school disaster. 
3. SARS – Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome – Spring 2003 
Thirty two deaths occurred in the Toronto area when the SARS outbreak struck.  
Originating in the Guangdong province of China, SARS produced symptoms of high 
fever, dry cough and difficulty in breathing.  The outbreak of SARS was the largest 
public health concern in decades, with the most deaths occurring in China.  Worldwide, 
the disease killed nearly 750 and infected more than 8,200 people.  Closer to home, the 
area of Toronto, Canada was especially hit hard.105   
With a population of 4.36 million, Toronto was the largest metropolitan area 
outside of Asia affected by SARS.  Most of the cases were related to in-hospital exposure 
to the virus.  While enforced quarantine is rare, thousands ended up in quarantine in 
Asian countries and Canada.106  Mass closures of schools occurred and Canadian 
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officials ordered home 1,500 students with a statement from the local health 
commissioner highlighting his authority on those who refused to comply would be 
hospitalized.107 
As critical as the intentions of terrorists is the access to information about patient 
health and treatment during a disease outbreak.  There remains a great deal of ignorance, 
even from first responders, on who will be lead agencies and who will be support 
agencies during public health emergencies.  In many states, it is public health authorities 
– not law enforcement, emergency management, or firefighting personnel- that have the 
authority to enforce compliance with medical treatments, to shut down institutions to 
prevent the spread of disease, and to issue quarantine and isolation orders.108 
4. Hurricane Katrina (August 30, 2005) 
Americans are only three years removed from the largest natural disaster in U.S. 
history though the impact will always be present for many affected residents within the 
90,000 square miles in Hurricane Katrina’s path in late August 2005.  Hurricane Katrina 
gained strength in the Gulf of Mexico after traveling east to west across Florida.  The 
storm’s impact on Mississippi, Alabama, and Louisiana, along with the resultant levee 
breaks, starkly revealed the vulnerability of at-risk populations in the U.S..   
Following Katrina, the impact on schools was largely ignored.  In the three Gulf 
States of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama, more than 1.5 million residents, including 
as many as 370,000 children were forced to relocate from their homes.  Children were 
subjected to traumatizing events in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina by living in unsafe 
and overcrowded shelter environments, endured multiple relocations, and were subjected 
to separation from family members due to a lack of coordination among government  
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agencies.  In the year following Hurricane Katrina, hundreds of students from New 
Orleans were turned away from public schools.  This added to the significant challenges 
facing students already struggling in reading and math.109 
E. SUMMARY OF CHALLENGES FACING SCHOOLS 
There are more options for schools to prepare and plan for natural disasters, 
because the factors are known.  The unforeseeable as far as potential threats may be 
better understood based on research discovered from discriminate or indiscriminate 
attacks on schools around the world.   
School shootings at Bailey, Colorado, Springfield, Oregon, and numerous other 
locations across the country exposed the vulnerability of children in U.S. schools.  
Attackers were not terrorists from foreign countries.  They were other kids in the 
neighborhood, both rural and urban.  In the case of Bath, Michigan and West Nickel 
Mines, Pennsylvania, they were local loners not considered threats to schoolchildren.  
As of yet, the nexus from school violence to homeland security in America has 
not been seriously considered.  However, by committing the same act yet changing the 
motive of the perpetrators to mirror Beslan, school attacks in the U.S. would immediately 
ascend to the top of homeland security issues and change the U.S. perspective on the 
threat and children’s vulnerability.  Coordinated attacks targeting children in Anytown, 
USA will affect the rest of the country, causing parents to pause on sending their kids to 
school. The question remains on what can be gleaned from Beslan, Avivim, and Ma’alot, 
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Schools need to prepare for the possibility that they are not immune from attacks 
– terrorism or biological.  The rest of the community should understand that threats in 
schools are not just the schools' problem; therefore, neither is the solution.110  Chapter IV 
will compare the analysis from the aforementioned case studies and glean lessons 
learned. 
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IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS  
The overarching thread of the findings and analysis stress the importance of 
physical and psychological reduction of exposure to traumatic circumstances.  Less 
exposure to trauma results in quicker recovery.   
A. VARIABLES OF ANALYSIS 
Incidents will be analyzed using the following five variables:  
(1) Time criticality.  Time is a critical factor in life and death situations as 
knowing what to do at the moment of danger can affect safety outcomes.   
(2) Information sharing.  The lack of information sharing proved fatal in 
numerous school shootings where critical information was not shared with 
other disciplines that could have prevented the deadly outcomes. 
(3) Family reunification.  Family reunification is an issue that is largely 
taken for granted.  Yet, numerous incidents revealed the difficulty and 
trauma that loved one’s experience when unable to connect with family.  
Some were found to suffer more from the separation from their parents 
than the actual disaster.   
(4) Lockdown Considerations.  Lockdowns and technology can improve site 
security but at what costs?   
(5) First responder readiness.  First responders are expected to arrive, 
provide comfort, and mitigate hazards.  Readiness will include examining 
the role of the school resource officer (SRO).  The ever-present issue of 
perimeter control from gathering crowds of concerned parents, onlookers, 
and the media will test readiness.  Mass casualty incidents present 
numerous challenges, including the mental recovery for those expected to 
be stoic and psychological removed from the incident.   
1. Time Criticality  
Kenneth Trump testified before the Committee on Homeland Security in 2007 on 
protecting schools.  Trump is President and CEO of National School Safety and Security 
Services, Incorporated, a Cleveland, Ohio-based national consulting firm specializing in 
school security and school emergency preparedness consulting and training.   
The actions taken by school officials as the incident unfold, and in the first 
half hour or so immediately thereafter, can determine the severity of the 
impact on the lives of children and teachers for months and years to come. 
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And once public safety officials complete their heroic jobs and leave the 
school emergency site, it will be the school officials who will carry the 
bulk of the responsibility for the short and long-term recovery of their 
schools.111  
Time is one of the most important factors in survival of all disasters.  With fires, 
the time of discovery and one’s location, along with the time taken to spring into action, 
has often meant the difference between life and death. Pulling a fire alarm sends 
information that a threat may be near and action is required.  Removing or delaying 
transmission of even the basic communication will compromise safety.  Closely related to 
actions of school officials and consistent in all case studies is time criticality exemplified 
in the number of deaths at the Our Lady of the Angels School fire.  The twenty-minute 
delay from awareness to notification allowed fire to spread to the second floor where all 
95 victims perished in the classroom, or by jumping to escape the smoke and flames.   
Those that survived in most examples reacted quickly and removed themselves 
from the threat in the early stages.  The survivors of Beslan, Ma’alot, and Our Lady of the 
Angels fled during the initial threat where only precious seconds allowed them to 
preserve their safety.  At VTU, many students in Room 205 were saved by the actions of 
a few that braced themselves against the classroom door as Cho arrived, trying to force 
his way in by shooting through the door.112   
Students also rise to the occasion and quickly reacted to mitigate the situation.  
While wounded from a gunshot wound, 16-year-old Jacob Ryker tackled Kip Kinkel as 
he was reloading to continue shooting in the Thurston High School cafeteria.  Ryker’s 
actions undoubtedly saved lives. 
What becomes clear is that similar to the first responders on 9/11 that served as 
the first line of defense as the U.S. went to war, the very first responders to an incident of 
crime, violence, mass casualty, or natural disaster that strikes the schools will be school 
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officials.  Students will look to teachers to safely remove them from dangerous 
environments.  Despite prompt law enforcement responses, most shooting incidents were 
stopped by means other than law enforcement intervention.113  
School personnel and their actions played an important factor in determining life 
and death.  Individual actions from teachers are often heroic, usually stemming from their 
own initiative and not from school policy or training.  In Collinwood, Ohio, teachers 
struggled heroically for their students by attempting to march them out as they had 
practiced in the past.  Unfortunately, this march had always led them out the front door, 
which was directly involved in the fire.  The children had never trained to seek an 
alternative exit.114  Many of the victims at the Collinwood and Our Lady of the Angels 
fires’ never had a chance.  Neither did the victims of the explosion at the New London 
School, the victims on the 9/11 flights, and victims inside the Pentagon and upper floors 
of the World Trade Center. 
Teachers and staff protected children for hours before SWAT teams made entry at 
Columbine High School.  At schools in the vicinity of Ground Zero, school custodians 
were credited for multi-tasking and minimizing the impacts of the disaster by shutting 
down the air handling systems, and maintained school facilities that were being utilized 
by recovery workers.  They were also instrumental in getting school facilities back in 
order for continuity.  They are a critical component in future response planning.115   
While the majority of the incidents were mass casualty incidents (MCI), there are 
examples of non-MCI events that did not become MCIs for any other reason than the 
actions taken that prevented the disaster scene from becoming a mass casualty incident.  
As all too often, positive changes occur after tragedies.  Another casualty of time 
occurred at Columbine when teacher Dave Sanders died from the trauma of his wounds 
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by waiting over three hours before receiving medical attention.  Law enforcement across 
the country quickly learned the lessons of Columbine by following up with “active 
shooter” protocols nationwide.  Time will no longer be granted to perpetrators to kill at 
random.  Law enforcement will now seek to engage the shooter immediately.  
Negotiation will be secondary to securing the scene and minimizing deaths.  This will not 
eliminate violent deaths in the schools, but they will shorten the duration of the trauma, 
and shorten the psychological recovery for victims.  The immediate law enforcement 
convergence on active shooters at West Nickel Mines (Amish school), Platte Canyon 
High School, and from students at Thurston High School prevented greater tragedy than 
already inflicted. 
Another mass casualty was averted two weeks after the Our Lady of the Angels 
fire on December 16, 1958, when a fire occurred at a school in nearby Kenilworth, 
Illinois.  Immediately after Our Lady of the Angels, Kenilworth school officials had 
contacted local fire authorities to review their safety plans and evacuation procedures.  
One of the fire marshal’s recommendations had been to practice alternative egress from 
the building.  Similar to Our Lady of the Angels, a fire started in the basement and smoke 
quickly filled the hallway.  The similarities end there.  Instead of fighting the fire as the 
custodian was first inclined, he activated the alarm, which allowed the orderly evacuation 
of 650 students.  Two fire sprinklers extinguished the fire in the primary hallway.  As 
practiced, the children used the alternate exit.  None injured, none killed.116 
One’s experience with handling disasters is important.  Knowing what to do and 
practicing those actions are actions, even if momentarily delayed, that will likely kick in 
during the real event.  Our Lady of the Angels demonstrated that possessing the 
knowledge and acting upon it are two different things.  The lack of experience from fire 
drills to lockdowns, or even cultural norms that prevent the intuition of pulling a fire  
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alarm when smelling smoke, will result in more deaths.  One can possess the intuition of 
proper actions to take when knowing a dangerous situation such as fire exists.  Not acting 
upon the knowledge is useless.     
Whether one is concerned more about the terrorist, the fire, or the deranged 
shooter, compromised egress can lead to dire consequences.  It is up to school officials 
with possible input from first responders to practice drills with alternate exits.  This will 
allow preparedness to kick in when primary exits are blocked.  Students and faculty can 
also benefit since they are often in different parts of the school, such as the cafeteria or 
media center, when disaster may strike.   
2. Information Sharing 
The lack of information sharing has proven deadly when numerous red flags are 
ignored, or when critical information is kept from other agencies. Without information 
sharing, school officials, law enforcement, and mental health professionals are prevented 
from connecting the dots that could have stopped attacks or otherwise prevented disaster.   
There are substantial obstacles in sharing critical information.  Confusion exists 
with education officials, healthcare professionals, law enforcement, and others that are 
not fully informed on what information they can share on persons who are likely to be a 
danger to self or others.  Parents, teachers, and students should learn to recognize 
warning signs and encourage those who need help to seek it.117   
Public health emergencies will create significant public fear.  Unlike school 
shootings or terrorism that target specific groups, an influenza pandemic targets the entire 
population, causing widespread concern versus isolated populations (schools).  The 
absence of information will only increase existing anxiety.  Following the SARS 
outbreak, information dissemination on quarantining was delivered to the public from the  
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following sources: the media (54%), public health authorities (52%), occupational health 
department (33%), healthcare providers (29%), word-of-mouth (23%), hospital websites 
(21%), and other websites (40%).118 
A significant amount of the affected population was not satisfied and angry with 
the lack of information provided regarding infection control measures to be followed 
during quarantine.  Nearly 30% did not believe they had received adequate information 
on SARS.  Another 20% were not told with whom they could have contact; 29% did not 
receive information on when to change masks; and 40% - 50% did not receive 
instructions on the use and disinfection of personal items, including toothbrushes and 
cutlery; and 77% were not informed on how to use and disinfect the telephone.119   
Columbine and Thurston high school shootings revealed gaps in communication 
between law enforcement and school officials with critical consequences, which would 
also occur at VTU.  All perpetrators had previous law enforcement contact and previous 
disciplinary issues in school.   
Eight to ten days before the attack at Beslan, the Russian government had 
developed intelligence that a school in the Chechnyan region was being targeted, yet only 
one guard was on hand at the Beslan School that morning.  The terrorist attack on Beslan 
took months of planning and reconnaissance, studying the buildings and surrounding 
neighborhoods.  The attack was planned down to the smallest detail and the reporting of 
suspicious activity could have prevented the attack and no children would have died.120 
There is no single profile of a school shooter, particularly when the perpetrator is 
a teenager going through complex identity crises and emotions.  Following the killing of 
two students at Thurston High School, Superintendent, Jamon Kent defended the school’s 
actions.  “If we detained every student who said, ‘I’m going to kill someone,’ we would 
have a large number of kids detained.”  Mr. Kent called Kinkel “an average, everyday 
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kind of kid.”  Fellow students recall Kinkel telling his literature class of his plans to 
“shoot everybody,” and in another class demonstrating how to build a bomb with a 
timing device.121 
In Columbine, if the information had been shared, the perpetrators might have 
been investigated and the attack may have been prevented.  It may also get the individual 
the psychological help needed and untie the hands of law enforcement.  The Columbine 
Review Commission recommended law enforcement and school officials establish 
protocols for exchanging criminal and disciplinary records to the extent permitted by 
state and federal law.  As a result, in 2000, the State of Colorado enacted legislation to 
clarify what information can be exchanged and shared.  Law enforcement can now notify 
the school district when their students engage in criminal behavior resulting in either a 
juvenile delinquency report or a juvenile criminal report.122 
The media will play one of the most critical roles in regards to information 
sharing.  In Colorado, the local media had erroneously requested all available EMS 
personnel in the vicinity to report to Columbine High School to assist with the mass 
casualty incident.  Some arrived from two hours away, but the un-requested influx only 
added to the onsite challenges and confusion. A local news crew had aired an 
unauthorized and unneeded request that all available EMS personnel in the vicinity of 
Littleton should go to Columbine High School to assist with the mass casualty incident. 
The responsiveness of these personnel, some of who drove as long as two hours to reach 
the scene may be considered commendable by some, but the influx of unnecessary 
providers only added to the onsite challenges.  The overwhelming urge to help will cause 
first responders and citizens to converge en masse to the scene.  Unless requested, those 
arriving may only add to the great confusion that already exists.123  
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Were warning signs present that could have recognized Cho as a potentially 
violent student?  If present, could those signs have averted the VTU massacre by 
connecting the dots through information sharing?  The answer is yes to both questions.  
At VTU, campus agencies feared privacy laws regarding the sharing of information.  
Therefore, VTU did not recognize Cho as an emerging threat despite his contact with 
police, a court order for psychiatric treatment and reports from professors of violent 
writings.124  Again, as at Columbine and Beslan, the stovepiping of critical information 
prevented sharing between law enforcement, school officials, and mental health.  Critical 
mental health records are not necessarily shared between institutions, yet it is a common 
practice to request and receive immunization records.  The issue of personal privacy is an 
important one but at what cost?125 
3. Family Reunification 
Traumatic incidents involving children are emotional events and up-front 
planning on rejoining families is an important consideration.  A common theme in nearly 
all case studies was the problem of family reunification in the disaster’s aftermath.  The 
longest hospitalized patient from the Our Lady of the Angels fire, Irene Mordarski, had 
her name misspelled on the hospital admittance chart.  This created significant anguish 
for her parents, who were already searching for their other two daughters.  They would 
end up at three other hospitals and the morgue before finally finding Irene at 10:00 that 
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In the aftermath of Beslan, there was a great deal of chaos with numerous injured 
or killed, unidentified.  Bodies were laid outside in rows covered by plastic for family 
and friends to identify.  Hundreds of children remained huddled in hospitals unclaimed 
by parents they would never see again.127  Few school incidents have greatly 
demonstrated the importance of family reunification planning than Beslan.128 
The Russian government was roundly criticized for their mishandling of the 
Beslan incident with security forces receiving the greatest condemnation.  From the 
beginning of the incident, they failed to provide a scene perimeter to aid in controlling 
hundreds of armed locals.  This led to interference during the rescue operation as 
hostages and rescuers were caught in the crossfire and civilians were avoidable 
casualties. The Russian focus was on the enemy and not on security or school safety.129   
At VTU, as with most mass casualty incidents, obtaining information on the status 
of loved ones proved difficult.  People did not know whether to show up at morgues, 
hospitals, or designated centers.  Not to mention the media barrage.  The spouse of a 
murdered faculty member saw members of the media descend on her home before his 
death had been confirmed.130   
One of the initial problems discovered at the Platte Canyon High School incident 
was the lack of a public information officer (PIO) assigned to the incident.  The delay 
resulted in the media gathering information from students with cell phones that were 
often false and misleading.  Parents and the media converged on the same location for 
information, which was not timely.  Many parents became panicked and formed a mob 
outside of a Bailey Police substation.  Neighboring Jefferson County, which had the 
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experience of Columbine, finally arrived and assumed PIO responsibilities.  By this time, 
erroneous information was spreading and the first priority became damage control.131     
Natural disasters such as Hurricane Katrina will likely displace more families than 
any other type of disaster.  With the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, not since the Dust 
Bowl migration from the southern Great Plains region in the 1930s, have more people 
been displaced.  The displaced were estimated at 770,000 with over 200,000 with chronic 
medical conditions unable to get their medications or medical care.  Gulf residents ended 
up in all 50 states.132   
There are instances where even with insufficient resources and experience that the 
public health communities grasp the challenges early in the process to improve complex 
situations.  Mental health services in Oklahoma City found the establishment of a Family 
Assistance Center (FAC) invaluable.  Family members were very appreciative as they 
were able to receive information about the welfare of their loved ones.  The FAC proved 
to be a focal point for social assistance, food, clergy services, child care and overall 
wellness.  The media was used to announce that the FAC was the best place to find out 
about loved ones.133 
More than 12,000 professional rescue personnel and volunteers were involved in 
the rescue operations.  The stress took its toll as rescue workers switched from life saving 
operations to removing bodies and body parts.  Separate services were provided to offer 
stress management to first responders.  When the Center closed, Governor Frank Keating 
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lead agency to conduct mental health crisis response services.  On May 15, 1995, the 
Center became Project Heartland with support from FEMA and the Office for Victims of 
Crime.134 
On 9/11, the overriding objective for the New York Board of Education was to 
get 1.1 million children home and re-united with their families.  From the time of the first 
plane hitting the tower at 8:46 a.m. to the return of children to their homes at 1 a.m. on 
September 12, it took approximately 16 hours to reunite children and their families.135 
4. Lockdown Considerations - Security 
Security is very broad in scope and was a common theme in case study analysis; 
from both a physical and human perspective.  The analysis will address lockdown 
considerations, and the human element of security, which is still the most crucial variable 
as technology alone will not thwart school attacks.  Schools have a history of 
demonstrated safety initiatives but often after disasters have occurred.  The fires at 
Collinwood and Our Lady of the Angels fire revealed numerous fire code conditions that 
would result in sweeping national changes of building and fire codes136  Today, school 
security has been enhanced by fire sprinklers, smoke alarms, fire exits, and fire 
extinguishers are present in many schools.  Modern fire code requirements in new school 
construction have largely taken care of the fire spread issue, and most importantly, fire 
deaths have been all but eliminated.  No child has been killed in a school fire in the U.S. 
since the 1960s.137   
The success of fire prevention efforts have some wondering if the balance is 
equitable to newer threats of school violence.  In any given year, dozens of students and 
employees are killed by acts of violence in American schools.  In fact, children are 
dozens of times more likely to be killed by violence than fire, and thousands of times 
                                                 
134 Responding to Terrorism Victims: Oklahoma City and Beyond, 1-5. 
135 Markenson, Degnan and Thomas, Uncommon Sense, Uncommon Courage: How the New York City 
School System, its Teachers, Leadership, and Students Responded to the Terror of September 11, 32-33. 
136 Cowan and Kuenster, To Sleep with the Angels. The Story of a Fire, 285. 
137 Brian Lake, “Publishers Letter,” Homeland Defense Journal 6, no. 2 (March 2008), 
http://homelanddefense.epubxpress.com/ (accessed July 7, 2008), 1. 
 62
more likely to be seriously injured by violence as compared to fire. “If we can spend all 
that money and time preparing for fire, shouldn’t we spend time and money preparing for 
the thing that is far more likely to kill or injure a child?”138  
Lockdown drills, with consideration to the issue of lockdowns in schools; became 
law in the wake of the Columbine shooting.  The goal of a lockdown drill is to protect 
students and staff from the immediate physical threats posed by natural disasters, 
hazardous material releases, or the presence of dangerous individuals on or in the 
immediate vicinity of the campus.139   
At VTU, law enforcement was roundly criticized for their actions and delay in 
notifying students and for not activating some form of lockdown.  Supporting law 
enforcement’s decision, the Virginia Tech Review Panel in their report to Governor 
Kaine found that on researched reports of multiple shootings on campus over the past 40 
years, no scenario was found where the first murder was followed by a second elsewhere 
on campus (Appendix).  Largely ignored is that if Cho had stopped after the first two 
shootings, he might well have never been caught.  Also ignored is that VTU is a 
community of 35,000 people.  When a murder occurs in a city of 35,000, it would never 
be shut down.140   
Caution should be used when reacting to the most recent threats, such as school 
shootings and resolving one set of problems, while creating others that may arise as the 
yet foreseen future threats.  There is still concern that the safety demands from shootings 
and terrorism, and incorporated lockdown drills, may swing the pendulum too far the 
other way in regards to safety.  This is of particular concern to fire officials that have long 
battled with school officials to get the safety standards present in most schools today, 
versus the safety and financial concerns of the school that often perceive the safety efforts 
have been overkill.   
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There are many school lockdown plans that intentionally prevent emergency 
alarm notification and evacuation, and doors may be locked from the inside of a 
classroom with the idea that it will prevent intruders from entering.  Unfortunately, it will 
keep students from leaving and that is a violation of fire safety codes in the majority of 
U.S. jurisdictions.  Some plans call for the chaining of exit discharge doors, also a 
violation.141  A general consensus of fire officials is not caring how schools keep people 
from getting into the building, as long as everyone can get out. 
The mere appearance of security can dissuade attackers from targeting buildings 
that the perpetrators feel will limit their success.  Therefore, the security of the school is a 
psychological as well as a physical improvement.  It is difficult to argue against the need 
for security and fire officials may be viewed as arguing against security versus fire 
concerns.  The parties in the debate will usually be fire officials locking horns with 
school officials, law enforcement, and security experts that may represent the schools or 
architects.  All have an interest in school safety, though the means of achieving the 
security will differ.  A balance of security and life safety codes can usually be met if the 
personalities of school, fire, and law enforcement officials avoid a personality power 
struggle and consider what they would want if their own children were in that school.  
Lockdowns should not be viewed as a panacea of security from harm from those 
hell-bent on creating mayhem.  A controversial question to ponder:  are school 
populations blindly following a policy (lockdown) that may increase their danger by 
remaining in close proximity to the threat?  If so, is it for fear of physical harm or legal 
repercussions?  The essence of time and reaction are proven to be critical factors in 
survival as students in Ma’alot and Beslan survived by running, even jumping out 
windows.  Are there times when teachers should get their students out of the school and 
running towards safety versus staying in the classroom down the hall from the gunman 
going room to room?  After all, armed perpetrators are seldom interested in taking  
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hostages.  Rather, they tend to know that they are on a suicide mission and are seeking a 
high body count before they themselves are killed, or commit suicide, as seen in Platte 
Canyon, Columbine, VTU, Beslan, West Nickel Mines, and NIU. 
Lockdown procedures are not universal and every situation will be different.  The 
same holds true for threats.  Platte Canyon High School and Columbine are in close 
proximity, both are considered school shootings, yet they are two totally different 
circumstances and analyzing in the same manner is an apples and oranges comparison.  
With no intent to minimize the circumstances, Platte Canyon happened to be a hostage 
situation within a school.  Conversely, the intent of Harris and Klebold at Columbine was 
to kill as many as possible with no intent of taking hostages.  In their discovered writings 
after their deaths, they talked of leaving the school to continue their rampage.  They even 
mentioned the flying of a plane into a building.  Even the active-shooter policies 
developed because of Columbine could have forced the shooters out of the school at the 
other end and into the community.  The fact is there is no right answer.  “It’s a judgment 
call the teacher has to make.”142   
In hostage situations, the decision to escape is a spur of the moment decision that 
may place the lives of others in jeopardy.  Questions to be considered include: Is 
attempting escape more dangerous than staying? Should one attempt to rescue others?  
Can one desert one’s family?  The problem is these questions are usually not answerable 
before triggering the deranged gunman’s reaction.  The subsequent feelings of guilt and 
regret for taking the wrong action will create psychological outcomes that must be 
weighed.143 
5. First Responder Readiness 
First responders as defined here include law enforcement, fire and emergency 
medical services (EMS) services, public health, special response teams including SWAT 
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and hazardous materials (HazMat) teams, and non-traditional responders that include 
school officials. All will play a critical role in scene mitigation and their initial actions 
often have a dramatic impact on successful outcomes.  Scene success will rely on 
overcoming cultural differences and contradictory scene objectives that have hampered 
operations, often leading to less communication and cooperative efforts.  Incidents have 
sometimes resolved themselves in spite of first responder efforts. 
Natural disasters are more widespread and often affect the first responder’s family 
and community greater than the centralized targeted.  A pandemic outbreak will 
challenge America’s first responders, emergency facilities, physical resources, continuity 
planning, and family recovery like no other incident.144  First responders and school 
officials must realize that there own resources will be seriously hampered by an 
infectious outbreak as a considerable percentage of employees will be out of service from 
illness. 
Emergency preparedness and planning has often paid insufficient attention to the 
psychological dimensions of disasters.  Mental health services have not been widely used 
in the aftermath of disasters, and are often perceived to be unhelpful to people more in 
need of concrete goods and services.145  
There is a tendency among mental health organizations in America to focus on the 
needs of emergency workers instead of victims, though both will require assistance.  
Even when victims are given consideration, the focus is generally narrow and does not 
always include family, friends, and others that are emotionally affected by the disaster.  
Intervention also tends to focus on the short-term needs of victims rather than long-term 
recovery.146   
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The mental health actions at recent mass casualty incidents are positive indicators 
that the trend is changing.  Mental health has played a prominent role after Oklahoma 
City, Columbine, 9/11, and more recently, the shooting in West Nickel Mines, 
Pennsylvania, and the campuses of VTU and NIU.   
When violence or terrorism is involved, law enforcement will be the primary lead 
agency.147  Their four basic functions at mass casualty incidents beyond the basic tenet of 
providing life safety will be: 
1. Traffic control.  Both at the scene itself and the ingress and egress routes 
for other emergency personnel.   
2. Crowd control.  Uninjured and uninvolved people have a tendency to 
interfere with emergency operations, or become injured by dangers still 
present at the scene.    
3. Criminal investigation.  The emergency may have been caused by an 
intentional criminal act and scene preservation is necessary to protect any 
evidence. 
4. Death investigation.  Responsibility depends on jurisdiction and if the 
event was a criminal act.148 
The issue of crowd control is a glaring problem for first responders, primarily 
from law enforcement.  Problems arise in dealing with the human element of perimeter 
control of gathering crowds.  Tied in very closely with family reunification, perimeter 
control is a physical concern that may compromise emergency operations; thereby, 
threatening the safety of first responders and school victims. The issue of crowd security 
was significant regardless of natural or manmade disasters.  Firefighters were physically 
assaulted at Collinwood and Our Lady of the Angels fires.   
Understandably, the anguish of the parents was immeasurable as many were 
unaware of their children’s whereabouts and no rescue efforts by others would suffice.  In 
the aftermath, much of the anger was aimed at the fire department for perceived 
inattention to fire code enforcement to the known fire code violations.   
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Understandably, even law-abiding citizens may disregard command operations 
when their children are in harm’s way.  No amount of caution tape will restrain parents 
from doing what they think is best to secure their child’s safety; especially when the 
actions of first responders will not be swift enough to mitigate the danger.  Crowds will 
overwhelm scene and hamper operations by requiring additional resources for crowd 
management.  There will always be mass confusion during a mass disaster.  Removing 
the crowd as a concern is easier said than done, but often plans are not even in place to 
consider the rush of a panicked population that have their children in harm’s way.   
While school resource officers, also known as liaison officers, have existed at 
some schools before Columbine, their presence became commonplace across the country 
afterwards.  The lacking clarity of responsibility and the expected nontraditional 
functions for School Resource Officers (SROs) was a concern at Columbine.  SROs are 
expected to act as friends, consultants, and public relations representatives; roles that are 
traditionally outside the purview of law enforcement.  Jefferson County school officials 
acknowledged that some principals and staff members worked very close with SROs, and 
treated them as counselors or assistant principals.  Staff resented the presence of law 
enforcement in the schools and intentionally omitted SROs from information on 
administration matters, including safety concerns or disciplinary problems.149 
The Columbine Review Commission concluded that the primary task of SROs is 
to protect the public safety and enforce the law.  SROs are considered to be first 
responders and should be trained in rapid deployment tactics.  The Jefferson County 
Sheriffs Office used SROs before Columbine and continues to use them. The SRO at 
Columbine at the time of the shooting was fully trained as a patrol deputy with 15 to 20 
years experience.150 School administrators with all legal information that is required to 
maintain the safety of the school, including student’s records, should also include 
SROs.151 
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The absence or fractured approach in using the incident command system (ICS) 
was a common problem at many school incidents.152  From the Littleton Fire 
Department’s perspective at Columbine High School, the most complex issue during 
response was attempting to coordinate with law enforcement operations.  After initial 
confusion, they began working collaboratively and worked together very well.153  Local 
law enforcement had two to three different sets of priorities and two to three sets of 
operations and utilized a “hybrid ICS” because of the rapid engagement of first 
responding officers with the two gunmen that prohibited.154 
Most law enforcement agencies have since gone through mandated ICS training.  
Pessemier questions the metrics in changes brought about from ICS training, not just for 
law enforcement, but for all first responders required to go through ICs, and how that 
translates into practice out in the street.  “What’s changed and how do you measure that?  
What were you doing before, what are you doing now and how has that training made the 
difference?”155 
Those not involved at the scene but still playing a critical role are emergency 
dispatchers.  At VTU and Columbine, dispatchers were on the other end of the phone line 
as chaos ensued around the callers.  Often, a forgotten component of preparedness 
planning, the message delivered or information shared can have life saving or traumatic 
consequences.  Their instructions to stay still when the victim should flee or flee when 
they should stay still can result in unnecessary deaths.  When in doubt of the situation, 
dispatchers should just be reassuring.156  
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At Beslan, security forces failure of effective incident command that resulted in 
mismanaged objectives, ineffective transfer of command, and errors in the dissemination 
of public information and intelligence, all contributed to the tragedy.157  One of the 
problems identified in Beslan was the absence of command and control.  The top military 
commander acknowledged the absence of planning to rescue hostages.  In fact, 48 hours 
after the school was seized, Russian Special Forces were training 30 kilometers away 
from the school.  When the firefight began, rescuers only had two or three armored 
personnel carriers to use as shields, and were pinned down by the terrorists’ heavy fire.  
The elite Alfa and Vityaz forces lost 10 men.158   
One of the unforeseen lessons realized after the Columbine response is the 
importance of developing an operational network with law enforcement, which became a 
critical element with the fire department’s EMS efforts.  At Columbine, law enforcement 
was taking shooting victims out to their patrol cars and then driving victims to fire 
department triage areas where they were treated.  Typical of many communities 
throughout the U.S., police and fire agencies have minimal operational experience with 
each other, less the routine, daily calls. There is even less training and communications 
exercises.  Operational Networks beforehand are all about building relationships with key 
people and different organizations that you are going to have to work with when a 
catastrophic disaster occurs.  Building that relationship ahead of time will improve 
operations.159   
Developing operational networks in advance will enhance agency and individual 
competence and confidence.  The result will be improved working relationships, 
coordinated resources, and sustained effective response that will have the agency more 
confident about their day-to-day operations.160  
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One of the positive outcomes from Columbine was the development of new 
partnerships with schools and a closer relationship with law enforcement; particularly 
those that were directly involved in the response.  It would have been of great benefit if 
the SWAT teams, EOD technicians, and fire/EMS personnel at Columbine had been able 
to train in joint operations. Where joint training is especially critical is in the interface of 
the law enforcement teams and the EMS units.161  Firefighters did not begin carrying 
weapons, but they were trained to become SWAT paramedics for future active shooter 
situations.162   
One of the components of ICS is knowing the resources available during mass 
casualty incidents that will be required from multiple disciplines.  VTPD had understood 
that they could not handle a major event with their limited resources and had entered into 
a mutual aid agreement with the Blacksburg Police Department (BPD).  Both agencies 
trained together frequently, including practicing the active shooter situation in a campus 
building.163   
First responders will also have to deal with the psychological recovery of mass 
casualty incidents.  Recovery can be hampered by others that refuse to let go of the 
tragedy.  As the Jefferson County Sheriffs Department Incident Commander at 
Columbine, Dave Walcher says a week does not go by where someone is not bringing up 
the shooting at Columbine.  He expects the reminders to intensify as the tenth anniversary 
approaches in April 2009.164  Similar to Our Lady of the Angels, many of the law 
enforcement and fire department personnel at the scene had children or knew other teens 
that attended Columbine High School, which added significantly to responder stress 
levels.165   
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First responders may need an outlet to help understand and process their reactions 
to disasters.  Following any major fire/rescue (and law enforcement) incident, there is an 
immediate need for affected personnel to have an outlet for understanding and processing 
their reactions to the event.   
CISD is Critical Incident Stress Debriefing and is an immediate intervention for 
first responders within three to five days of a traumatic event that seeks to relieve stress 
with the goal of mediating or avoiding long term pathology.  It provides a forum where 
the department members can express their concerns and feelings about the incident and 
address their issues.166  
The intervention of CISD, now revamped as CISM or Critical Incident Stress 
Management, where CISD remains the central and defining signature intervention, has 
come under heavy scrutiny for its lack of empirical evidence demonstrating efficacy, or 
any significant benefit.  In fact, there are many psychologists that suggest the use of 
CISD may do more harm than good.  Five areas of concern include: 
1. the lack of choice 
2. poor timing 
3. retraumatizing the victim of terror 
4. vicarious traumatization 
5. superficiality 
Other findings conclude that psychological debriefing should not be provided to 
individuals immediately after trauma…Consensus can be found in providing comfort, 
information, and support, play useful roles in one’s immediate coping needs.  There is 
also no evidence that psychological debriefing is a useful treatment for prevention of 
PTSD after traumatic incidents.167 
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Despite the findings questioning CISD, first responders have often found solace in 
providing the service to their personnel.  When asked the most important takeaway in the 
aftermath of the Our Lady of the Angels, survivor Michael Mason replied, “The 
importance of getting some form of CISD,” which was not available in 1958.168   
One of the lessons from the Platte Canyon incident is that CISM is a tool that can 
be helpful, but it can cause more harm if not used correctly.  Managing attendance 
became difficult as there was confusion on which responders needed the debriefing the 
most. Adding outside agencies and citizens changed the meaning of CISM 
dramatically.169   
On the evening of the Columbine High School shooting, most of the Littleton Fire 
Department personnel returned to their stations by approximately 5 p.m. Critical incident 
stress debriefings took place that evening at the fire stations, and continued incrementally 
for months.170  The Littleton Fire Department had used CISD at least once before 
Columbine when an EMS medical helicopter lifted off from an emergency scene, touched 
high-power lines and crashed, killing the entire crew.  CISD services were utilized after 
the Columbine incident as well.  One of the unexpected surprises for Pessemier was the 
developed animosity between firefighters that were not directly involved with the scene 
response towards those that were.  There was an underlying animosity because of the 
great deal of attention the responding firefighters received.  “I was surprised and didn’t 
think it would happen.  We had to reevaluate what we were doing for the department as a 
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Following Columbine, a few problems were encountered by the Littleton Fire 
Department.  Primarily, the involvement of those first responders that were not on duty 
that day, or who worked the incident from a remote location, with those firefighters from 
the A shift that were directly involved at the school.  Their involvement, and therefore, 
their needs were different.171 
There will be different needs for different individuals.  To be effective, there 
needs to be a pre-event understanding of what CISD is all about, when and why it should 
be used, what it is intended to do, and what the limitations are.  Understanding these 
conditions up front will allow the asking of people what they need, instead of telling them 
what they need.  “Ask them very direct, probing questions, making sure they know what 
they need and are not hiding behind machismo.  Ask, what can we do for you?  It’s not a 





















Collinwood  9  9  9    
New London  9  9     
Our Lady of the 
Angels 
9  9  9  9    
Thurston 
(Springfield) 
9   9     
Columbine 9  9  9  9   9  
Platte Canyon 
(Bailey) 
9  9    9   
W. Nickel Mines 
(Amish) 
    9  9  
VTU 9  9  9   9  9  
Northern Illinois 
Univ. 
    9  9  
Ma’alot, Israel  9  9     
Beslan, Russia 9  9  9  9  9  9  
Table 1.   Case study analysis using critical variables.  Blacked out areas indicate the 
variable is either a) not applicable, i.e., school shooter policy in relation to 
school fires or b) information was not discovered in research.   
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B. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The preceding variables all have an impact on the duration of trauma for victims 
of mass casualty incidents.  The teacher’s initial actions, the ability to egress the facility, 
the ability to get families back together, and the first responder’s readiness, all are critical 
components to scene mitigation, removing victims from the danger, and enabling 
recovery for victims. 
Regarding the threat of natural disasters and pandemics, the U.S. has been 
fortunate that the lessons learned data is scarce as pandemics do not occur on a regular 
basis.  However, no disaster will have a greater societal impact on a global scale, and the 
occurrence of both, natural disasters and pandemics, has proven inevitable over history.   
The cultural silos between agencies that restrict vital information flow have 
compromised student and faculty safety.  Security issues and the fear of legal 
repercussions play a role in information sharing.  Potentially dangerous students could be 
identified by a quid pro quo between school personnel and law enforcement officials by 
implementing procedures that would share all criminal records of students within the 
school district that they are enrolled.   
Providing timely information to the public is imperative and experience has 
shown that an informed public will cooperate with officials, thus allowing them to 
perform their duties.  This requires first responders to have the adequate resources on 
scene in the initial response that are not involved in rescue to fulfill other command roles, 
including public information.   
Operational preparedness manuals need to be dusted off bookshelves in schools 
and not cut and pasted documents from other districts. First responders understand the 
utilization of ICS principles improve response.  Whether they decide to use the model 
may be a different story.  Security and technology will constantly improve and the 
balance between security and fortress-like conditions, or real-time notification versus cell 
phones in schools will long be debated.  At Platte Canyon High School in Bailey, 
Colorado, officials credit the lessons learned from Columbine (including utilizing first  
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responder personnel from the Columbine incident) and the ongoing training of the Park 
County Sheriff’s SWAT team, and strong relationships developed with all first responder 
agencies, and ongoing training provided to staff members of the school.173   
From their new construction after the Columbine incident to their development of 
the active shooter program, and establishing a School Resource Officer in Platte Canyon 
High School, the disaster was largely mitigated from being the potential disaster it could 
have been.174  Key lessons learned from the incident include: 
1. Rural areas are not immune to violence in U.S. communities, especially 
with regards to schools.  
2. The Incident Command System works best when utilized to its full 
capacity.  
3. Federal, state and local partnerships are essential for successful response 
and recovery operations following a large-scale incident.  
4. Interoperable communications must be strengthened and supported to 
overcome multi-jurisdictional communications differences and to 
strengthen mutual aid response.  
Strong media and public relations are a key ingredient to successful outcomes.175  
One variable that requires further analysis and is the crux of this thesis is the issue 
of psychological recovery.  The paucity of research on psychosocial factors including 
recovery makes the psychological recovery variable the most difficult to overcome.  It is 
a variable many do not want to consider since it means accepting the fact that schools 
may be targets, including intentional targets of deranged gunmen and terrorists.  It also 
means that children have suffered emotionally (and physically), and adults were not able 
to prevent them from being harmed. When disasters occur, practically everyone is 
unprepared for the short and long-term recovery.  Yet, educators, parents, first 
responders, and the entire community will be affected by a disaster that involves mass 
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casualties at schools.  Schools and the response community have emphasized 
consequence management without significant attention to long-term recovery.  
Preparedness and recovery from a psychosocial standpoint that has largely been omitted 
from practical application and debate will be addressed.   
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V.  THE PSYCHOSOCIAL IMPACT OF MASS CASUALTY 
INCIDENTS ON FAMILY, SCHOOLS, AND THE COMMUNITY  
It is worth noting that not all variables have a role in all incidents.  Limitations 
include the absence of psychological recovery data from incidents that occurred before 
the 1970s, such as the fire disasters that happened at a time when there was less 
consideration focused on psychological recovery.  Diagnoses of Posttraumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD) did not manifest until 1980.  There were also research limitations on 
psychological recovery as reports and journals placed an emphasis on the preparedness 
and response (Platte Canyon High School).  This does not imply that there was an 
absence of psychological trauma.  To the contrary, the examples show that these events 
can happen anywhere and there will be many psychological burdens to bear.   
The psychosocial elements of disasters and the manner in which humans respond 
to them only began to take shape in the 1980s.  Today, there is extensive literature 
documenting the vulnerability and practical implications for disaster planning and 
response.  Outside of the social sciences, there appears to be a lack of interest to address 
the long-term implications of mass casualty recovery for the school community.  There 
are no new ways of harming children in the school setting, but there are new ways to 
cope with the consequences that enhance physical and psychological recovery.  By 
addressing the psychological reactions to disasters, educators, first responders, and family 
members can better understand the process of recovery. 
Research has shown that the consequences of mass casualty disasters will be 
significant from natural or manmade threats.  When considering the long-term 
psychosocial impact on victims, the event does not have to be terrorism related to cause 
long-term suffering.  It is important to remember that all major incidents are not only 
physical events; they are also psychological and social events.176   
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Schools should prepare to minimize adverse impacts on the school population, 
whether or not they are the intended target.  The attacks of 9/11, the Oklahoma City 
bombing, and natural disasters like Hurricane Katrina demonstrated that proximal threats 
could impact student safety and need to be considered in planning through threat 
assessments, response coordination and recovery capabilities.   
History suggests that there may be many more psychological victims than 
physical victims in a terrorist attack.177  A partial history of threats that face schools has 
been examined and the current and future threats have been considered.  Chapter IV 
addresses the psychological and psychosocial issues that affect children and their schools.  
This thesis is drawn from a tactician’s perspective as a first responder.  There is no intent 
to depict an expertise in the complex world of psychology and the social sciences.  
Taking the aforementioned case studies, this chapter adds the variable of psychological 
recovery for analysis.  
A. PSYCHOLOGICAL RECOVERY  
The recovery process following a disaster can have a long-term impact on 
survivors.  In terms of mental health recovery, society has come far since the fires and 
disasters of decades ago.  Recovery was handled in a much different manner then.  The 
comments of survivors reveal the emotional scars left years later.  The culture of the day 
within the school structure and amongst families is that it just was not talked about.   
The children at Our Lady of the Angels and New London did not have the 
psychological resources available today.  In fact, the norm was to be stoic and not discuss 
the incident, which is still a characteristic in some cultures as was the case with children 
in North Ossetia.  Decades later, many survivors still suffer the psychological wounds of 
repressing their experiences.  Talking about the fire and openly expressing their feelings 
was almost taboo for the children and adults.  As a consequence, many never learned how 
to cope with the psychological effects of the fire.  For over forty years following Our  
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Lady of the Angels, no psychological tools to aid in recovery were available.  The 
formation of the Friends of OLA website provided an avenue for survivors to discuss the 
event and help in healing.178   
As a first grader at the Our Lady of the Angels school, six-year old Michael 
Mason remembers the fire he survived fifty years ago as if it was yesterday.  Before the 
fire, he recalled the occasional fire drill or civil defense drills common during the early 
years of the Cold War, but nothing prepared him for December 1, 1958.  The panic in the 
nun’s faces was apparent as they hurried children out of the first floor classrooms.  “It 
was utter chaos and panic.  It was insane, the breaking glass, the screaming children, and 
seeing children jumping from windows.”  Firefighters were grabbing and dropping kids 
from their belt buckles.179  
Mental health services have come far in the decades since these tragic fires.  More 
needs to be done to address the newer threats of school shootings and terrorism.  “They 
had to have some idea of what we were going through.  They built a new school, but no 
one talked about the fire with the kids.  No one ever came up to us to ask, ‘How are you 
doing?  How do you feel?  What do you think of this?’ “I really can’t buy into the excuse 
they didn’t know how.  It’s just amazing that nobody thought of helping these people.”180  
After the explosion of the New London School explosion, survivor Joan Barton, a 
second-grader at the time recalls, “We were not allowed to talk about it at all.”  Barton 
still lives in New London.  “You would think after 70 years, I’d learned not to cry.  It was 
just too sad.  Of course, now, they want you to talk about it because it helps you and 
everything. Maybe that’s why I still cry.”181 
The children and first responders were not the only victims.  The long-term 
impact was significant on the neighborhood as well.  “I can remember playing with kids 
that I had never seen until after the fire.”  The trickle down effect was that the fire did not 
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just affect those kids that passed on.  It affected those parents, grandparents.  It 
disintegrated an entire neighborhood.  “That neighborhood would still probably be 
together if it wasn’t for the fire. Eventually, the fire took its toll on the neighborhood and 
it fell apart as we all moved into the suburbs.  It is now probably one of the worst 
neighborhoods in Chicago.” 
There was no support system for families that all lived within a certain area of the 
school.  There was jealousy and a lot of remorse that one student had lived and one had 
died.  “You could literally walk down the street in the first couple weeks after the fire and 
hear mothers weeping.”182 
Many survivors still have a vivid recollection of children screaming, jumping, and 
the smell of the thick, black smoke.  Some that were crowded at the windows still have 
issues with claustrophobia; others have difficulty looking at fire scenes on television 
newscasts.  In general, they have a heightened awareness of their vulnerability.  In places 
with crowds, they instinctively look for alternate exits and when staying in hotel rooms, 
do not stay in rooms higher than the second floor.183   
The psychological impact of fear from disease outbreaks is real.  One in five 
Toronto residents reported avoiding Asian restaurants and stores, and 16 percent said 
they were avoiding public places because of SARS.  In the U.S. where 70 cases were 
diagnosed with no deaths, citizens were not as likely to take precautions against SARS.  
If the SARS experience in Toronto occurred in the U.S. that could not be contained 
quickly, the economic impact would be significant in any major city where cases 
occurred.  Also, as what happened in Toronto, as the cases increase, so does the fear.184 
Toronto residents understood the importance of quarantining and approximately 
22% of Toronto residents had a friend or family member that was quarantined due to 
SARS exposure.  About one-quarter of those quarantined reported two major problems: 
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(1) emotional difficulties relating to the confinement (11 percent) and not getting paid 
because they had to miss work (10 percent).  On a positive note, three-quarters of 
Toronto residents did not find the quarantine to be a major problem and the public’s 
awareness were indicative that health education efforts through media communication 
worked.185  
Research data from Hurricane Katrina will provide a plethora of recovery data 
and psychological impact studies for decades to come.  To date, post-Katrina studies in 
St. Bernard and New Orleans parishes reported that over 31 percent of returning children 
could be categorized as clinically depressed.186  While there were few differences in their 
emotional well being, nine months after the storm the evacuated youths were more prone 
to participate in risky behaviors and fewer protective behaviors, such as school sports or 
other extracurricular activities, than their non-evacuated peers.187   
Children were forced to attend multiple schools averaging two to nine.  Families 
were forced to relocate an average of 3.5 times with some as many as nine times.  The 
constant movement erodes familial continuity, prevents reestablishment of education and 
employment relationships.  In the months and years afterwards, chronic psychological 
and physiological stress reactions can develop.188  
School shootings such as Columbine resulted in a mass media response rarely 
seen.  The images broadcast around the world as it happened were shocking as media in 
helicopters and on the ground witnessed children critically wounded in windows, and 
escaping the building with their hands above their heads, as law enforcement dealt with  
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perpetrators at large.  The psychological impact was significant.  In the first two weeks 
following the incident, professionals in mental health provided more than 50,000 sessions 
debriefing and counseling sessions to over 15,000 people.189 
The mental health services at VTU focused special attention on the many people 
directly impacted by the event.  Dozens of presentations on trauma, post-incident stress, 
and wellness were presented to hundreds of faculty and student groups.  The university’s 
Cook Counseling Center knew that graduation several weeks later would be a difficult 
time for many people.  They sent 50 mental health professionals to the graduation 
ceremonies and developed resource materials on resilience and rebounding from 
trauma.190  This may be evident of mental health interventions improving.  
While VTU showed readiness with mental health needs, they also experienced 
problems that schools at grade school or university level could expect from mass casualty 
incidents. The day after the shooting, VTU took action to provide family assistance but 
the center set up nearby failed for a few reasons.  First, there was a lack of leadership and 
coordination among service providers.  Second, though well intentioned, many of the 
University volunteers were unqualified and unable to provide answers or guide families 
to the resources they needed.191 
Following the Beslan siege in Russia, the need for psychosocial support was 
immediately recognized.  By mid-October, 558 people were receiving individual 
psychosocial counseling and support provided to groups of victims, relatives and staff.192  
Parents send their children to school on a nearly daily basis with the expectation that the 
school will provide for their safety.  When schools and others fail at this task, school 
officials, first responders, and government officials can expect to be blamed for their lack 
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of response or attention to the victims they are charged with protecting as they were at 
Our Lady of the Angels, Columbine, and VTU.  Blaming the perpetrator alone is too easy 
and while officials did not cause the disaster, they play a dramatic role in its mitigation. 
After the Our Lady of the Angels fire, many survivors and family members have 
long blamed the Chicago Archdiocese for failing to recognize the incident, and for failing 
to prosecute the boy that confessed to the fire three years later.  The neighborhood 
grieved in their own way and in the process, blame was placed on several innocent people 
including the janitor for bad housekeeping, and the fire department for improper 
inspections.  People wanted answers though none could be given except blame being 
tossed everywhere. Shortly after the fire, the building was torn down and a new one built.  
“There was not even a plaque on the new school.”193   
Receiving much of the blame in Beslan was the Director of Beslan School No. 1, 
Lydia Tsaliyeva.  She was accused of being complicit in the assault, even allowing 
terrorists to hide weapons in the school prior to the attack.  What appears to be ignored is 
the fact that Lydia was a hostage along with her sister and three of her grandchildren.  
She was also injured in the initial assault and hospitalized weeks after the siege.  Six 
months following the siege, she was still in hiding, fearing for her life.194 
The Amish school in West Nickel Mines, Pennsylvania was cited for the primary 
reasons of a rapid law enforcement response and the unique recovery following the 
shooting.  It is not the manner in which society generally considers as a process of 
recovery from grief.  The media and the general public did not understand how the Amish 
could consider so quickly, the act of forgiveness.  There is a great deal of 
misunderstanding on the meaning of forgiveness and many criticized the Amish reaction, 
including many in the media after the shooting.  The restrained Amish reaction was 
unnatural, and therefore, inappropriate.195 
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The Lord’s Prayer is prominent in Amish culture and the first thing Amish 
children learn, in both English and German.  Unlike most Americans, the Amish 
emphasize the authority of the community, and place themselves under the authority of 
the church over the freedom of the individual.  The first two verses of the Lord’s Prayer 
embody the fundamentals of Amish forgiveness.  ‘For if ye forgive men their trespasses, 
your heavenly Father will also forgive you:  But if ye forgive not men their trespasses, 
neither will you forgive your trespasses” (Matthew 6: 14-15).  The Amish believe if they 
do not forgive, they will not be forgiven.196 
Forgiveness is psychological because the forgiver is personally changed by the 
release of resentment.  Forgiveness is also social because it involves another person.  
Forgiveness does not mean pretending a wrong did not occur, it is not forgetting what has 
happened, and it is not condoning or excusing it.  Forgiveness does not mean pardon, 
allowing the wrongdoer to be free from suffering or consequences from their actions.  
Finally, it is not to be confused with reconciliation, which allows the restoring of a 
relationship.  Advocates maintain that forgiveness means admitting that a wrong was 
done and that it should not be repeated.197 
One should pause if thinking the Amish parents do not grieve as much for the 
death of their children as the non-Amish do.  Like all people coping with the loss of a 
child, the Amish pondered the meaning of their loss and shed many tears in their homes.  
At the funerals, they committed their children to God and believed their daughters were 
now in heaven.  The presence of faith and the ability to forgive in no way made the death 
of a child easy.198 
One of the major stumbling blocks to peace in Northern Ireland has been the 
memories of conflict, both current and from the distant past, that are easily activated in 
Northern Irish society.  For the historical cycle of violence and revenge to end, 
forgiveness must move further up the agenda.  Forgiveness is more a socio-political than 
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a religious factor.  Religion has actually been found to be a weak predictor of forgiveness 
whereas in-group identification and especially out-group attitudes were strong predictors.  
As would be expected, the more involved in the violence (the troubles) the less forgiving 
they tended to be.199   
Kidnapping, shooting, and torture are traumatic events that present even greater 
challenges to children and communities than disasters that are known and somewhat 
predictable.  They are also intentional.  The taking of hostages may occur from lone 
gunmen as in Platte Canyon or the Amish school in Pennsylvania; or as an act of 
terrorism as in Ma’alot and Beslan.  Though the former does not constitute the definition 
of terrorism, no one would say the children involved were not terrorized to the level of 
the latter.  The Amish and Platte Canyon hostage-taking situations remind the U.S. that 
torture can and will occur in the U.S.  
There are three factors that distinguish these types of trauma from other forms of 
violence: 1) victims are typically held against their will, 2) the injury is intentional and 
personally directed and 3) pain is often inflicted for the purpose of punishment, coercion 
or perpetrator pleasure.200 
The shooting at NIU may be as indicative of any recent school event that society 
is becoming desensitized to mass casualty shootings.  The seven deaths are no less tragic, 
but the vulnerability others feel along with the media coverage, will be reduced 
significantly than when younger children are victimized.  Many college students have left 
the comforts of home and the necessity of care from their parents, and adults, even young 
ones, are self-sufficient.   
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B. CHARACTERISTICS OF MASS CASUALTY DISASTER SURVIVORS 
The mental health field has little experience understanding terrorism and 
generally relies on extrapolation of knowledge from related fields.  So what is the 
anticipated response and recovery process for victims of natural disasters or intentional 
trauma?  Natural and manmade disasters differ in their origin, predictability, duration, 
intensity, destruction, and recovery environment.  Incidents involving mass violence are 
intentional, and therefore, more psychologically disturbing types of disasters; thus, their 
psychological consequences are frequently more severe.201   
The psychological response to terrorism attacks will be more intense than from 
natural disasters – even if the disaster is serious and large scale.  The element of surprise 
and the inability to prepare for when and where the intentional attack may occur leaves 
people with greater vulnerability.  Natural disasters such as hurricanes or earthquakes can 
be prepared for, while the intentional malevolence of terrorism can neither be effectively 
predicted nor prevented.202   
Unlike natural disasters whose occurrences are easily understood by the public, 
causal attributions are largely absent following a terrorist attack.  The location, 
progression, and duration of natural events are generally known or can be reasonably 
estimated.  Schools, first responders, and mental health professionals have greater 
experience and know what to expect and know the actions to take to mitigate the incident.   
Terrorism’s impact will be greater than other threats and its impact on youth may 
occur in a variety of ways.  Youth will experience terrorism based on their proximal 
contact with the incident along with media-based contact with terrorist attacks, and 
exposure to an extended climate of threat, expectation and alert.  Each type of risk places 
the child at a heightened risk for distress, maladjustment, and the potential development 
of psychopathology.203 
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Being less mature, a child does not have the psychological mechanisms in place to 
understand trauma and they are more likely to be overwhelmed by the experience.  As a 
result of events occurring in the midst of their development, these events are more likely 
to impact their psychological growth and maturity.204 
In fact, upon occurrence, the coping process will include coping with the 
knowledge that the act could have possibly been averted.  Coping will entail dealing with 
the reality that someone wishes to inflict immense harm, and that someone’s life may be 
altered substantially in moments.  Terrorism even differs from other manmade disasters 
such as transportation accidents and hazardous materials incidents because terrorism acts 
are based on low predictability, short duration, and a deliberate intent to harm and 
destroy.205  
There are observed phases of crisis recovery from many that have been involved 
in, or survived disasters.  The model developed by Zunin and Myers (1992), is used 
extensively by organizations involved in the planning and training for disaster response, 
including the American Red Cross. Mental health specialists following the Oklahoma 
City bombing found the victims mirrored these phases.206  The five phases are: 
1. Initial Impact – Targeted violence toward a school or community will 
provoke shock, horror and disbelief. 
2. Heroic Period – From the onset of rescue operations, the community will 
engage in altruistic kindness towards the rescuers, the survivors, and 
victims’ families.  By donating food, shelter, or money, people will look to 
help in anyway they can. 
3. Honeymoon Period – There is a window of opportunity for schools to 
rebuild as numerous resources arrive and new relationships are developed.  
Promises are made in the desire to make the community whole again.  
Eventually, this period will end after several weeks as the realization sets 
in that rebuilding and recovery will be a long and difficult process. 
4. Disillusionment Phase – Anger and depression are characteristic traits as 
the rate of healing will vary for the survivors.  Some students will feel 
ready to move on while others have day-to-day difficulties.  The blame 
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game will arise as people ponder the possibility of preventing the incident 
and how the perpetrator should have been punished versus those that 
continue to support him. 
5. Reconstruction Phase – This may take one to two years and sometimes 
longer.  Many staff members after several school shootings reported an 
ability to move on after the freshman class at the time of the incident had 
graduated high school.207   
The reconstruction phase was prominent at Thurston High School as many of the 
students found it difficult to return to the school cafeteria following the shooting.  School 
administration helped children and staff cope by changing the appearance with a new 
paint color on the walls, new tables and chairs, thus changing the environment.208 
Limiting ingress and adding school resource officers, or changing the school’s 
appearance show students that they are being well cared for.  Most students will find an 
emotional balance within six to eight months after the incident.  Despite the best efforts, a 
small amount of staff and students may develop PTSD or depression that will require 
mental health treatment due to pre-existing factors in their lives.209  Community studies 
indicate that more than a third of children exposed to trauma such as violence and natural 
disasters meet the criteria for PTSD in the following weeks or months.210 
The conditions of PTSD and panic will be examined. 
1.  PTSD 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) is a mental health disorder that results from 
witnessing an event, such as a hazard or disaster that is particularly distressing and 
produces a cluster of symptoms that includes re-experiencing phenomena in the form of  
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flashbacks or nightmares, psychic numbing or avoidance, and hyperarousal.211  Though 
PTSD was recognized as a psychiatric diagnosis in 1980, little was known about the 
impact of PTSD on children and adolescents.212 
Factors that will influence the chances of developing PTSD depend on the 
magnitude, duration, and severity of trauma exposure.  The most important factor for 
PTSD to be considered is that the victim was exposed to the traumatic event.  Otherwise, 
PTSD does not exist. Symptoms must endure for a minimum of one month for a 
diagnosis of PTSD to be possible.213   
Other studies have looked at the development of PTSD in post-terror victims.  
Most prevalent chances exist with bombings (34%), mass shootings (28%), and natural 
disasters (4-5%).214  Four years after the 1995 sarin gas attack in Tokyo’s underground 
system, more than half of the survivors still had symptoms consistent with PTSD.215   
With the SARS outbreak, prolonged durations of quarantine were associated with 
increased symptoms of PTSD and depression, 28.9% and 31.2%, respectively.  Knowing 
someone with or direct exposure to someone with a diagnosis of SARS increased PTSD 
symptoms and those with children experienced higher rates of fear.216 
Mass violence such as terrorist attacks is likely to have a more severe impact than 
natural disasters. In a 1992 study by Solomon and Green, in a review of 80 different 
disasters, the National Center for Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (NCPTSD) reported that 
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67% of individuals who experienced mass violence compared to 42% who experienced 
natural disasters and 34% of those who experienced technological disasters suffered from 
severe psychological distress.217  Following the Oklahoma City bombing and the 9/11 
attack, girls exhibited significantly greater PTSD symptomalogy than boys.  Similar 
effects have been found in youth experiencing wartime stress.218 
Studies on children of war or terrorism including the Belfast riots and the ongoing 
conflict in the Middle East show the more direct a child lies in harm’s way, the more 
severe the risk of PTSD.  In the U.S., children are exposed to numerous traumas, but 
exposure to trauma from terrorism is uncommon.219 
Analyzing children for PTSD following disasters have become commonplace.  A 
long-term follow-up study of adolescent survivors of a 1974 terrorist attack in Israel 
indicated that the adjustment in adult years was mediated by the extent of the injuries 
experienced.  Seventeen years after the incident, the severity of injuries was positively 
associated with the symptoms of PTSD.220   
In Beslan, a sample of 92 children and adolescents that were held as hostages 
were examined and found to be suffering from extremely severe trauma, demonstrating 
the main signs of acute stress disorder (ASD).  A group of 22 children and their 20 
caregivers were found to suffer from PTSD three months after the attack.  A common 
theme found from caregivers’ accounts were the children’s fear of going back to school, 
and survivor’s guilt.  “He’s afraid of going back to school.  He doesn’t want to go 
because he says that it might happen again.”221 
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Before the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995 and the events of 9/11, little research 
or funding was given to terrorism attacks in the U.S. In addition, most of these studies 
were conducted outside the U.S., in countries where terrorism attacks were more 
common. There is a tremendous need to evaluate the efficacy of proposed interventions.  
Little evidence based on prevention and intervention strategies for addressing 
psychological needs regarding terrorism events exists.  This shortcoming of terrorism 
data does not preclude the need for action.222   
Seven weeks after the Oklahoma City bombing, 14.7%, students did still not feel 
safe and 62.8% reported worrying about themselves or their families.  In addition, while 
more than one-third of the students reported knowing someone killed in the explosion, 
only 6.8% sought counseling.223 
High-level avoidance is the avoidance of places or situations that increase the risk 
for direct exposure to terrorism such as a city center, buses, and cafes.  It is a primary 
symptom of PTSD and there were relatively low numbers of students receiving 
counseling in Oklahoma City, which suggests that many youths in need of services may 
be overlooked.  Children may initially avoid discussing the trauma.  Even brief 
interventions should be initiated by mental health professionals to assess symptoms and 
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Project Heartland was the first community health response to a large-scale 
terrorist event in the U.S.  As such, there was no existing template on the appropriate 
services for terrorist-caused psychological trauma.  Project Heartland found that 
traditional crisis counseling techniques were ineffective.225  They reached out to provide 
services to a broad spectrum of minority and ethnic populations, since they often suffer in 
much greater numbers the effects of mass consequence incidents, whether natural or 
man-made in nature.  The following victims’ needs were identified in the postcrisis phase 
in Oklahoma City.  
• Mental health services to ease the transition from the event to “normal” 
work and family conditions. 
• Recognition by employers and supervisors of the traumatic impact on first 
responders and efforts to provide counseling, debriefing, and other 
assistance to help them cope. 
• The ability to increase and supplement mental health staff in agencies 
faced with responding to mass casualties. 
• Experienced staff aware of the unique needs of terrorism victims.  Many 
individuals whose lives were relatively untroubled and productive before 
the bombing continue to experience symptoms including nightmares, loss 
of short-term memory, hallucinations, and a recurrent sense of “going 
insane.”226   
Still, a number of researchers question the metrics used in disaster research.  One 
of the criticisms of Oklahoma’s Project Heartland is that it is a failure to systematically 
and contemporaneously evaluate its effectiveness.  Therefore, the lessons learned in the 
process are anecdotal.227 
Four months following 9/11, 18% of New York City youth exhibited “severe” or 
“very severe” levels of PTSD, and 66% of youth were exhibiting “moderate” symptoms 
of PTSD.228  Again, the importance of proximal relation to the incident is evident.  Three 
and nine months following the 9/11 attacks, Koplewicz et al., (2002) compared PTSD 
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symptoms of youth that were trapped in the towers versus youth who attended nearby 
schools but were not at the site of the attack.  The PTSD rates were higher for those 
trapped at the World Trade Center and they exhibited more disaster-related fears 
unrelated to terrorism than the comparison youth.229 
Six months following the 9/11 attacks, PTSD rates were highest among those 
directly exposed to the attack.  By exposed, they were injured, running from debris or 
smoke, had a family member who died or escaped from the WTC towers, or had been 
exposed to trauma prior to 9/11.  Interestingly, those who immersed themselves in 
watching television coverage of the attacks suffered PTSD as well.230  This was 
consistently found in residents of Oklahoma City bombing who spent a great deal of time 
watching television coverage.  Most Americans not directly affected by the attacks of 
9/11 recovered within six months of the event, but the simple threat of a terrorist attack 
and the media transmitting this threat may cause children and the community to be 
terrorized.231 
2. Panic  
This section will address the reality of panic’s likelihood in disasters.  If it is not 
occurring as often portrayed, why is not pre-event awareness being promoted to further 
limit the likelihood of occurrence? The actions that victims or potential victims take 
during the event phase will impact the recovery phase.  There is a common myth that 
panic is the most common reaction from people caught up in disasters.  For this reason, 
there are those that believe disaster and hazards information should not be disseminated 
to the public for fear of causing panic.  This paper argues that children can handle age-
appropriate information as they have with fire prevention education materials.   
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Furthermore, the following indicates that there is strong evidence in having information 
(possessing knowledge) prior to a disaster will provide a basis of awareness, and further 
reduce the possibility of panic. 
The Our Lady of the Angels and Collinwood school fires document panic from 
children “It was utter chaos and panic.  It was insane, the breaking glass, the screaming 
children, and seeing children jumping from windows.”232  Two important factors in panic 
figured prominently that day; the delay in a timely response to the existing threat, and the 
lack of options when trapped or perceived to be trapped.233 
The idea of panic endures because it allows the blaming of victims of a disaster, 
which is an easy explanation to a complex situation.  Therefore, it deflects attention from 
the larger contexts of people’s behavior.234  The reality is that panic rarely occurs and 
people are more likely to be guided by choice and helping those around them who need 
it, particularly where informed choices are available during the event.  This does not 
mean that panic will not occur; only that it is rare.235  Not only is it rare, it is not 
contagious, and it is of short duration.  For panic to occur, three conditions need to exist: 
(1) a perception of immediate danger (2) apparently blocked escape routes and (3) a 
feeling by the victim that he is isolated.236 
Movies and the media promote the image of panic where chaos ensues, and a 
complete disregard for the welfare of others is rampant.  It is almost understandable from 
the media’s standpoint since little drama or newsworthy headlines come from orderly 
egress from a building, or leadership that calmly takes charge, leading the less vulnerable 
to safety.  The Oxford English Dictionary defines panic as an “excessive feeling of alarm 
or fear…leading to extravagant or injudicious efforts to secure safety.”  The idea of self-
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interest or selfishness is often incorporated, giving the idea that people will sacrifice 
others to save themselves.  The reason we believe it is wrong to yell “fire” in a crowded 
theater – even if the theater is on fire – is the assumption that the ensuing panic will cause 
more deaths than the fire itself.237 
Survival is not just a product of luck and everyone has a “disaster personality” 
that takes over in a crisis that can refine a personality and teach brains to work quicker 
and maybe wiser.  On the contrary, when disaster strikes, a troubling human response 
may cause people to freeze up and shut down, suddenly becoming limp and still.  This 
response can inflate the death toll.  Humans show an extraordinary capacity to survive in 
adverse situations.  Though there are instances of people permanently scarred from 
traumatic incidents, the occurrence is rare.238   
History is replete with examples of mass disasters and the reactions of both 
individuals and groups that either led them to safety, or led to tragedy.  The main purpose 
of a group is to perform some function that the individuals who belong to it cannot, or 
will not, solve alone.  The individuals within the group still have free will and to maintain 
cooperation they must have greater confidence in the decision-making of the group than 
from acting alone.  The cooperation of groups can be the most effective resource for 
individual resilience.239  Instead of panicking, crowds generally become quiet and docile 
during times of extreme stress contrary to the popular expectation that mass panic will 
ensue.  In fact, panic is rare and the bigger problem is people doing too little, too 
slowly.240 
Many in the general public hold the media’s notion of panic.  Victims from the 
World Trade Center on 9/11 often interpreted the behavior of others or themselves, in 
terms of panic, when the feelings they were typically describing were feelings of fear and 
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not panic-stricken behavior.  Five decades of research on how people respond to extreme 
natural disasters such as floods, earthquakes and tornadoes have concluded that people 
rarely lose control.241   
The reaction to the 1995 sarin gas attacks on the Tokyo subway was a 
predominantly psychological response in a phenomenon known as the “worried well” – 
individuals who feared they were exposed and contaminated despite evidence to the 
contrary.  Psychosomatic symptoms occurred in some of these unexposed individuals 
believing they were in danger.  Panic was not a common reaction in Tokyo.  The hasty 
evacuation of subway cars and terminals, or rapid flight from the traumatic scene; intense 
emotions; the desire to assist others in need; fear; or anger are actually rational responses 
to disaster.242 
Specific incidents that perpetuate the notion of panic include the 1977 fire at the 
Beverly Hills Supper Club in Southgate, Kentucky that killed 165 people.  The reality is 
that upon the report of fire, people began calmly filing out through the exits.  Smoke and 
flames soon met those attempting to leave the front doors. As the fire grew, survivors 
reported feeling frightened, and screaming and pushing began.  What did not happen was 
the overpowering or shoving aside of weaker individuals to preserve self-interest.  
Similar to Our Lady of the Angels, had they realized the danger they were in earlier, 
fewer would have died.243  Many were waiting in a crowded hallway as the smoke started 
to get heavy and lights began to flicker, without a sound.  Standing in the dark, the crowd 
was waiting to be led.244 
The general public is not considered capable of handling knowledge and access 
from high-level decision makers.  The justification is that the public cannot handle bad 
news and will as a result, panic.  Research from decades of natural disasters to the events  
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of 9/11 demonstrates that even under the worst news, people will act civil and cooperate.  
Leadership charged with information dissemination would be wise to see the public as 
partners in recovery rather than as a “constituency” to be handled.245 
Panic is largely preventable by having an informed public that has the capacity to 
adapt and cooperate with officials in responding to threats and disasters.246  Social 
situations have rules that people generally follow.  Disaster situations have rules as well 
and people tend to follow them in a like manner.  People die the same way they live, with 
friends, loved ones, and colleagues.  The rule of people helping those around them before 
they help themselves can be found in social or disaster situations.247  
C.   COMMUNITY SUPPORT 
When considering psychosocial intervention for children, planning, training and 
response should include those professionals that work with children, such as teachers, 
counselors, and school resource officers.  It should be remembered that children can only 
comprehend the long-term effects of the disaster at their own level of experience and 
understanding.248 
There is tremendous value in learning about children’s values from the adults in 
their lives, though research has shown that adults consistently underreport levels of 
distress and emotional problems.249  Parents are likely to influence how children respond 
to terrorism, and there are few other types of traumatic events where the potential threat 
to both parent and child is comparable.   
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When the events of 9/11 unfolded, one New York father frantically packed his car 
after pulling his three children from school.  His plan was to remove his family from the 
smoke of the city burning and travel to a cabin in North Carolina.  His frantic behavior 
was scaring his family, and more importantly, teaching his children inappropriate ways of 
dealing with stress.  About five days later, the family returned when the world did not 
end.  However, his initial actions caused long-term stresses on the children.250   
The needs of children are often underestimated or neglected following disasters.  
The problem of under reporting is something that mental health and school officials may 
have to watch for, as parents are wrapped up in the trauma themselves, and largely 
unaware of the impact on their children.  Adults will struggle with their own ability to 
cope with the event and may be less attentive to their children.251  Parents should be 
encouraged to resume as much of their normal routine as soon as possible.252   
Ofra Ayalon’s “circles of vulnerability” model is often used to understand the far-
reaching psychological impact of terrorism.  Using concentric circles from the center 
outward, the closer to the event, the stronger the impact (Figure 2).  Moving from the 
center to the outer circles will be those with less physical proximity and less emotional 
connection to the original attack.  Survivors most directly affected are located in the 
center circle.  This includes direct victims of kidnapping taking as hostages who are 
harmed themselves or witness to the murder of family and friends. The circle outside the 
center will be represented by loved ones of those killed or injured.  Like the images in the 
aftermath of 9/11 when families were helplessly anxious about the well being of their 
loved ones, and afterward had to deal with the burden of loss and mourning.  The next 
circle identifies the first responders that were involved in the rescue and recovery.  Other 
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circles will include friends, mental health workers, and other individuals that offer 
support and the at-large community that may have been specifically targeted (e.g., 
Americans, Jews, African Americans, etc.).253   
Dr. Scott Poland applied the circles of vulnerability as a psychological tool during 
his role as a crisis consultant following the school shooting at Red Lake High School in 
Bemidji, Minnesota.254  The circles are geographic, psychosocial proximity, and the 
individual’s trauma history.  Dr. Poland describes the process using the incident as an 
example.  A gunman enters the classroom and kills a boy named Thunder.  Within the 
first circle of vulnerability will be those that saw Thunder killed.  The second circle will 
be Thunder’s family members and best friends.  The third circle will contain those in the 
community that may have lost someone close to violence, or they may have a family 
member dying from cancer.  These circles can overlap and follow up is required, 
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Figure 1.   Circles of Vulnerability following Terrorism 
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Community support comes from those furthest away from the affected to the inner 
circles surrounding the event.  The outer community circle may be the nation that rallied 
around the victims of 9/11 or Columbine.  Community may be the neighborhoods 
surrounding the Amish schoolhouse in Pennsylvania, and community may be family, 
friends, schools, churches, and help groups.  It is important to recognize that while 
individual victims are affected, disasters do not happen to individuals, per se.  Rather, 
they represent collective stress situations occurring at a community level as a result of 
major unwanted consequences.  Thus, the disaster, the recovery, and the rebuilding 
process may be considered a social and communal phenomenon.256 
“One of the problems is that most schools do not want to think about disaster or 
recovery as a long-term process.  Addressing long-term recovery means that an event will 
go beyond a couple of days, which goes beyond the inclination of school administrators.  
Following traumatic events, evaluation may be needed week or months later.  Triggering 
events may be anniversaries, memorials, or maybe the birthday that Thunder would have 
had.”  For most trauma survivors, posttraumatic growth and distress will coexist, and the 
growth emerges from the struggle with coping, not from the trauma itself.257 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The research into the effects of terrorism in the U.S. is in its infancy and 
comprehensive literature on America’s psychological experience with terror is scarce.  
Due to the infrequency of attacks, the U.S. government, including its education system, 
has a fractured approach in dealing with the recovery process, if it has an approach at all.  
After action reports and case studies from school violence incidents such as 
Virginia Tech and Columbine may suffice as a corroborating link to the terror experience 
that others have experienced abroad.  Incidents such as Oklahoma City, 9/11, Hurricane 
Katrina, and the SARS outbreak, provide studies that address the psychological impact on 
children.  In the big picture of enabling and expediting school recovery, the psychological 
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impact of terrorism needs to be considered vis-à-vis other aspects of school violence.  If 
so, are American schools, and the public in general, addressing the issue and will children 
get the care needed to enable recovery? 
The best way to protect against PTSD would be to prevent future terror attacks.  
Since such a strategy is unlikely to occur, the next best approach is to promote resilience 
at the societal level.  This would require implementing laws, policies, and practices to 
ensure optimal preparation for the public in response to terrorist attacks.  When brought 
down to the individual level, psychological resilience should be promoted as part of an 
overall public health strategy.258  
Those that have been directly involved in disasters highlight the importance of 
exercising caution to those that apply a simplistic time-lined approach to recovery and 
understanding the reactions of individuals.  People will not return to the same pre-event 
life and will have to adapt to finding a “new normal” as part of recovery.259 
In the aftermath of the Amish schoolhouse shooting, mental health professionals 
provided counseling for several weeks thereafter, serving anyone in need, including 
panic-stricken Amish children.  According to an Amish fire official, “They told us things 
will never be the same again, that we must find a ‘new normal.’”260  Following the 
Beslan siege, some caregivers refused to be overwhelmed by revenge or helplessness, and 
instead focused on the return to normal life.261  New York school officials were faced 
with the challenge of how and how soon to return to normalcy.  They never deviated 
from the objective of sustained well being for the students.262  
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The new normal requires a new level of vigilance and responsibility.  Schools 
have the same responsibility in preparing for unsuspecting threats and prolonged 
uncertainty as household and communities do.  The preparations will not only serve 
school communities in times of crisis, but also during times of stability.263  One of the 
lessons from 9/11/01 is that resilience is the usual response to terrorism and the general 
rule of human adaptation.  It is time for the new normal to include psychological 
resilience to empower children and strengthen the resolve of schools they attend. 
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VI.  RESILIENCE AS A METHOD TO ALLEVIATE IMPACTS 
The events of 9/11 raised awareness on how to better protect the nation and 
individuals. The attacks momentarily erased the apathy that entrenches many school 
districts and society in general.  Seven years removed from 9/11/01, the “it can’t happen 
here” mantra is alive and well in the U.S., even amongst educators.  This is a dangerous 
attitude since schools are charged with protecting 53 million young people for a 
considerable part of most days in more than 119,000 public and private schools.  Another 
6 million adults work as teachers or staff. Counting students and staff, on any given 
weekday more than one-fifth of the U.S. population can be found in schools.264   
The type of resilience being promoted should be clear as the types of resilience 
vary.  Business may define resilience as maintaining continuity of operations after a 
disaster’s affects.  In this context, resilience will be examined from a psychological or 
psychosocial perspective. This chapter will take the lessons learned from previous school 
disasters that have left significant psychological impacts on school faculty, students, their 
families, and communities.  Promoting resilience will not be a substitute for natural 
reactions during mass casualty incidents.  It has, however, been proven to strengthen 
resolve, and improve psychological recovery.   
Though reduced from the stress of intentional targeting, natural disasters can also 
adversely affect a child as well as the community’s sense of protection and well-being.  
Fires, tornadoes, hurricanes and flooding have impacted American schools much longer 
than terrorism and shootings. The Our Lady of the Angels school fire tragedy is one of 
the earliest school settings that stressed the important aspect of promoting resilience, 
preparedness, and the response to possible fires.  Since the fire, students across the 
country recognize the fire alarm and know how to react in the event of a fire.  Fire drills 
are standard in all school settings and preparedness reduces the potential for chaos or 
harm to students should a fire occur.  Society is still learning and attempting to apply the 
lessons of resilience from other natural disasters, primarily from Hurricane Katrina.    
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A. WHAT IS RESILIENCE? 
The lessons are available to strengthen psychological resilience, which is the 
characteristic that allows one to resume functioning with minimal disruption. The 
empirical study of psychological resilience originated in the early 1980s to study children 
at risk of poor outcomes due to genetic or environmental circumstances.265  It was 
initially described as “stress resistance” for children at risk for poor outcomes due to 
genetic or environmental circumstances.  The unexpected observation of positive 
development among high-risk children gave rise to the study of resilience.266   
Resilience is a positive trait that can be difficult to define.  It is known to be 
desired, but if asked, the definitions would likely be wide-ranging.  Many social 
psychologists have tackled the concept of resilience and their opinions vary on the 
definition.  
Resilience is facing a threat in a way that builds confidence in the 
individual’s ability to  master future threats.  It cannot grow from someone 
else and personal responsibility is required for the successful response to a 
threat.267 
Resiliency is an interactive product of beliefs, attitudes, approaches, 
behaviors, and perhaps physiology that help children and adolescents fare 
better during adversity and  recover more quickly following it.  Resilient 
children bend rather  than break during stressful conditions, and they 
return to their previous level of psychological and social  functioning 
following misfortune.268   
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Just as understanding the meaning of forgiveness is important when judging the 
Amish reaction to their tragedy at West Nickel Mines; so is understanding what resilience 
is and is not.  Resilience does not mean forgiveness or getting over the incident and 
moving on; especially when discussing the intentional harming of children.  Rather, it 
means that though difficult and upsetting, hardships are not insurmountable.269 
The term “resilient” was adopted to differentiate from the earlier terms such as 
invulnerable, invincible, and hardy because of the recognition of the struggle involved in 
the process of becoming resilient.  Resilience refers to those factors and processes that 
limit negative behaviors associated with stress and result in adaptive outcomes even in 
the presence of adversity.270 
A widely used definition of educational resilience is “the heightened likelihood of 
success in school and other life accomplishments despite environmental adversities 
brought about by early traits, conditions, and experiences” (Wang, Haertel, & Walberg, 
1994).  While success is a variable that is often measured through cognitive, affective, 
and behavioral outcomes, adversity is a phenomenon that educators usually avoid 
defining and study though its impact affects success.  Adverse conditions may include 
attending an at-risk school environment, poverty, drug abuse, sexual activity, coming 
from a single-parent home, or being home alone after school three or more hours a day.  
If multiple risk factors exist, can an otherwise successful student be considered resilient?  
Educationally-resilient students with one or two risk factors will be different from 
students with extremely high-risk behaviors (e.g., substance abuse, attempted suicide).271    
Sometimes referred to “bouncing back” like a spring to pre-trauma or pre-crisis 
behavior, resilience focuses on assets and resources that serve a protective purpose in 
adverse conditions.  Psychological resilience is increased by breaking down a crisis into  
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manageable pieces and not as too large to be managed.  By providing pre-attack 
information and the small steps that the population can take to greatly improve their 
security from attacks, authorities can greatly enhance resilience.272 
Stress is a normal reaction to disaster.  In the majority of cases, people bounce 
back, and in fact, psychological resilience is probably the most common observation after 
all disasters.  Disasters have been found to bring communities together in an altruistic 
manner that helps victims cope and learn about their own strengths, save or comfort 
others, and change the way they view the future.273   
Disasters will still occur and lives may be lost but communities can be better 
prepared by empowering children that will have a ripple effect throughout the 
community.  One’s experience with disaster and their ability to cope is an important 
consideration in building resilience. A key to the development of resilience is having had 
the experience of facing a threat and successfully managing the crisis.  The population 
will likely be helped by having concrete information on what to expect and what to do to 
prepare for a terrorism event.274   
Most studies of resilience emerge from countries outside the U.S.  Israel and the 
United Kingdom (UK) have led the world in the study of resilience.  Their research 
focuses on the impact of terrorism on specific populations, including children and an 
emphasis on societal resilience.  Countries that have greater experience with terrorism 
serve as models that may be applicable in the U.S.  Specific criteria including U.S. 
history of resilience, models or education programs, the resilience of children, the role of 
government, and finally, organizational resilience, which includes schools, will be 
analyzed; primarily from Israel and the UK with a correlation to America’s approach. 
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B. U.S. RESILIENCE COMPARED TO ISRAEL AND THE UNITED 
KINGDOM (UK) 
America’s response to 9/11 was dramatic as the nation grounded all air traffic for 
three days, increased security, escalated the list of targets considered to be at-risk, and 
travel, particularly by air, plummeted.  Contrast with the July 2005 terrorist attack in the 
United Kingdom after a coordinated attack on London’s mass transit system that killed 
58 and injured hundreds more.  In spite of the attacks, London’s mass transit system 
resumed some routes the same afternoon and all were resumed after repair.275 Clearly, 
the British population was more resilient after a traumatic event than the American 
population.  The question is why.   
It is not possible to determine the quick return to normalcy of the British, but an 
understanding of resilience suggests that trauma is increased by a number of 
psychological factors.  This includes the population’s preparation for the trauma, their 
perceived ability to cope with trauma, and perhaps most important, experience of 
successful recovery to past trauma.276  Beginning with civilians being targeted by 
German bombers during WWII and continuing through attacks by the Irish Republican 
Army over the past few decades, the British experience with traumatic attacks is greater 
than the U.S. and they have had to learn to live with terror to a much greater extent.277   
A peculiar trend was discovered in the UK by social psychologists where the 
human tendency is to recover better and faster to major trauma than minor trauma.  After 
a bomb killed 11 people and injured 60 others in Enniskillen, Northern Ireland, the 
residents exhibited greater coping behaviors than residents of communities under less 
attack.  The residents of Enniskillen accurately recalled the violent event and actively 
sought social support, often through church attendance and their religiosity.278  In another 
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study, children on the Isle of Wight, Rutter (1979) determined that in the wake of attacks, 
the school environment could foster a sense of achievement in children, enhancing their 
personal growth, and increasing their social contacts.279 
Similar to the reaction after the UK train bombings, Israeli police officials believe 
that citizens, businesses, governmental agencies and other impacted groups need to return 
to daily routines as quickly as possible after an attack.  They stress that the longer the 
delay in returning to normalcy, the greater the impact of the attack.280 Israel does not 
have the external strength of the U.S.  However, they do have a great deal more 
experience with terrorism and school attacks and a natural built-in resiliency that comes 
from that experience.  
Since its establishment in 1948, Israel has been through five major wars.  
According to Danny Brom, the director of the Israel Center for the Treatment of 
Psychotrauma, “as to terrorism we are not talking about PTSD; we are talking about an 
attack on the fabric of society…We have to develop resiliency-building services…We 
will become a stronger society as the result of attempts to weaken us.”281  Resiliency is 
the cornerstone and overarching theme of Israel’s efforts.  Resiliency – in the form of 
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The Israeli government provides realistic information to the public on terrorism.  
On the Home Front Command website, they encourage the proper behavior depending on 
the threat.  Examples include, “How to behave in …” terrorist attacks, fires, earthquakes, 
and the updated, “How to Behave in a Rockets or Mortar Attack,” with the tag line, 
“Correct behavior in the face of daily threats saves lives!”283  
So what about American resilience?  America’s founding is rooted in 
extraordinary challenges from wars to economic struggles, and natural disasters, so 
resilience is not a foreign concept to the U.S.284  From teaching fire prevention in the late 
1950s and hiding under desks from nuclear attacks during the height of the Cold War in 
the 1960s, Americans have evolved to lockdown drills in the last decade to better prepare 
children, and in turn, the community.  Still, something seems to be missing in preparing 
U.S. communities to be resilient.  Instead of self-awareness and focusing on strengths 
including resilience, the tendency is to look for someone to blame as seen with practically 
every mass casualty incident over the last decade (e.g., law enforcement at Columbine 
and VTU, school officials at Beslan, and the government on 9/11 and Katrina).  Blaming 
others does not empower and does not coincide with resilient behavior.  Resilience 
promotes the responsibility of self and not necessarily reliance on others to provide 
protection. 
C. RESILIENCE IN SCHOOLS  
Israeli academia has looked at youth and school violence for more than 30 years.  
Still, many in Israel did not believe school violence was a serious issue until the late 
1990s.285  Early studies did not give more than cursory attention to the role of schools.  
Ofra Ayalon’s “Rescue,” a guidebook for schools was the only instruction manual that  
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existed in Israel in 1979, and contained little more than training teachers and students to 
run to shelters.  The focus in the late 1970s was to help individuals and communities cope 
with emerging violence in Northern Israel border towns.286   
Preparedness is a way of life in Israel and considered a shared responsibility 
between the citizenry and the government.  Every day, Israelis consider the threat of 
terrorism.  Resiliency in the face of terrorist acts has been a hallmark of the Israeli 
approach. As a result, a prepared citizenry is needed from a young age and preparedness 
education is a core part of the school curriculum in all primary schools.287   
Two Israeli projects highlight their resilience, the National School Intervention 
Project (NSIP) and the Building Resilience project.  The impetus behind Israel’s National 
School Intervention Project (NSIP) was the largely unrecognized attention to long-term 
stress and exposure to terrorism.  NSIP was developed over growing concerns with the 
security situation and the impact on the Israeli population.  It was designed for the entire 
school population and framed around resilience and wellness, instead of the typical focus 
of pathology, risk, and treatment.288   
The field of psychological resilience is still in its early childhood, but there is a 
general consensus that factors include self-esteem, coping strategies, social support, hope 
and meaning, optimism, and humor.  In Israel, the Building Resilience project selected 
teachers as the focus of the program since they are in daily contact with children and can, 
therefore, provide the most direct and ongoing support to children experiencing high 
levels of stress and exposure to trauma.  The purpose of the project was to provide  
 
 
                                                 
286 M. Lahad and A. Cohen, “The Community Stress Prevention Center - 18 Years of Community 
Stress Prevention & Intervention,” Community Stress Prevention 3 (1998), 
http://www.icspc.org/_Uploads/dbsAttachedFiles/CSP3(1).pdf (accessed July 19, 2008), 1-9. 
287 Conroy, What is Going to Move the Needle on Citizen Preparedness? Can America Create a 
Culture of Preparedness?, 81. 
288 Naomi L. Baum, “Building Resilience: A School-Based Intervention for Children Exposed to 
Ongoing Trauma and Stress,” in The Trauma of Terrorism. Sharing Knowledge and Shared Care. An 
International Handbook, eds. Yael Danieli, Danny Brom and Joe Sills (New York: The Haworth Press, 
2005), 489. 
 111
teachers with skills and knowledge in the areas of resilience, stress, and exposure to 
trauma, to assist them in their interaction with children, dealing with issues such as fear, 
loss, and dealing with trauma, through improved self-confidence.289 
One of the strategies for protecting the civilian population during times of 
emergency is to utilize high school students to assist the IDF Home Front Command 
Medical Corps by assisting in the distribution of medications and rendering assistance to 
the population in shelters and assist in the hospitals.290  This attitude is not as ingrained 
into the American teenager’s mind as it is in Israel.  Part of the reason may be that Israeli 
students know upon completion of high school that they will be joining the military.  
Schools in Israel and the UK have endured attacks through war and terrorism 
from which the U.S. can learn.  Educators are an influential group that could adopt the 
term resilience like their counterparts in the UK.  However, they must be given the 
proper tools to empower children.  Both Israel and the UK have dedicated:  
• A commitment to citizen preparedness 
• Promoting resiliency in the formative years of childhood. 
• Keeping safety messages clear and simple. 
• Better understanding the psychology of terrorism 
• Improving government trust.291 
Israel has gone a few steps further towards resilience.  Along with the 
aforementioned, the U.S. could possibly apply the following lessons from Israel though 
some may be cost prohibitive:   
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• Interagency cooperation – Israel includes schools in the planning process, 
exercise simulations and critiques of realistic drills and scenarios with all 
agencies that will be involved. 
• Public Education – A major education campaign complete with the 
distribution of necessary literature and safety/medical equipment to 
citizens. 
• The use of advanced technology such as sensors and surveillance cameras. 
• The use of barriers and fences to provide security and buffer zones. 
• The National Police Force School Security Unit concept.292   
In the U.S., the 1984 Project Competence study by Garmezy, Masten, & Tellegen, 
sought to better understand how resiliency influences elementary aged students from 
third to sixth grade under stressful situations.  Two hundred children and their families 
participated over a 10-year period.  Researchers discovered that disadvantaged children 
with lower IQs, socioeconomic status, and diminished family relationships were more 
likely to be disruptive and less competent.  However, some of the disadvantaged children 
were competent and displayed no behavioral problems, which prompted the question, 
why some children did not succumb to the adversity they faced and develop negative 
adaptations.293    
Millions of parents send their children to school daily with the relative comfort 
that schools are a sanctuary from the outside world of violence, terrorism, and other 
threats.  This perceived comfort is rational since most schools operate daily without 
consequential incidents that leave a lasting impact on the school community.  A predictor 
of vulnerability to the effects of mass casualties and hazards is youth and family status.  
Such predictors make schools the ideal choice to incorporate all hazards education that 
will also provide the link to the home and create the greatest impact on the community, 
both immediate and long-term.294 
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Schools operate on a tight schedule with local, state and federal requirements that 
must be met during a school year.  Coupled with greater scrutiny, the higher potential for 
lawsuits and doing more with less, public schools struggle to add yet another component 
to their curriculum.  Homeland security is not high on the requirements list for many 
schools and many school officials believe that disasters happen to other schools and not 
their own.  Consider that school districts often place a heavy reliance on federal and state 
initiatives rather than local emergency plan development and emergency plans run the 
gamut from comprehensive to non-existent.  A report from the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) on school planning and preparedness identifies gaps in 
schools meeting the Homeland Security strategies.  Among the findings were that 32 
states have laws or other policies requiring school districts or schools to have emergency 
management plans, though Congress has not enacted any broad applicable laws requiring 
school districts to have emergency management plans. Also, a survey sampling public 
school districts found an estimated 56% of all school districts have not employed any 
procedures in their plans for continuing student education in the event of an extended 
school closure, such as might occur during a pandemic, and many do not include 
procedures for special needs students.295  
Conceptual and empirical research over the last few decades has examined why 
some students are successful in school while others are not, though they come from the 
same socioeconomic disadvantaged backgrounds. The focus of resilience is not as a fixed 
attribute but something that can be altered and positively impact an individual’s success 
in school.296 
Due to the group dynamics, the social networks, and the amount of time spent 
there, schools fit the model of being able to support students in the coping process.  
Community residents look to school personnel for advice on their child’s development,  
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learning, behavior and planning for his or her future.  Children see teachers as role 
models and mentors.  This responsibility makes the school leaders an important 
component in community efforts to build resilience in children and families.297 
Resilience integration for students and school officials may provide emerging 
leadership during a crisis.  Just because promoting resilience has validity, does not mean 
it will be promoted in schools that have numerous state and federal academic 
requirements to meet.  Hurdles include the limited resources available to schools; limited 
communication between school personnel and parents after a disaster; administrators not 
understanding helpful disaster-related services; and the decrease in family involvement as 
children enter higher school grades, though continued participation from family is 
important to building resilience.298 
D. RESILIENCE IN CHILDREN 
Using a resiliency framework, psychologists have observed repeatedly that 
children and adults exposed to critical incidents will survive emotionally.  In the late 
1970s, the resiliency concept was rather new.  Despite the constant threat and disruption 
of routine, the damage and the casualties, the major phenomena was that children 
demonstrated coping, surviving and managing life.  Surveys have revealed that only 5-
10% of the population manifest acute stress reaction following an incident.  What causes 
the majority of the population to manage and continue their lives productively?  The 
answers are quite simple.  One, people are stronger than expected, and when lives are 
temporarily disrupted, peoples’ responses are simply normal reactions to abnormal 
situations.299   
Case studies reveal that resilience does exist in the U.S. and in its schools.  A look 
at the Amish is not typical Americana, but the manner in which they cope with trauma is 
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inimitable. The Amish are a close-knit community woven together by family, faith, and 
culture who believe that the community should come first, not the individual.  Whether 
the tragedy is fire, flood, illness, or death, the Amish respond by surrounding the 
distressed family with care.  They consider this thick web of support mutual aid.  “The  
Amish grapevine is faster than the Internet,” said one Amish man, who has never sent an 
email.300  The Amish acceptance of community serves as a model that can lead to 
resilience after traumatic events and aid in healing.  
Examples of resilience and altruism in children were evident in case studies.  In 
the small Amish schoolhouse, Roberts tied the feet and legs of the remaining schoolgirls 
telling them, “I’m angry at God and I need to punish some Christian girls to get even with 
Him.”  After calling 911 and ordering law enforcement to leave the school area, he told 
the girls, “I’m going to make you pay for my daughter.”  One of the two thirteen-year old 
girls, Marian knew his plan was to kill them and assumed a leadership role to protect the 
younger girls. Telling Roberts, “Shoot me first,” Marian hoped to save the others and 
fulfill her duty to watch over the little ones in her care.  Marian was one of three 
pronounced dead at the school.301  
Jacob Ryker was struck by a bullet from a .22-caliber semiautomatic rifle that 
pierced his right lung, sending him tumbling backward over a cafeteria bench at Thurston 
High School on his 17th birthday.  Injured and seeing his girlfriend shot, Jacob untangled 
his foot from the bench and charged 10 to 15 feet toward Kinkel who was reloading.  
Jacob knocked Kinkel to the floor, subduing him.  Jacob told his mother, 'He had been 
shooting people, and I wasn't going to let him shoot again.'  “This was perfectly 
consistent with his character, thinking about other people instead of himself,” said Gary 
Bowden, who coaches wrestling and teaches social studies.  “He was angry that his 
girlfriend got shot. It was just like Jake to go after him. He wouldn't have been afraid.”302  
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An adolescent during the terrorist siege in Beslan volunteered to stand in front of 
the window to protect the terrorists.  At the time, he was thinking that he had already seen 
a lot of things in life, so he wanted his little brother to live some more, because he still 
needed to see lots of things.303 
The biggest question is why?  What causes certain children to exhibit significant 
courage to fight and accept fate, instead of running from danger?  Numerous factors may 
be involved including a person’s faith, their family upbringing, or their previous 
experience in dealing with stress or trauma.  The manner in which children adapt to 
adversity includes the way youngsters view and engage the world, the availability and 
quality of social resources and support, and the presence of specific coping strategies.304 
Two studies identified several factors can influence a child’s resilience.  Benard 
noted in 1993  that resilience is typically displayed by four characteristics: (1) social 
competence, (2) problem-solving skills, (3) autonomy and (4) a sense of purpose.305  In 
1994, four other related factors were cited by McMillan and Reed  including: (1) personal 
attributes such as motivation and goal orientation, (2) positive use of time including on-
task behavior, homework completion, and participation in extracurricular activities, (3) 
family life (e.g., family support and expectations), and (4) school and classroom learning 
environment (i.e., facilities, exposure to technology, leadership, and overall climate).306 
Flynn lists four factors to sustaining resilience.   
1. Robustness.  The ability to keep operating in the face of disaster.  Built-in 
redundancy or substitutable systems that can be utilized if something 
breaks or stops working. 
2. Resourcefulness.  Skillfully managing a disaster once it unfolds.  What are 
the options, what should be done to mitigate the problem, and 
communicating who is going to implement the procedure?  
Resourcefulness is a product of people, not technology.   
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3. Rapid Recovery.  Getting back to normal as quick as possible following a 
disaster.  This includes prepared operations and contingency plans, and 
engaging citizens, i.e., Community Emergency Response Training 
(CERT) as auxiliary first responders, and utilizing non-governmental 
vendors as resources and expertise.   
4. Absorbing Lessons Learned.  Once the disaster has been resolved, it is 
foolish to repeat the same mistakes that worsened the disaster in the first 
place.  This includes recognizing communication failures and resolving to 
correct them, and taking financial responsibility for living in a floodplain 
and deciding to repeatedly rebuild in the same location with the same 
result.307 
Just because children are more vulnerable does not mean they are inherently not 
resilient.  However, children need order when their lives have been disrupted.  By 
promoting resilience, their vulnerability can be reduced by improving their access to 
resources and information, empowering them through increased participation in disaster 
preparedness and response activities, offering personal and community support, and 
providing proper treatment in recovery.308  
When promoting community resilience, the vulnerability of children and their 
resilience capability is a critical component of preparedness and recovery.  During the 
London Blitz, London youth were evacuated to the countryside to escape German 
bombers.  It was discovered that the prolonged family disruption was causing a greater 
negative impact on the children than the direct impact of violence or destruction.309  
After direct exposure to political attacks from 1974 to 1980, psychologists observed 
psychological difficulties in youths.  They noted the symptoms of avoidance and 
hypervigilance, which would soon be termed PTSD.310 
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The BASIC Ph model was developed in Israel to promote coping strategies in 
Israel and elsewhere.  Using multiple modalities to explain mental resilience in stressful 
situations, BASIC Ph examines six fundamental characteristics that are at the core of an 
individual’s coping style.   
• Beliefs and values that allow coping through self-reliance and clear 
values, views, and beliefs. 
• Affect and emotion when a person copes by expressing affect of all types. 
• Social coping by seeking support in friendships, social settings, and 
organizations. 
• Imagination strengthens coping through imaginary playmates or 
situations. 
• Cognition and thought where coping is enabled by their own knowledge, 
thoughts and common sense. 
• Physiology and activities allows coping by engaging in physical activities 
and resources. 
The BASIC Ph model has been used in response to a variety of incidents that 
include Tel Aviv during the Gulf War and various military operations.  To study the 
coping styles of children, the model was used in two different incidents.  First, during 
school evacuations in Kiryat Shmona and next, involving junior high students in Afula 
exposed to a suicide car bombing.  Three girls and four adults were killed, and eight 
classmates were injured.  The results of the BASIC Ph model demonstrated its usefulness 
in working with children to assist them use their natural coping style and expanding their 
coping mechanisms to help reduce tension and prevent posttraumatic stress.311 
E. GOVERNMENT TRUST 
Preparedness is a partnership.312  Most people pay closer attention to the opinions 
of family and friends than to distant sources such as the media and government officials. 
The individual’s specific circumstances are more likely to play into their decisions than 
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dangers communicated from large-scale sources.313  One of the obstacles facing the U.S. 
that is not as prevalent in the UK and practically nonexistent in Israel is the lack of 
credibility and government trust.  The trust in its government to manage disasters 
plummeted in the aftermath of the Hurricane Katrina response. 
Conversely, Israeli citizens place a great deal of trust in their government; 
specifically, the Home Front Command (HFC).  U.S. citizens are not inclined to heed 
homeland security threat warnings, and other alerts that often appear frivolous, such as 
the use of duct tape and plastic.314  Therefore, resilience strategies will more likely be 
successful through local communication and a heavy reliance on what is working for 
people nearby rather than on messages about what a distant government assures the 
public is the right thing to do.315  The majority of the U.S. public believes that terrorism 
will occur within the country, but not to them.  The message communicated to the public 
needs to be credible.316   
As in the UK, local law enforcement is critical to school protection and are more 
engaged with schools than their U.S. counterparts.  Israeli police determine the school’s 
policy and guidelines and each police station has an officer in charge of school security.  
If an incident occurs, the police have full and complete control. They and other first 
responders maintain possession of each school’s security plan that is supervised by the 
Ministry of Education.317  
Israeli anti-terror protection programs reduce other school related crimes 
including drugs, violence, vandalism and theft.  School protection plans incorporate all 
local law enforcement and emergency agencies including the municipality, bomb 
disposal units, fire department, ambulance services, hospitals and the PTA.  School 
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security provides a complex response to all fields relating to human life and property and 
that security assists in protecting academic freedom and free spirits. The security 
response requires an evaluation of threats, environment, population, installation, 
combined forces and a list of priorities.318 
Public places, including schools have guards posted at their entrances to check 
visitors' bags.319  Conroy aptly provides anecdotal stories from Israeli citizens that 
highlight their resilience in light of constant terror threats.  “In the U.S., bags may be 
checked for shoplifting when leaving a mall.  In Israel, they are checked for explosives as 
you enter.” All students from elementary to high school receive instruction on how to 
protect themselves, and teachers learn how to protect their children from terror attacks.320 
The United Kingdom and Israel have an extensive history of school attacks and 
unlike those countries, the U.S. does not have a national school system.  And, it is not 
realistic for the U.S. to nationalize educational emergency preparedness since schools 
have diverse needs including their urban or rural settings and geography.  Having federal 
oversight and initiatives from the Department of Education does not equate to a national 
policy on school security.  Though the UK serves as a model of resilience, there are 
lessons that the U.S. can teach them as well.  Dr. Jane Eyre from the UK suggests their 
population take a queue from Americans when it comes to engaging citizens in the post-
9/11 world.  Eyre cites Citizen Corps and the promotion of Community Emergency 
Response Teams (CERT) as a model for large-scale incidents where first responders may 
not be readily available to respond.321 
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F. ORGANIZATIONAL RESILIENCE/SCHOOLS 
The National Response Framework (NRF) is the national guide promoting all 
hazards response and encourages resilient communities at the local level by preparing 
individuals and tending to the most vulnerable.322  Resilience strategies will assist 
individuals and groups in the response phase by having strategies in place prior to an 
emergency.   
Though families play the most critical role in supporting child disaster survivors, 
schoolteachers demonstrated their importance with Katrina-evacuated children by helping 
them cope with the tremendous loss of the disaster.323  This intensifies the role of the 
schools for the physical and psychological well-being of children.  With an average of six 
hours a day, 180 days per year, schools are essential components of community 
preparedness, response, and recovery.  Teachers and parents can provide input to assure 
children they will be cared for and not be left alone.  These two factors are critical to the 
psychological well-being and recovery of victims of disaster and mass violence.324 
Before children can learn the lessons of resilience, the concept must be adopted 
by organizations, including schools.  The hostage taking at Platte Canyon is a prime 
example of the importance of the knowledge that the individual or the community has 
beforehand that increases their chances for survival and enhances the recovery process.  
In Platte Canyon, it was primarily the school officials’ awareness of lockdown 
procedures, and the first responders’ knowledge of Columbine that prepared them with 
the active shooter policy to mitigate the situation.  Without the lessons of Columbine, 
Platte Canyon or any school could have suffered the same tragedy. 
First responders have been studied as a group and are considered highly resilient, 
in part because of their numerous experiences with tragedy and coping.  The tragedy at 
Columbine resulted in developing organizational resilience in law enforcement (active 
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shooter policies).  Public health and the fire service, by virtue of their missions, are 
resilient-oriented organizations.  Outside of conventional first responder organizations, 
Rick Rescorla turned Morgan Stanley Dean Witter into a resilient organization.  As the 
head of security for Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, the largest tenant of the building at the 
World Trade Center, the first World Trade Center bombing was a wake up call for Rick 
Rescorla that would factor in saving lives on 9/11.  Rescorla knew it was foolish for them 
to rely on first responders to save his employees.  He was met with great resistance as he 
forced his employees to participate in many surprise fire drills.  After the first tower was 
hit, Port Authority officials urged the tenants of the second tower to remain at their desks.  
Rescorla ignored the direction and systematically ordered Morgan Stanley employees 
out.  By the time the second plane hit, Rescorla had led his employees from the 73rd floor 
to the 44th floor. At the time of collapse, the 2,687 Morgan Stanley employees were safe.  
Only 13, including Rescorla and four of his security officers were inside.325 
In the UK, policymakers have adopted the term resilience to describe the ways 
they would like to reduce the nation’s susceptibility to major incidents of all kinds by 
reducing their probability of occurring.  The ‘resilience agenda’ achieves this by building 
institutions and structures in such a way that minimizes possible effects of disruption. 
This is accomplished by doing the following three things: 
1. Build a comprehensive capability for anticipating major incidents to 
prevent them or take action in advance that will mitigate their effects. 
2. Ensure that planning for response and recovery is geared to the risk 
therefore ensuring preparedness. 
3. Promote a culture of resilience including business continuity thus helping 
to reduce the disruptive effects of disaster.326 
Along with promoting resilience, mental health and school officials can promote 
the idea of psychological first aid (PFA).  PFA is a group of skills identified to limit 
distress and negative health behaviors that can increase fear, arousal, and subsequent 
health care utilization.  Though no evidence is currently available to test its efficacy, 
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there is a push to promote PFA as a national strategic intervention to provide possible 
benefits in dealing with the psychological consequences of dealing with smaller scale 
random acts of violence.  Similar to physical first aid that helps in coping with life’s 
stressful and traumatic events, the idea is to promote community resilience and prevent 
adverse psychological effects.327 
G. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
After the attack on Beslan, Israel was viewed as the one country capable of 
understanding what the Russians had been through and the country that has necessarily 
developed techniques in dealing with consequences of such experiences.  Numerous 
Israeli psychologists traveled to Beslan to treat the hostages and their families, as well as 
assisting their Russian counterparts to continue the therapy after their departure.  They 
were invited because the Russians see the Israelis as able to handle their plight by living 
with terror everyday, and being able to bring a realistic approach to Beslan.328 
Lessons from disastrous fires have shown that up-front knowledge is proven 
effective in the realm of fire education in schools.  Hundreds of children died in school 
fires and explosions until 50 years ago when society had had enough.  Children and 
school officials were taught the proper actions if fire was to occur.  The anticipated fear 
and panic when “scaring” the children never happened.  Instead, the fire drill became an 
example of teaching child preparedness to increase their chances of survival without 
causing panic.  Similar results can be found with seatbelt and recycling campaigns.329     
Resilience is not only applicable to terrorism or war.  In this generation, natural 
disasters in the U.S. have provided all too many opportunities to embrace resilience.  
Building resilience in every community is crucial to managing the disaster and 
accounting for all individuals as demonstrated by Hurricane Katrina.  When the next 
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pandemic occurs, adopting community resiliency to help others will help alleviate fear, 
provide the most vulnerable with the care needed, and households will be equipped with 
emergency supplies.330 
Individuals can be mobilized and community resiliency can be fostered if a 
comprehensive plan is in place and responsibility is distributed to the point where no one 
party is overtaxed.  Since they are in every community, the public school system is 
uniquely established to deliver to even the most vulnerable populations that would 
otherwise be inaccessible.331   
There remains a lack of public discussion on the concept of resilience.  To a large 
extent, there has been a failure to promote psychological resilience and address the long-
term process of recovery and continuity.  Greater attention should focus on improving the 
coping skills of American school children and the schools they attend.  Not only should 
the U.S. model Israel by taking the “terror” out of terrorism, the U.S. should accept 
resiliency as the cornerstone and overarching theme in the form of an equipped, educated, 
and psychologically prepared community as the only true way to confront and defeat 
terrorism.332  The final chapter will provide recommendations on adopting a resilient 
mindset that can be applied to U.S. schools in collaboration with other disciplines. 
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VII. RECOMMENDATIONS  
Schools are a natural location to teach resilience but they cannot do it alone.  It 
requires familial, community, and first responder support to be successful and 
indoctrinated into a resilient culture.  Lessons learned are only that if applied.   
A. EXPANDING RESPONSE TEAMS WITH A FOCUS ON RECOVERY  
There is a great need to invest in the training and response of traditional first 
responders that include law enforcement, fire service, mental health, and emergency 
management.  Often overlooked are school personnel, though they are the first on scene 
of a school disaster and expected to take charge, perform actions that lead to safety, and 
calming the fears of a large, vulnerable population.  Time is of the essence when disaster 
strikes and school personnel are expected to lead their students to safety.   
In the past decade, many schools have implemented the use of Crisis Response 
Teams (CRTs).  The purpose of CRTs is to handle emergency situations within their own 
schools.  Prior to disasters occurring, schools can incorporate a network within a school 
district and even within a single school that tasks itself much in the way first responders 
have with the formation of incident management teams.333  Experience has shown that 
school officials should incorporate the positions used in ICS, such as the need for a public 
information officer (PIO) at Platte Canyon, and a school liaison officer that can manage 
the influx of numerous agencies and parents.334 
First responders utilize mutual aid during operational and recovery phases, 
especially if they become too emotionally involved from prolonged exposure to mass 
casualties.  The schools, with less disaster experience, will endure similar emotions.  Just 
as first responders incorporate incident command and utilize mutual aid resources when 
local resources are tapped, schools will face similar circumstances.  Widespread disasters 
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from natural or intentional reasons will limit resources and first responders may not be 
coming right away.  Schools should accept the possibility that they may need to be self-
reliant until more help arrives.  Creating partnerships should occur in the planning and 
preparedness phase to establish positive relationships that may come into play during a 
disaster.  The time to foster such relationships is not in the midst of a disaster.335 
This author maintains that for mass casualty incidents, it will not be practical for 
the affected school to employ their CRT to manage the event.  If the event is significant 
enough, the entire school district may be too emotionally involved to effectively manage 
the disaster.  Schools that are attacked or victimized will be too emotionally involved to 
effectively manage the crisis at hand.   
School districts should consider establishing teams that branch into the outer 
circles of involvement.  Just as victims are less impacted the further they are from the 
inner circles, the same would apply to response team members.  If specific criteria are 
met as defined by schools, activation of a response team at the county level should be 
considered.   
Furthermore, should they be called response teams?  Higher impact disasters 
would realistically limit any response from school officials for a prolonged period during 
the event.  These include violent episodes such as shootings or terrorist acts that place all 
within the school building in lockdown mode.  Not to mention the fact that response 
teams will be absorbed in their own crises.   
More appropriate would be the formation of crisis recovery teams that come from 
area schools, districts, or counties.  It is not about titles; it is about function.  The event’s 
aftermath is when the teams will be most needed and best utilized.  After the first 
responders have left as potential heroes, and sometimes the recipients of blame, the 
school officials will be left to deal with the psychological trauma of students and staff, 
and the physical continuity of school operations.   
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Single schools, and maybe districts, may not have sufficient resources to assist in 
the management of large-scale disasters.  However, county resources are usually enough 
to model the first responders’ incident command system.  This is not meant to preclude 
further needs that may require state educational resources for events such as Hurricane 
Katrina, terrorism attacks, or potential pandemics.  Like ICS, the school’s resource needs 
could expand or contract as needed.  To keep crisis team members engaged in what could 
be long waiting periods between incidents, they should actively engage with safety 
partners in conducting threat assessments and training on a routine basis.    
No one is more familiar with the school and the students than school teachers, 
SROs, and especially with the school layout and operation, the custodians.  Adding 
mental health professionals and law enforcement representatives would help add 
experience to the emergency services system where schools lack experience.  Specialized 
professionals are valuable resources that can aid in preparedness, planning and 
response.336  
Specialized professionals are valuable resources that can aid in preparedness, 
planning and response.337  Adding mental health professionals, law enforcement 
representatives, and fire prevention specialists, such as the local fire marshal, would help 
add experience to the emergency services system where schools lack experience.   
B. PROVIDE A STRONGER LINK BETWEEN SCHOOLS AND PUBLIC 
HEALTH  
Public health can be a helpful partner in prevention, preparedness and response 
efforts and can help schools address the long road to recovery if a traumatic incident 
occurs.  Public health has largely been a victim of its own success.  Following the 
eradication of the last known smallpox case in Ethiopia in 1977, and other infectious 
diseases that long plagued society, they were rewarded with continuous cuts in funding.   
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The anthrax scares of 2001 and associated hoaxes exposed U.S. public health 
shortcomings and resulted in a resurgence that looked at public health’s role in disasters 
of all types.338   
Similar to fire prevention education, perhaps nowhere may the opportunity to 
promote community resilience be better than for health emergencies, where the biggest 
concern for schools would be food or beverage contamination.  Schools should 
coordinate with public health officials should prepare plans in dealing with the response 
and mitigation of biological threats.339 
Public health is prevention oriented and capable of promoting wellness education, 
including resilience in schools.  The goals of public mental health are: (a) protection of 
the general population through preventive measures; (b) early detection of and 
intervention for populations at risk; and (c) reducing symptom severity and functional 
impairment among people with chronic psychiatric disabilities.340  
The New York Board of Education came up with the following “lessons learned” 
in regards to mental health considerations during and following the 9/11 attacks. 
• Engage experts in the design of mental health response.  New York 
officials utilized the few experts there were in such disasters-Oklahoma 
City and the World Trade Center bombing (1993).   
• Data and information gathering.  A needs assessment provided the 
appropriate tools of scientific and psychological data gathering.  The 
compilation of assessments gathered by the BOE will constitute a 
tremendous contribution to field for those who suffer similar attacks in the 
future. 
• Quality control assurance.  Many people will rush to assist following a 
mass casualty incident.  Mechanisms for screening the individuals are 
needed, as is the need to handle the enormous number of phone calls with 
qualified, informed individuals. 
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• Provide staff with mental health services.  Staff will require many of the 
psychological needs that children will, yet they may be overlooked.  BOE 
Crisis management and mental health services were made available to 
staff. 
• Mental Health Crisis Team pre-planning is critical.  9/11 and other 
large-scale disasters will overwhelm the resources that are currently 
available in schools.  It is imperative that relationships are formed and 
developed with consultants, mental health professionals and other referral 
organizations for a crisis team. 
• Mental health services should address the needs of the entire family.  
Traditional treatment would focus solely on the child.  The child’s role 
within the family context must be recognized to effectively support the 
child.341 
C. ENGAGE LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 
At the collegiate level, there existed a good relationship between law enforcement 
agencies in Blacksburg and the VTPD.  However, gaps existed that prevented the sharing 
of information between law enforcement and school officials.  This gap enabled Cho to 
slip through the cracks.  One of the most critical components in relation to first 
responders is clearly defining the role of school liaison officers or SROs.  In U.S. high 
schools, SROs are most likely to be the first to engage school shooters or terrorists.  Law 
enforcement and school officials should have a clear, cohesive understanding of what the 
SRO is and what the SRO is not.     
After Columbine, the U.S. Secret Service and U.S. Department of Education 
embarked on the Safe School Initiative to identify information that could be obtainable, 
or “knowable,” prior to an attack.  The report sought to understand the thinking, planning 
and other pre-attack behaviors engaged in by shooters who targeted and carried out 
school shootings.  The ten key findings from the Safe School Initiative that will have 
implications for the development of strategies to address the problem of targeted school 
violence are: 
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• Incidents of targeted violence at school rarely are sudden, impulsive acts. 
• Prior to most incidents, other people knew about the attacker’s idea and/or 
plan to attack. 
• Most attackers did not threaten their targets directly prior to advancing the 
attack. 
• There is no accurate or useful profile of students who engaged in targeted 
school violence. 
• Most attackers engaged in some behavior prior to the incident that caused 
others concern or indicated a need for help. 
• Most attackers had difficulty coping with significant losses or personal 
failures.  Moreover, many had considered or attempted suicide.   
• Many attackers felt bullied, persecuted, or injured by others prior to the 
attack. 
• Most attackers had access to and had used weapons prior to the attack. 
• In many cases, other students were involved in some capacity. 
• Despite prompt law enforcement responses, most shooting incidents were 
stopped by means other than law enforcement intervention.342 
Schools are soft targets that are vulnerable to attack as demonstrated in Beslan.  
Russia has to live with the fact that hundreds were killed including children at an 
unprotected school.  The lessons are available that allow a proactive approach before 
disaster strikes.  The reaction to 9/11 included federalizing airport security with the 
formation of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA).  If the U.S. can react by 
federalizing airport security, consideration should be given to standardizing approaches 
to school security, including the role of SROs.  This does not advocate another 
governmental bureaucracy or federalizing SROs, similar to Israel’s National Police Force 
School Security Unit.  However, the debate could be made that schools are more 
vulnerable to attack than airplanes.  Standardized training, minimum qualifications, and 
physical requirements would provide consistent expectations, increase professionalism, 
and may serve as a deterrent from those considering attacks.  As pointed out at 
Columbine, the roles of SROs are ambiguous and without standards.   
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Lockdown drills should be discussed as there are numerous scenarios that can 
occur.  Bomb threats, explosions, gunmen, and chemical releases will require different 
responses from sheltering in place to evacuation.  Are there secondary options to initiate 
lockdown procedures or is the front office the only option?  Gunmen will not check in at 
the front office and with the numerous points of entry, they may enter from a remote, 
unnoticed area of the school.  Ten, twenty, fifty years from now, will the modern 
lockdown protocols still apply?  In other words, lockdown procedures have existed for 
nearly a decade as a reaction to known threats.  It is the unknown threats that may present 
complex situations that require different actions, including prompt escape from teachers 
and students.  Lockdown policies should not be static and need continuous assessment to 
consider alternative solutions for alternative situations.  Any considerations will require 
the vital input from law enforcement. 
First responders, primarily from law enforcement need to consider and plan for 
worst-case scenarios involving schools.  After action reports and case studies have shown 
law enforcement vulnerabilities and challenges following mass casualty incidents at 
schools.  They need to place an added emphasis on perimeter control and security, whose 
absence played such a crucial role in Beslan.  Many parents and bystanders will be 
arriving before first responders and will add to scene confusion.  It is imperative for law 
enforcement to take control early as the situation develops.  Before tactical or fiscal 
considerations, parents, school officials, and first responders must first consider the 
reality that such an event could happen, and adopt the mental and psychological 
preparation that will be required.343 
D. EDUCATE PARENTS 
Information sharing is a critical component and parents should be involved in 
emergency planning.  However, training of parents is easier said than done.  Generally, 
the older their children get, the less involved parents become in school life.  Schools have 
become proxy daycare centers as both parents are often working full-time jobs, and have 
other commitments.  It is naïve to believe that parents, even informed ones, will obey all 
                                                 
343 Giduck, Terror at Beslan, 288. 
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instructions to stay away from emergency scenes.  The data from the history of school 
disasters have revealed crowd control as a serious issue.  However, first responders, 
mental health professionals, and school officials can collaborate to deliver training to 
community residents.  Topics should include the roles and responsibilities of the 
numerous agencies that will be responding to a mass casualty incident, and the expected 
role of parents that will provide them the information they need.   
Absent from all case studies, was a significant pre-existing relationship that 
allowed parents to know the first responders and school officials.  Making the effort to 
share information with parents can go a long way towards establishing confidence and 
public trust towards governmental agencies - whether they are schools or first responders.  
Parents are likely to be more cooperative if they know schools are watching out for their 
children’s interest.  In fairness, parents should bear some of the responsibility in 
preparing their children to be self-reliant and not place the full burden on schools and 
first responders.  The reality is that the public is not held to the same expectation.  More 
effective in educating parents is the transfer of information from teachers to children to 
home.  Projects that require parental acknowledgement of receiving educational materials 
increase the chances of interaction and involvement with their children.  
E. PROMOTE RESILIENCE IN SCHOOLS 
Fire deaths in schools have been all but eliminated as no one has died in a school 
fire in American schools in decades.  Unfortunately, it took the deaths of hundreds in 
numerous conflagrations until society demanded safer schools through building 
construction, fire protection systems including sprinklers, and teaching children how to 
react in the event of a fire.  This was also preparing them in the pre-event phase, which 
ingrained knowledge and provided options during perilous times as seen with the Flight 
93 passengers on 9/11.   
The brain can be trained to respond more appropriately in times of high stress, 
which may improve performance by reducing fear.  While safety rituals such as fire drills 
and listening to a flight attendant’s safety points are largely considered a waste of time, 
they are proven to be utilized when needed and increase chances of life safety.  As a loud  
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sound will cause animals to snap from their stupor, many flight attendants are being 
trained to scream at passengers on burning planes, “Get out! Get out! Go!”  People 
respond well to leadership during a crisis.344   
The essence of time in survival has been highlighted.  New smoke alarms have a 
feature that allows parents to record their voice to command their children to wake up 
during a fire.  The smoke alarm was developed after numerous incidents of children and 
adolescents not waking up to the beeping smoke alarm.  The authority of their parent’s 
voice yelling at them has proven to be more effective in waking them up in a timely 
fashion.345   
From first responders to school officials to children, knowing what to do can 
mean the difference between life and death.  Just as fire prevention education does not 
require vast amounts of education dollars, nor should strengthening resilience.  Mental 
health and other first responders need to get more engaged with the school community 
similar to the decade’s long successes of fire prevention education.  Fire prevention has 
increased resilience for children by empowering them on a regular basis on how they can 
protect themselves from fire.  This will also help parents get informed as they receive 
resilient messages on a routine basis.   
Advanced knowledge and experience will enhance resilience.  Conversely, 
children that are uninformed regarding hazards, warnings, evacuation and other 
protective behaviors are at greater risk for death and injury when disaster strikes.346  
During extreme stress, brains search for an appropriate survival response.  Sometimes, 
the wrong response is chosen, like the deer that freeze in the headlights of a car.  If 
trained properly, the brain can respond with less fear, making paralysis less likely.  A 
look at the fire prevention education model shows the importance of mind conditioning.  
During mandatory and unexpected fire drills, if the worst comes to pass, knowledge of 
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exits and stair locations can dramatically reduce fear.347  This does not suggest scaring 
children with inappropriate warnings of terrorists coming to their school.  It does suggest 
empowering children with understanding the difference between evacuation and shelter 
in place, and between primary and secondary egress.  It also suggests that there be a 
secondary meeting place outside in case the first meeting place is compromised.  Being 
prepared, trained and proactive in U.S. schools mitigated the fire threat.348   
Children in Israel are taught to take the “terror” out of terrorism.  Schools in the 
U.S. can similarly provide realistic mental conditioning from an early age that will 
empower children and increase resilience.  It may also encourage altruistic behavior that 
promotes taking care of those less able as seen during many school incidents.  Obviously, 
there is increased sensitivity in teaching terrorism preparedness, particularly in the U.S. 
where the threat is still not considered viable by many.  Resilience can still be taught 
without specifically focusing on terrorism.  The next natural disaster, influenza outbreak, 
or any other threat can be better handled by providing an operational mindset before the 
event occurs.   
Unlike natural threats, terrorism preparedness has much less to do with voluntary 
responsibility of the citizens for their children.  Rather, it is the responsibility of local 
governments and their school systems to safely account for children during the school 
day.  Even as the government urges through the Department of Homeland Security’s 
(DHS) www.ready.gov website that urges Americans to stock “ready kits” of basic 
supplies in their homes, schools, which are run by the government and house children 
five days a week, should practice what they preach by stocking the same supplies.  Yet 
very few schools stock such emergency supplies.349 
                                                 
347 Ripley, How to Survive a Disaster, 43. . 
348 Lake, Publishers Letter, 1. 
349 Allison Phinney, Preparedness in America's Schools: A Comprehensive Look at Terrorism 
Preparedness in America's Twenty Largest School Districts (The America Prepared Campaign, Inc., 
September 2004), www.workplaceviolence911.com/docs/20040916.pdf (accessed August 19, 2007), 4-5. 
 135
F. FUTURE RESEARCH 
1. The Impact of Terrorism on Children 
Future contributions to research should focus on many aspects of recovery 
including what becomes of children that have survived mass casualty incidents?  Fires 
and other natural disasters have provided a rich history of how survivors have either 
coped, or proven their inability to move on. 
Mental health professionals need to differentiate conventional trauma from the 
impact of terrorism.  Community ideology, beliefs, and cultural values, allow children to 
give meaning to traumatic events and promote adaptive functioning in everyday life – 
even under extreme conditions.  Even after one of the worst European atrocities targeting 
a civilian population in Beslan, there is still a paucity of research analyzing the negative 
health impact on children, families, and the entire community.  More research is needed 
to address the effects of terrorism on the mental health of children and their families.  
This will increase the efficiency of mental health services and help professionals be better 
prepared in supporting communities affected by terrorism.350 
G. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Though inherently resilient, the entire community from parents, first responders, 
and school officials, can increase a child’s resilience through formalized programs.  First 
responders from law enforcement, the fire service, and public health have a vested 
interest in preparing schools and children for the consequential impact of mass casualty 
incidents.  They often have the personnel that can provide training to children and 
educators as they have with fire prevention, DARE, and public health awareness.  Mental 
health professionals should take the lead role in developing resilience strategies so that 
the proper information is being disseminated and received.  While hoping for the best in 
crisis situations, the lack of experience and coping skills will cause greater harm to 
children and the community.  The human tendency is to react after a disaster occurs.  
Preparedness planning, training and collaboration between schools, public safety 
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agencies and government emergency management authorities can mitigate the impact of 
emergencies, improve responses and accelerate recovery.  The pre-event phase is the 
proper time to encourage resiliency; not when dealing with the long-term recovery 
process.   
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APPENDIX.  FATAL SCHOOL SHOOTINGS IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
1966 - 2007 
 
DATE LOCATION DESCRIPTION 
N/A N/A Statistics computed solely by analyzing the 
information located in this compilation. 
N/A N/A General articles/information 
Aug. 1, 1966 Austin, TX Charles Whitman, 25, points a rifle from the 
observation deck of the University of Texas at 
Austin’s Tower and begins shooting in a homicidal 
rampage that goes in for 96 minutes, Sixteen people 
are killed, 31 wounded. 
 
Feb. 8, 1968 
 
May 4, 1970 
 







This index does not include the incidents involving 
protests. 
July 12, 1976 Fullerton, CA Edward Charles Allaway, 37, a custodian at the Cal 
State Fullerton Library, shoots nine people in the 
basement and first floor of the library with a .22 
caliber rifle. The shootings occur shortly before 9:00 
am, when the library was scheduled to open. Seven 
of the nine wounded victims die. The victims were 
his fellow university employees. Incident coined 
“Fullerton Library Massacre.” 
Jan. 29, 1979 San Diego, CA Brenda Ann Spencer, 16, wounds eight children and 
one police officer and kills the principal and 
custodian when she opens fire across the street from 
her San Diego home. Spencer tells police that she 
killed two people and wounded nine because she 
“didn’t like Mondays.” She is in prison. 
Jan. 20, 1983 St. Louis, MO Eight-grader, at Parkway South Junior High School, 
David Lawler, 14, shoots two of his classmates then 
turns the gun on himself and commits suicide. David 
brought two guns to school and used one of them on 
himself to end the violence. 
Jan. 21, 1985 Goddard, KS James Allen Kearbey, 14, armed with a M1-A semi-
automatic rifle and a .357-caliber handgun, kills the 
principal and wounds two teachers and a student at 
his Goddard Junior High School. Kearbey pleaded 
no contest and served seven years in a state youth 
facility. 
May 20, 1988 Winnetka, IL Laurie Dann, 30, shoots six students at an 
elementary school, killing one second-grader. She 




DATE LOCATION DESCRIPTION 
Sept. 26, 1988 Greenwood, SC James Wilson, 19, opens fire in an elementary 
school. He shoots seven students and two teachers. 
Two 8-year-old girls die. 
Jan. 17, 1989 Stockton, CA Patrick Edward Purdy, a disturbed resident, opens 
fire on the Cleveland Elementary School playground 
with a semi-automatic, Type 56, assault rifle, killing 
five children and wounding 29 others and a teacher. 
The fatalities, (ranging from 6-years-old to 9-years-
old) were all Cambodian immigrants, except for one 
child who was born in Vietnam. Incident is coined 
the “Stockton Massacre.” 
Nov. 1, 1991 Iowa City, IA Gang Lu, 28, a graduate student in physics from 
China, reportedly upset because he was passed over 
for an academic honor, opens fire in two buildings 
on the University of Iowa Campus. Five University 
of Iowa employees are killed, including four 
members of the physics department. Two other 
people are wounded. Lu fatally shoots himself. 
Dec. 14, 1992 Great Barrington, MA Wayne Lo, 18, student at Simon’s Rock College of 
Bard, approaches a security-guard shack on the 
campus and begins shooting, as he says now, “at 
anything that moved.” Lo fires at least nine rounds 
during the following 20 minutes, killing another 
student and a Spanish professor and wounding four 
others. Lo had not adjusted well to the liberal college 
environment. He held conservative views, which 
were deemed racist, homophobic and anti-Semitic by 
fellow students at the college. Steadily he had 
become more and more excluded by his fellow 
students. 
Nov. 15, 1995 Lynnville, TN James Rouse, 17, a student at Richland High School, 
kills one student and one teacher. Another teacher is 
seriously wounded. Rouse was convicted as an adult 
of two counts of first degree murder and one count 
of attempted murder. He was sentenced to life in 
prison without parole. 
Feb. 2, 1996 Moses Lake, WA Barry Loukaitis, 14, walks into algebra class with a 
hunting rifle in his trench coat and opens fire, killing 
the teacher and two students. Years before the 
shooting, his father began an affair and his mother 
became increasingly distant and often spoke of 
suicide. She frequently implied that Barry would 
also have to kill himself. In January of 1996, she 
informed Barry the date of the double-suicide would 
be Valentine’s Day. However, it is widely believed, 
and he himself claimed that relentless bullying at the 
school impelled him to this murderous rampage. 
Incident coined “Frontier Junior High Shooting.” 
Aug. 15, 1996 San Diego, CA Frederick Martin Davidson, 36, a graduate 
engineering student at San Diego State, is defending 
his thesis before a faculty committee when he pulls 
out a handgun and kills three professors. 
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DATE LOCATION DESCRIPTION 
Feb. 19, 1997 Bethel, AK Evan Ramsey, 16, opens fire with a shotgun in a 
common area of his high school, killing the principal 
and a student and wounding two others. Ramsey was 
sentenced to two 99-year prison terms. 
Oct. 1, 1997 Pearl, MS Luke Woodham, 16, brutally beats and stabs his 
mother, Mary Woodham to death and then drives  
her car to his high school. Wearing a blue-denim 
jacket, he makes no attempt to hide his rifle. He 
enters Pearl High School and shoots nine students. 
Two students died, including the suspect’s ex-
girlfriend. He goes on to wound seven others before 
the assistant principal retrieves a .45 caliber pistol 
from the glove compartment of his truck and 
subdues Woodham while he was trying to drive off 
the campus. Woodham confessed to shooting his 
classmates, but he claimed not to remember killing 
his mother. He pleaded insanity, but the jury rejected 
the insanity defense, and instead found him guilty. 
Dec. 1, 1997 West Paducah, KY Michael Carneal, 14, opens fire on a group of 
praying students killing three girls and wounding 
five others. He pleaded guilty but mentally ill to 
murder and is serving life in prison. 
Mar. 24, 1998 Jonesboro, AR Two boys, Mitchell Johnson, 13, and Andrew 
Golden, 11, both dressed in army-style camouflaged 
clothes, steal a van from Johnson’s home and load it 
with camping supplies, food, and seven weapons 
which they stole from Golden’s grandfather’s house. 
The boys arrive and open fire on their middle school 
from nearby woods, killing four girls and a teacher 
and wounding ten others. Both boys were convicted 
of murder and can be held until the age of 21. 
Incident coined “Jonesboro School Massacre.” 
May 19, 1998 Fayetteville, TN Three days before his graduation, Jacob Davis, 18, 
an honor student, opens fire at his high school, 
killing a classmate who was dating his ex-girlfriend. 
He was sentenced to life in prison. 
May 21, 1998 Springfield, OR Student Kipland “Kip” Kinkel, 17, kills his parents, 
William and Faith, both Spanish teachers at local 
high schools. He then arrives at class at Thurston 
High School and murders two of his classmates, and 
injures 25. His case has become one of the standard 
case studies in profiling students who bring guns to 
school for the purpose of murder. He was sentenced 
to nearly 112 years in prison. 
April 20, 1999 Littleton, CO Students Eric Harris, 18, and Dylan Klebold, 17, kill 
12 students and a teacher and wound 23 others at 
Columbine High School. They had plotted for a year 
to kill at least 500 and blow up their school. At the 
end of their hour-long rampage they turned their 





DATE LOCATION DESCRIPTION 
Nov. 19, 1999 Deming, NM Victor Cordova, 12-year-old boy arrives at school 
dressed in camouflage and shoots Aracceli Tena, a 
13-year-old girl, with a .22 caliber gun as students 
return from lunch. 
Feb. 29, 2000 Mount Morris Township, MI A first-grade boy at Buell Elementary School fatally 
shoots classmate Kayla Rolland, 6, after the two 
children has a verbal spat. He took the .32-caliber 
handgun from his uncle’s home where he was living. 
Mar. 10, 2000 Savannah, GA Darrell Ingram, 19, shoots and kills two students 
while they are leaving a school sponsored dance 
honoring the Beach High School girls basketball 
team’s state championship. 
May 26, 2000 Lake Worth, FL Nathaniel Brazill, 13, an honor student, shoots and 
kills his English teacher on the last day of classes 
after the teacher refused to let him talk to two girls in 
his classroom. Police said the seventh-grader had 
been sent home for throwing water balloons and 
returned to the school with a handgun he found in his 
grandfather’s dresser. 
Mar. 5, 2001 Santee, CA Santana High student Charles Andrew Williams, 15, 
opens fire with a pistol, killing two fellow students 
and wounding 13 others. 
Mar. 30, 2001 Gary, IN Donald R. Burt Jr., 17, shoots and kills fellow 
student outside Lew Wallace High School. 
May 15, 2001 Ennis, TX A 16-year-old sophomore upset over his relationship 
with a girl, takes 17 hostages in his English class. He 
shoots and kills himself and the girl. 
Jan.16, 2002 Grundy, VA Graduate student Peter Odighizuwa, 42, recently 
dismissed from Virginia’s Appalachian School of 
Law, returns to campus and kills the dean, a 
professor and a student before being tackled by 
students. The attack also wounds tree female 
students. 
Oct. 28, 2002 Tucson, AZ Failing University of Arizona Nursing College 
student and Gulf Was veteran Robert Flores, 40, 
walks into an instructor’s office and fatally shoots 
her. A few minutes later, armed with five guns, he 
enters one of his nursing classrooms and kills two 
more of his instructors before fatally shooting 
himself. 
April 24, 2003 Red Lion, PA Principal of Red Lion Area Junior High is fatally 
shot in the chest by a 14-year-old male student, who 
then commits suicide, as students gather in the 
cafeteria for breakfast. 
Sept. 24, 2003 Cold Spring, MN John Jason McLaughlin, 15, shoots and kills two 
students at Rocori High School. 
Mar. 21, 2005 Red Lake Indian Reservations, 
MN 
Jeff Weise, 16, shoots and kills his grandfather and 
grandfather’s girlfriend. He then proceeds to his high 
school where he kills a security guard, a teacher, and 
five students, and wounded seven other before 




DATE LOCATION DESCRIPTION 
Nov. 8, 2005 Jacksboro, TN Kenneth Bartley Jr., 15, shoots three administrators 
and kills one using a .22-caliber handgun at 
Campbell County High School. He plead guilty to a 
single count of second-degree murder and two 
counts of attempted second-degree murder, and was 
sentenced to 45 years in prison. 
Aug. 24, 2006 Essex, VT Christopher Williams, 27, went to Essex Elementary 
School in Vermont and when he could not find his 
ex-girlfriend – a teacher, he shot and killed one 
teacher and wounded another. Earlier, he had killed 
the ex-girlfriend’s mother. He attempted suicide but 
survived and was arrested. 
Aug, 30, 2006 Hillsborough, NC After shooting his father to death, a student opens 
fire at his high school, injuring two students. 
Deputies found guns, ammunition, and homemade 
pipe bombs in the student’s car. The student had 
emailed Columbine High’s principal telling him that 
it was “time the world remembered” the shooting at 
Columbine. 
Sept. 2, 2006 Shepherdstown, WV Douglas W. Pennington, 49, kills himself and his 
two sons, Logan, 26, and Benjamin, 24, during a 
visit to the campus of Shepherd University. 
Sept. 17, 2006 Pittsburgh, PA Five Duquesne University basketball players are 
wounded after a shooting on campus after a dance. 
One of the two shooters was allegedly upset that his 
date had talked to one of the athletes. 
Sept. 27, 2006 Bailey, CO Duane Roger Morrison, 53, enters Platte Canyon 
High School, claiming to be carrying a bomb. 
Morrison takes six female students hostage and 
sexually assaults them, then releases four. When 
police enter the classroom, Morrison opens fire 
before killing one hostage. The remaining hostage 
escapes. Paramedics confirm that Morrison had 
committed suicide. 
Sept. 29, 2006 Cazenovia, WI Eric Hainstock, 15, takes two guns into his rural 
school and fatally shoots the principal before being 
captured and arrested. 
Oct. 2, 2006 Nickel Mines, PA Charles Carl Roberts IV, 32, a milk-tank truck 
driver, walks into a one-room Amish schoolhouse 
with two rifles, a semi-automatic handgun, and 600 
rounds of ammunition. He selects all the female 
students and shoots them execution-style, killing five 
(ages 7-13) and seriously wounding six. He then 
shoots himself, having left his wife suicide notes 
beforehand. 
Jan. 3, 2007 Tacoma, WA Douglas Chantabouly, 18, enters Henry Foss High 
School and shoots and kills a fellow male student. 
The school proceeds to enter lockdown. Students are 
moved to the school’s gymnasium until police secure 
the building. Shortly after, Chantabouly is arrested 
walking through a nearby suburban neighborhood. 
Tacoma police believe that the shooting was due to a 
disagreement. 
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DATE LOCATION DESCRIPTION 
April 16, 2007 Blacksburg, VA Gunman, Scung-Hui Cho, 23, Kills 32 people and 
wounds 25 before committing suicide. The incident 
is comprised of two separate attacks, about two 
hours apart. One in a dorm the other in a classroom 
building. 
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